Department of Military Science
Wheaton College, Wheaton, Ill., 60187

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

APRIL

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 53 APRIL 1975 No. 3

A NEW POLICY FOR ISRAEL

By Stanley Hoffmann

SINCE the end of the Yom Kippur War, the main attempt at resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the step-by-step approach initiated by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Enormous energy has been spent in Washington and in Israel on negotiating disengagement agreements with Egypt and with Syria, and on preparing for a new limited agreement with Egypt. But whether or not the current effort succeeds, we are reaching the end of this particular road. The time has come to look at the long term, to learn lessons from the obstacles the current method has met, and to resort to a new diplomatic strategy.

My own conviction is that it is time for a sweeping Israeli initiative aimed at a peace settlement. The United States will remain an indispensable participant in the effort. But instead of what is essentially an American policy groping to bring gradual peace to the parties, we now need a decisive effort by the party whose future existence and security are at stake, whose role in the Middle East has been the heart of the matter since 1948, and which finds itself on the defensive. For it is its destiny that is being shaped, and it has a vital interest both in remaining its own master and in reaching with its adversaries a settlement that cannot be seen as the result of an outside power's skill at exploiting temporary circumstances.

II

After 15 months of American efforts and after the successes of the Palestine Liberation Organization at Rabat and at the United Nations, the leaders of Israel have had to face two serious problems.

The first is the choice of a method toward a settlement. Here, there is a serious division on how to proceed. But there are also some important common features in their views. The first is a sense of dependence on Henry Kissinger, who is in a way the most important political personality of Israel. This dependence is accepted with hope and

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gratitude by some; it breeds misgivings in others. But everybody, for the time being at least, believes that—for better or worse—he has the key to the locked door that separates Israel from the Arab world. A second common feature is a profound distrust of the Soviet Union, seen both as an intriguing great power pursuing great-power interests and as a potential force for social revolution and disruption in the Arab world. Not all Israeli Sovietologists agree with this view, but it is that of the policy-makers. A third common feature is a set of contradictions, resulting from the sense of dependence on the United States and distrust of the Soviet Union. Concerning the United States, even the officials who are most obviously converted to America's approach are keen on avoiding telling Mr. Kissinger what Israel's views of an ultimate settlement should be. They are willing to entrust him with the next step, because they feel that they have no choice, but they do not want to reveal too much of their final hand, not only because they do not agree among themselves but also because they do not want to have their whole fate negotiated by the United States.

Finally, they note that there is a potential conflict of priorities. American priorities in the Middle East are what could be called great-power relations: how to keep the Soviet Union contained, or out; how to deal with the oil producers so that they do not strangulate the industrial powers, provoke crises in the American alliance, etc. And Israel fits in with that strategy. Israel's priorities are quite different: essentially, its first concern is relations with the Arab world. From that conflict of priorities even the most pro-American Israelis realize that there could come a clash in strategies later on. Also, even those who are most pro-American would not like to have superpower forces stationed in the Middle East as the end result. But even those who are most anti-Soviet realize that there will not be a settlement without including the Soviet Union somehow, and even those who ask that Egypt drop its Soviet connection as a way of showing its goodwill toward peace would also, like Egypt, prefer to be able to play with both superpowers, and to have diplomatic relations with Moscow, however much they distrust the Soviet Union.

The division on how to proceed opposes the partisans of the step-by-step approach, who include the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, and those who would prefer the "Geneva method." The step-by-step approach represented a blend of America's two earlier courses between which Washington had oscillated since 1948: a "great-power" approach which aimed at keeping the Arab-Israeli conflict local, and at trying to find a solution either through the action of the permanent members of the Security Council or through Soviet-

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American cooperation; and a "strategy of commitment," which developed after the Soviets' own shift of policy against Israel, and consisted of firm American military and diplomatic support to Israel. Like the "strategy of commitment," the step-by-step approach stressed American support to Israel and tried to contain the Soviets by shutting them out diplomatically. Like the "great-power" approach, it aimed at a settlement through outside efforts, and at restoring America's position in the Arab world. (Paradoxically, the blend also meant that the United States is now to some degree arming both sides.)

Moreover, this policy represented a blend of necessity and interest. As for necessity, Kissinger, in November 1973, had discovered in President Sadat a man eager for American friendship and willing to move cautiously toward peace with Israel. But Sadat could not "betray the Arab cause" by making a separate deal with Israel. Step-by-step agreements could set in motion a process in which Egypt would gradually get its lost territory back. Israel, in turn, would obtain assurances of nonbelligerence, in such a way that Sadat could not be accused of repudiating Nasser's ideal of Arab solidarity and would not have to grant Israel full recognition while other Arab states still refused to recognize the existence of the Jewish state. Similarly, the deadlocks of Israeli politics made it impossible for any Israeli government to shift abruptly from immobilism to a settlement involving a retreat from most of the occupied territories, at a moment when its Arab enemies were still unwilling to grant Israel formal recognition.

The approach was also likely to be beneficial both to the United States and to Israel. For Israel what was involved was a gamble on the good effects of time. At home, it was in the interest of the Israeli government to dispose of a long period of peace during which public opinion would recover from the trauma of October 1973, regain confidence in Israel's strength, accept the idea of gradual retreats, and find in strength a reason for magnanimity. Externally, it was in Israel's interest not to engage in a global negotiation with the Arabs while they were elated by the success of their oil strategy. Israel would benefit from dragging out matters until the time when Kissinger's common front of the consumer countries, set up to deal both with the problem of energy independence and with the problem of recycling the petrodollars, had restored the broken world balance.

A step-by-step approach was also in Washington's interest. At home, Kissinger had to deal with the powerful forces that had traditionally supported Israel—in the press and in Congress especially. A return to the prewar White House policy of pro-Israeli passivity was impossible. Merely to provide Israel with weapons without press-

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ing toward a settlement would have meant the certainty of more wars, new confrontations with Moscow, a splendid opportunity for the Soviets to expand their influence in the Middle East, a widening breach with Western Europe and Japan (i.e., no possibility of a common oil strategy under U.S. leadership), and the sacrifice of U.S. positions in friendly Arab countries. But a shift to maximum pressure on Israel toward a full settlement involving a retreat from the occupied territories, concessions on Jerusalem, and an immediate tackling of that most difficult of all issues, that of the Palestinians—all of this in apparent collusion with Moscow—would have seriously weakened the domestic base of Kissinger's foreign policy. He strenuously tried to convince Jewish leaders in the United States both that *some* movement was unavoidable and that it would serve to protect rather than undermine Israel. Externally, this approach allowed Kissinger to exploit Egypt's distaste for the Soviets, and to keep the Soviets—as well as the Europeans—out of the bargaining; it was complicated enough without additional outside interference. Moreover, only the United States could "deliver the goods" to Egypt and Syria.

In Israel today, what still appears decisive to many is Egypt's situation. Will Egypt define its national interest narrowly (as it did through the late 1930s) or will it continue to define it in a pan-Arab way? The step-by-step approach is seen as the only one that might allow one to find out. For most Israelis understand that Sadat cannot cut his ties to the other Arab countries openly or rapidly, that there is a need for a period of defusing and transition. Therefore the Israeli government is willing to sign an intermediate agreement which serves both sides. This of course also suits Israel's own psychological reluctance to think too much about the end of the road.

However, there are increasing doubts about the validity of this bet. First of all, even if there is a new agreement with Egypt, what would be the next? Nobody seems to see much room for a second disengagement agreement with Syria; here, the obstacle is geography. Sinai is a huge desert; the Golan Heights are narrow and almost impossible to slice up. Whoever controls its summits dominates either the Syrian or the Israeli valleys. So there is not very much leeway in between last year's disengagement and literally either war or peace with Syria.

Is there a Jordanian step? There was a hope that perhaps, after Egypt, Israel might conclude an agreement with Jordan which would deal not with the West Bank but with the other issues that concern both Israel and Jordan. With that view, there are two problems. One is that these issues are entirely minor with the exception of Jerusalem, which is crucial and cannot be handled only by Jordan and by Israel

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in a partial agreement. Also, the requirement for good Israeli relations with the King of Jordan is that they not be formalized, because he cannot formalize them without exposing himself to charges and threats.

Second, concerning a new agreement with Egypt itself, one needs to find a devilishly clever formula. The agreement must be ambiguous enough to protect Egypt from other Arab charges of treason (which would undoubtedly come if Egypt granted formal nonbelligerence or a promise of several years of nonaggression to Israel), yet clear enough to protect Israel from new pressures from Cairo just a few months later on behalf of Egypt and of the other Arab states and forces. Diplomacy is the art of reconciling irreconcilables, and history is full of agreements which are ambiguous enough to one side and clear enough to the other, but normally there comes a moment or an event or a person that is a terrible clarifier or simplifier, and at that point agreement collapses. Moreover, finding the right formula is difficult in itself, for it means writing an agreement by which the Israelis give up very tangible territory and the Egyptians give up something which is not so important politically as to weaken Egypt's position in the Arab world, yet consists of more than mere words that almost everybody in Israel would denounce as meaningless.

In the negotiation of this difficult formula, there are beginning to be serious doubts about who is the cat and who is the mouse, or who is the salami. Mr. Kissinger may be applying salami tactics, but it is not entirely clear to whom. Is Egypt, is the Arab world the salami? Is this a process by which gradually the links among Egypt, Syria, the PLO, Saudi Arabia, are being loosened, so that Israel gains some breathing space, or is it a process by which Israel is gradually pushed back piece by piece without anything really tangible being given up in exchange by the other side?

President Sadat, who has a way of hiding behind the smoke screen of countless interviews, in each one of which he says something different so as to maximize his freedom of maneuver, is clever enough not only to tie the size of his concessions to the willingness of Israel to move on other fronts—Syria and the PLO—as well, but also to suggest that his concessions will take the form of assurances, not to Israel, but to Kissinger. In effect, this puts the United States in the unhappy position both of having to pressure Israel for the kind of moves that will release those assurances *and* of answering for Israel's future good behavior so that no reason or pretext for an Egyptian cancellation of those assurances arises. Thus Sadat tries to exploit simultaneously America's mediating effort—in order to get back ter-

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ritories—and America's special link with Israel—in order to keep Israel both retreating and restrained. Any significant disengagement agreement with Cairo could therefore have the effect of forcing Israel to renounce any possibility of preemptive action even against a fully armed and mobilizing Syria—so as not to force Sadat to revoke his concessions—and, in the event that Syria should attack Israel first, to rely on the dubious hope that Egypt, faithful to its word, would remain passive.

Hence another debate which goes on in Israel: on whose side is time? Many Israelis have come to fear that time may be on the Arabs' side. If one looks at the past, one finds that the curve of inter-Arab relations rises toward cooperation, if not unity; certainly Rabat suggests that time does not guarantee a weakening of the links in the Arab chain. Moreover, on whom (as between Egypt and Israel) will there be greater American pressure for concessions? The Israelis remember with some trepidation that in the second half of October 1973 it was on Israel that the hardest pressure was put (in their own best interest of course, as seen by Mr. Kissinger). This may happen again, precisely because Mr. Kissinger argues that if Israel should demand the impossible from Mr. Sadat, Mr. Sadat will not be able to demonstrate his goodwill. This, in turn, poses again the question of who is manipulating whom.

There is still another reason why the step-by-step approach may actually put time on the Arabs' side. For Israel, because of Egypt's tactics, each new step entails, directly or obliquely, marginally or importantly, dealing with the essential: security, i.e., giving away part of the only Israeli trump: occupied territory. But the Arabs, in return, are not giving away any part of their trump: nonrecognition. *That* will have to wait for the final step, by which time Israel's bargaining power will have shrunk. Is trading territory for formulas the best use of time? Does not the length of the process provide Israel's adversaries with opportunities for tightening the noose, rather than with occasions for falling apart?

A final argument against the step-by-step approach refers to domestic affairs within Israel. Again time is not necessarily an ally of the policy. Small concessions for limited periods of time, leading only to renewed demands for more concessions without peace, mean that shortly before the period ends there is maximum pressure on Israel to make a new concession in order to have a new agreement; there is an artificial crisis aimed at creating the "right" international climate. This, internally, increases psychological resistance and plays, in effect, into the hands of the right-wing opposition, both outside and within

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the government. Whereas the external effects of time can be the subject of debate, there is now little doubt that within Israel any policy that postpones a settlement has a very dangerous effect in two important respects.

First, there is a pressure for the establishment of new Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. On the whole, the government has resisted and rebuffed these on the West Bank. It has not resisted them, and in fact it has promoted and financed them in Jerusalem and on the Golan Heights, perhaps because of the theory of bargaining chips. But we know from the field of arms control that bargaining chips may complicate rather than facilitate agreements. Another internal danger has to do with the new generation of Israelis, those who have come from Arab countries or from the Soviet Union, and are being integrated into Israeli society. If it has been difficult for Israel to make peace with the Arabs and to find accommodation with the Soviet Union under the present establishment and leadership, it will be far more difficult when this establishment is largely or partly composed of people who, because of what they have suffered in Arab countries or in the Soviet Union, hate the Soviet Union and the Arab countries with a perfectly understandable but flaming passion.

The debate over the step-by-step approach is accompanied by a debate about the alternative—a resumption of the Geneva conference. The opponents of Geneva rely on four arguments. First, when all the Arab opponents of Israel are under the same roof, there is a premium on intransigence. Today, Egypt can express its preference for peace and its willingness to achieve it gradually despite Syria's hard line and the PLO's recriminations. At Geneva, the toughest would set the norm—as they did at Rabat. Second, the step-by-step approach postpones the most difficult problem—the PLO—which would be the first to surface in Geneva, thus wrecking the conference or at least putting Israel on the spot immediately, over an issue that is domestically explosive. Third, Geneva reintroduces the Soviet Union. One of the great merits of the step-by-step approach, in Israeli eyes, is that it keeps the Soviet devil out. Fourth, in Geneva, the difference in priorities between the United States and Israel (which is implicit already in the step-by-step process) would become explicit. The United States, on good terms not only with Israel but with several Arab states, might put even stronger pressure on Israel in order to reach a settlement.

However, at present, there is a bizarre coalition of Israelis who are favorable to a return to Geneva. Some would like to go to Geneva because they think that there is at least a chance for a general settle-

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ment there, which the step-by-step method squanders by running into too many obstacles. These people think that leaping over those obstacles and facing the whole problem at once makes more sense than trying to detach elements of a chain that seems to be increasingly solid. But a return to Geneva is also favored by people, either outside the government on its Right or in the government, who believe that Geneva would show once and for all that one cannot really reach peace with the Arabs. The United States or the Soviet Union would no longer be able to say to Israel: "If you are not cooperative, we may have to go to Geneva." Recent statements of Abba Eban and of the Minister of Defense, Shimon Peres, create the impression that Geneva has become the refuge of both the prudent optimists and of the deep pessimists who want to demonstrate that there is no Geneva solution.

Then there is the specific problem of the Palestinians. Here again Israeli opinion shows some common features. There has been a considerable evolution since 1973. There is no longer any attempt to deny that there is a Palestinian problem, or to deny that there is a Palestinian people, although there are many different views about what the Palestinian people is. However, there still is a common refusal to deal with Palestinian organizations that do not recognize Israel's own existence and the legitimacy of the state of Israel. There is also a fear that any Palestinian organization that would negotiate with Israel would be immediately outflanked by an extremist faction, which would then become the rallying point, so that negotiations would in fact not lead anywhere. The official policy comes close to that old French adage "it is urgent to do nothing," it is urgent to wait.

And what appears impossible—dealing with the PLO—is also rationalized as undesirable. A negotiation with the PLO would undermine King Hussein, with whom there are many common interests, including the interest in not having in between Israel and Jordan a revolutionary state out to destroy both. Less convincing is the second argument: the hope that if one does not deal with the PLO long enough, it will fade away—that it will lose its influence if it does not achieve anything. In other words, the PLO may not really be representative, and if one just waits long enough and avoids building it up, it will lose its aura of success, which any revolutionary movement needs. Hussein will then come back into the picture, and there is still a preference for a solution negotiated with him rather than with the PLO, for a number of reasons. One of these is that there are about as many Palestinians on the East Bank as on the West Bank, so that any separate Palestinian West Bank state would be a recipe for instability anyhow. Another reason is that one can perhaps demilitarize

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part of a Jordanian state including the West Bank, but it is difficult to demilitarize a whole state.

How realistic is the hope that the PLO will fade away? Washington as well as Israel had hoped that Rabat would not consecrate the PLO. The very fact that at Rabat it was Saudi Arabia which more or less imposed the final formula recognizing the PLO as representative of all Palestinians makes one a bit suspicious about the Israelis' reasoning. It may very well be that since Saudi Arabia has a particular interest in Jerusalem it has chosen to support the one organization whose state, if it ever gets one, would have to have Jerusalem as its capital because it could not be anywhere else, whereas a Jordan with the West Bank would still have its capital in Amman and could make compromises about Jerusalem more easily.

One must remember that a "Jordanian solution" was possible for many years, before the rise of the PLO, and that it failed to materialize. To be sure, Israel's terms for returning part or all of the West Bank might now become more generous; but Hussein is less than ever able to make a final deal before the other Arab states, and they are now pressing either entirely for a PLO monopoly or at least for a PLO role.

One can also ask oneself whether the Israeli policy of not doing anything now is based on any real knowledge of what is actually happening among the Palestinians. In Israel, one hears very conflicting estimates. Some believe that what is happening on the West Bank is the gradual Jordanization of the Palestinians. Others think that what one can expect on the East Bank in the long run is the gradual Palestinization of the Jordanians. It is clear that the inhabitants of the West Bank, the notables and the people who follow them, are not going to reveal their hands while they are still both a stake of international politics and under military occupation. But there is no doubt that there is sympathy for the PLO, and one must remember, when one talks of the effect of failure, that the PLO's international emergence followed its crushing defeat by Jordan in 1970.

What are the alternatives suggested for the Palestinian problem? The most "dovish" is the one recommended by Nahum Goldmann, the President of the World Jewish Congress.[1] It proposes the evacuation of the West Bank by Israel, a temporary U.N. administration and plebiscite on independence vs. confederation with Jordan, and meanwhile either the creation of a Palestinian government in exile including but not limited to the PLO, or an invitation to Arafat to come to Geneva on the basis of Resolution 242. This essentially as-

[1] Interview in *Le Monde* (Paris), January 9, 1975, p. 5.

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sumes the willingness of the Palestinians to moderate their position and to accept merely a West Bank state. It is a proposal that practically nobody in Israel endorses. Some Israelis put forward a much more limited and tactical notion: the idea that Israel should at least publicly recognize the right of the Palestinians to self-determination, as long as the Palestinians recognize the Israeli right to self-determination. This is not the policy adopted by the government, precisely because it leaves the ultimate fate of the West Bank to decisions among the Arabs; if the outcome should favor the PLO, the present government would not accept it. It is also suggested that any prime minister who would offer this formula (comparable to what de Gaulle had offered for Algeria in 1959) would find himself without a government.

As for the hawks' alternatives, the most extreme is the annexation of the West Bank, for reasons in which strategy and Biblical references are mixed, while the most surprising is the notion of a Jordanian-Israeli common market and common army on the West Bank. This latter solution appears remarkably utopian, not only because it would require between the Jordanians and the Israelis a degree of cooperation which even the Europeans have not achieved, but also because it is very hard to imagine any Jordanian government accepting it and surviving.

III

Whether or not Secretary Kissinger succeeds in his current efforts, it is essential for Israel to think about its ultimate goals. Success would mean one or more disengagement agreements, a more or less limited period of assured non-war. But it would also mean a continuing arms buildup, new Arab pressures for further Israeli withdrawals, and the absence of recognition and peace. Failure would mean an immediate or rapid danger of war. The difference between success and failure is important—but not decisive, precisely insofar as the situation of neither-peace-nor-war, however stabilized new gradual agreements might make it appear, would be no more than an armistice, with worried and partly demoralized Israelis, unsatisfied yet encouraged Arabs. There would remain a choice between a resumption of war, and a new march to peace. Success of the gradual approach gives a chance to the latter but is no substitute for it. It is merely a prelude.

The heart of the present Israeli strategy is the Israeli-American connection. When we turn to the long run, it is with that link that we must begin. The present relationship, the present uneasy symbiosis between Premier Rabin and Secretary Kissinger, is fraught with

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potential unhappiness. One does not have to be a Gaullist to believe that there is a risk in entrusting somebody else with one's fate, even when one feels one has no choice. Furthermore, the conflict of priorities, already noted, breeds a constant and double risk of mutual recrimination: the Israelis feeling that the United States because of its priorities, of its need to have an Arab policy, may sacrifice (unknowingly, of course) some essential Israeli interests, and the United States becoming exasperated with the obstinacy of Israelis.

There are also risks of serious misunderstandings in the Israeli-American association. Today, it is not always easy to know who is the tail and who is the dog. Mr. Kissinger has a way of saying to his visitors: "I have to propose the following steps, because they are the only ones acceptable to Israel"; but one can hear from the Israeli officials that they are following the same course because they want to help Mr. Kissinger. Is the exclusion of the Soviet Union something Mr. Kissinger has accepted because it is in Israel's interest? Is it something Israel accepts because it's in Mr. Kissinger's strategy? Is the refusal to do anything that might undermine Hussein primarily an American or primarily an Israeli interest? It is not always clear. Tomorrow, another misunderstanding is possible: Mr. Kissinger, a solo performer, is a master at flexibility; the one thing he cannot tolerate is failure. If the step-by-step approach leads nowhere—either because there is no next step or because it is clear that the next step will not be followed by any more—he will go to Geneva. He has already suggested this. It is not at all clear whether those Israelis whom he has so thoroughly convinced of all of the disasters of Geneva are ready for it. The people who are ready for Geneva are the people who most disagree with him, and the people who most agree with him are those who, in a rigid parliamentary and governmental situation, have staked their careers on the avoidance of Geneva.

There is a long-range risk of misunderstanding also. The Israeli hard-liners—and this means not only members of the opposition coalition Likud but very important members of the cabinet—when asked what they would like America's role to be (instead of the step-by-step policy which they denounce) reply that they don't want too much from Washington: the United States should just give Israel weapons in numbers sufficient to compensate the Arab inflow of arms; America's diplomatic role is simply to neutralize the Soviet Union. Behind that double shield, Israel would take care of itself.

This "American alternative" strikes me as untenable, first of all because of an inherent contradiction. If the United States wants to "neutralize" the Soviet Union, it has to have an Arab policy. It has to

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be present in Egypt, in Saudi Arabia, in Jordan, and that means putting pressure on Israel, which is precisely what hard-liners do not want. Furthermore, there is a built-in hopelessness in this policy. Externally, it offers no prospect but continuing reliance on situations of strength and risks of war. Also, it means that hard-liners put all their American hopes first of all in Senator Jackson, and second, in the perpetuation of the cold war. They misread current American policy, by seeing in it an excessively "soft" and prudent course corresponding to a post-Vietnam weakening of resolve and battle-fatigue with world responsibility. Not only is this an inaccurate reading of Secretary Kissinger, who does not suffer from the Munich syndrome, and seems in fact haunted by the fear of a decline of the West. It is also a mistake for Israelis to want to base their association with the United States on purely strategic and anti-Soviet arguments, and, in terms of American politics, to want to associate only with the sector represented by Senator Jackson.

If this is an Israeli alternative to the present U.S.-Israeli relationship, what alternatives have been offered by Americans? Richard Ullman, in the last issue of *Foreign Affairs*,[2] argued for an American military guarantee to and military presence in Israel. But he did not make it clear whether it would be a guarantee after a settlement, or a guarantee before, aimed at making Israelis more confident about withdrawals and concessions. If it is a guarantee after a settlement, we are left with the problem of how to get the settlement. If it is a guarantee aimed at facilitating a settlement, yet preceding it, it introduces even more blackmail into Israeli-American relations than the present relationship, while probably weakening United States leverage in the Arab world. Ullman's argument that Sadat, Hussein and Faisal would welcome such a commitment as long as it was accompanied by Israeli withdrawals may be correct, but only if the United States puts maximum pressure on Israel for withdrawals that may—like the present course—merely shrink Israeli-held territory without anything tangible in return.

In short, his plan is not in Israel's long-term interest (unless it comes *after* a settlement), for Israel's long-term interest is not merely deterrence of an Arab attack, it is peace, i.e., a settlement. It would not solve the problems extant between the Arab countries and Israel, and especially not the PLO problem; it would exacerbate Arab perceptions of Israel as a kind of Western spearhead; and, as some

[2] Richard Ullman, "After Rabat: Middle East Risks and American Roles," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1975, pp. 284 ff. *Editor's note:* further discussion of Mr. Ullman's article will be found in the Correspondence Section of this issue, at pp. 577–80.

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Israelis put it, it would even complicate matters for Israel by limiting present Israeli freedom of movement in areas such as southern Lebanon: if one is a military ally of the United States, every retaliation will have to be checked with Washington, which may have good reasons for not approving.

Nor would a guarantee before a settlement be desirable for the United States, where it would be seen as giving Israel a kind of lien on Washington's Middle Eastern policy and as facilitating the task of the Soviet Union in Arab countries. For Moscow could point out that it had always told them that the Israelis are merely a tool of the United States. The guarantee would become a substitute for a settlement, and, as in so many alliances between a distant Protector and an exposed small ally, there would remain a fundamental ambiguity about who maneuvers whom. Every incident that occurred in the absence or in the course of withdrawals would confront Washington with the unwelcome choice of either carrying out its commitment, however reluctantly, or reneging on it. It is most unlikely that Congress would undertake *this* kind of a formal commitment. Thus, Washington would be reluctant to underwrite Israel too much, and Israel would be reluctant to tie itself down too much.

Is there any other American alternative? Many Jewish Americans have argued that the basis of the American-Israeli relationship should be an unassailable moral link resting in turn on an unassailable moral position of Israel. Such a link is indeed the best explanation of American support to Israel in the past. To maintain this bond we must take a hard look both at the moral roots of Israel's position, and at the moral implications for its foreign policy.

Unquestionably, there *is* an Israeli right to existence and security and an Israeli claim on other nations, not for the maintenance of the occupied territories, but for the survival and safety of Israel as a state. As Raymond Aron wrote shortly before the Six-Day War, any Westerner, in fact anybody, who would let this country be destroyed could not face himself anymore. Even if one believes that the creation of the state of Israel repaired one historical injustice at the cost of a new one perpetrated on Palestine's Arabs, the reparation of that injustice cannot be allowed to threaten Israel's own right to live. Even those who believe that the ideal solution is a "binational state" in former Palestine should realize that this has no chance of leaping from the printed page to political reality as long as one side sees in this formula a pretext for its own annihilation as a self-governing entity, and the other sees in it a weapon against the other's existence.

On the other hand, the argument that Israel has a right to total

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and unconditional support for whatever its policy, because of the Nazi holocaust, I find impossible to accept, especially since a gruesome, almost unprecedented moral and political tragedy is thus turned into a source of political blackmail. Nor can we believe that there is an Israeli monopoly on morality. There *is* a claim of the other side also, which is precisely what makes the problem so difficult. There are conflicting claims of justice on the same land. This means at a minimum that while there is a compelling Israeli right to its security and survival in its pre-1967 borders, there is no such right for the occupied territories.

It follows that the policy of Israel will be both more unassailable morally and more persuasive if it includes a clear and categorical willingness to return the occupied territories. (I shall state later what Israel is entitled to demand and receive in exchange.) It follows also that Israeli policy should recognize the avoidance of another war as an absolutely crucial priority.

Practically nobody in Israel wants war—people and leaders alike have known war in all its horror five times (for one must include the "war of attrition" with Egypt in 1969–70). But there is a reluctance to envisage broad concessions to opponents suspected of wanting not finite gains but the end of Israel. There is a belief that there may finally be no choice other than that between war and surrender. And yet it is morally imperative that Israel not provide its opponents with any reason for starting a new war to reconquer the territories lost in 1967, or for obliging Israel to preempt.

For another war would surely be a disaster, even if it is "only" a war of attrition at the outset. Wars of attrition, even if they do not escalate, *are* wars and cause heavy casualties. These also have a way, sooner or later, of escalating into full wars. If in the absence of a second set of disengagement agreements—or indeed at any time—there should be a war between Egypt and Israel, or a war between Israel and Syria, which it would be very hard for Egypt not to join, then one would face dismal prospects. This war, fought with the new sophisticated weapons accumulated by both sides, could be infinitely more destructive than anything in the past. More than in 1973, Israel's fate would depend on the American tie, and strains on that tie would be among the immense hazards involved.

If the Arabs were to impose another oil embargo, the war could also escalate geographically, providing Washington with the opportunity that some American policy analysts or advisers seem to be praying for, of seizing oil fields in the Persian Gulf. While this is not the place to argue in detail against such a course, it may be necessary to

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summarize the main objections, precisely because some of Israel's supporters have come to believe that the only alternative to a show of force in the whole Middle East is a Munich-like appeasement at the expense of Israel *and* of the industrial powers. On this view, a war might seem to provide a way of cutting the entire Gordian knot in one bold stroke.

However "easy" the military aspects may be, there are five huge political drawbacks. The targets of our attack would be the more conservative pro-Western and anti-Soviet regimes in the Arab world: they would in all likelihood be replaced by more extreme ones. Also, inflicting new humiliations on the Arab world, whatever it might do for resolving the world problem of oil and petrodollars, would not exactly be devised to enhance the chances for peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Even if Western Europe and Japan might be the beneficiaries of an American "oil seizure," the operation itself would strain the alliances more than any other American policy since 1947. Even if the Soviets remain militarily passive or restrained, they would gain huge opportunities for influence in the Middle East (even conservative Middle Eastern regimes might not reject Soviet offers of cooperation any more than Churchill rejected an alliance with Moscow against the common enemy in World War II). Even though they are themselves victims of the rise in oil prices, nations of the "Fourth World" would react against an American use of force, and the whole future of "North-South relations," the biggest coming world issue, would be pushed in a disastrous direction. A policy that avoids force, on the other hand, has far better chances of orienting these relations in the direction of interdependence, of letting strains between the "new rich" and the poor develop, and of leading to a gradual and sensible redistribution of world resources.

Finally, even if the next Arab-Israeli wars were like the previous ones and did not escalate in any way, they would offer no prospect for a political settlement achieved by Israel at the Arabs' expense. Either, as after 1967, the defeated Arabs would merely rebuild their strength until the next round, or else the great powers would do what they have not done before: impose a settlement that would ipso facto wound the pride of the Israelis and leave deep resentments throughout the Middle East. If there are two things that Israel cannot afford, one is a defeat because it might indeed be destroyed (whereas the Arabs can suffer many defeats and anyhow hope to be rescued) and the other is another major victory, because it would not lead to settlement but to headaches, problems, commitments, entanglements which would tie the Israeli body politic in knots.

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Thus, our discussion of an unassailable moral position for Israel brings us to this question: what political risks should Israel accept in order to maximize the chances of avoiding war? How could Israel act in such a way that, if war breaks out nevertheless, the onus for it would be unassailably on the other side? The answer lies in a new, long-run Israeli strategy aimed at achieving a general settlement. The strategy should be based on the following considerations:

First, the idea of a settlement must confront a central paradox. Ultimately, it is *Israel,* not the United States, which has to live with the Arabs in the Middle East. It is Israel's future which is being discussed. It is Israel's integration into the area which must be achieved. For there is something absurd as well as dangerous in the present situation, which is one of isolation—physical and mental—of Israel from its neighbors, and indeed from much of the outside world. The United States is almost the only pipeline to the world. What goes on among the Arab neighbors is a matter of guesswork. This is the result largely of a recurrent state of war, of a protracted state of siege. It is imperative that the siege be lifted, and that Israel be able to get out of the Hobbesian universe, with its two chief features: obsession and uncertainty. It is imperative for Israel's own future that the weight of the state-of-war on the budget and balance of payments be reduced. The only alternative is a drastic reduction in the standard of living that would both provoke serious inner tensions if it goes too far and increase the appeal of "hawkish" solutions.

Therefore the policy to be followed, whether or not it succeeds in leading to peace, ought to be primarily Israel's policy rather than America's. Rather than letting concessions be squeezed out of them by the gentle coaxing and the subtle threats of Mr. Kissinger, the Israelis should—even if this does not lead anywhere at once—seize the initiative toward neighbors who will remain their neighbors just as France remains the neighbor of Germany, and with whom permanent war is as hopeless as was the prospect of permanent war in Algeria.

On the other hand, and this is why we are in the presence of a paradox, the settlement itself *cannot* be left to the parties alone. The Israelis have come to recognize this: they had waited from 1967 to 1973 for the direct talks that never came. The settlement itself will not be negotiable by the parties only; other powers will have to play brokers and put pressure on the parties. If there should be a settlement, it will require external enforcement and protection also. However, it *does* make a difference whether the outside world is there to help the parties reach their own agreements and stick to their word,

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or whether it is there to impose its own views and exert its own tutelage. The latter is a formula for future trouble and instability.

Second, Israel cannot expect the United States to continue to be the only outside power directly involved in the quest for a settlement. After the next disengagement agreement with Egypt, if there is one, the United States will have done about as much as it can do in dragging concessions out of both sides. After that, despite Mr. Kissinger's apparent need to solve absolutely everything alone, it does not seem that he can do it any more, partly because his leverage will have been exhausted, and partly because there are other actors in the area over whom his influence is small—such as the PLO. Indeed, any Egyptian-Israeli agreement that is not linked to Israeli concessions to Syria and the Palestinians is likely to make Syria and the Palestinians more distrustful and uncooperative.

This brings us to the problem of the Soviet Union. There are as many views about Soviet interests in the Middle East as there are Sovietologists, and the Soviets themselves, unlike our own officials, do not publish a yearly State of the World message in which they describe their interests in sententious epigrams. We are obliged to guess and to gamble. The present situation is not exactly ideal for Moscow. One could have argued easily that between 1967 and 1973 the state of neither-peace-nor-war served Soviet interests. This may not be the case any more. There are two major risks for Moscow: a risk of loss of control and a risk of loss of influence. The two are not the same. Even those countries in which there is a Soviet influence, such as Syria, are perfectly capable of following their own course and of starting to move at moments when the Soviet Union would not want it. Thus there is the danger, with which we are very familiar, of the superpower being dragged into the unknown or the unwanted by its clients, something which the Soviet Union, even more than any other great power, has always resisted. This may explain why it is Moscow rather than Cairo which drags its feet in the Soviet-Egyptian controversy. Moscow holds back its more advanced weapons unless they are accompanied by Soviet advisers and other assurances of Soviet control. Moreover, the present situation, it is clear, does not enlarge the sphere of Soviet influence, which is strong in Iraq, relatively so in Syria and with the PLO—and that is all, in the main. Of course it might increase again if there is a war, but then we are back to the issue of control: a war entails a danger of confrontation with the United States.

If one analyzes the behavior of the Arabs since October 1973, one gets the impression that here, too, arises the question of who is the tail

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and who is the dog: the Arabs are able to use the Soviet Union at least as much as the other way around. As for OPEC's oil strategy, it is being waged without Soviet involvement, and increases the Arabs' ability to develop their own policies—including buying or building weapons—without relying too much on Moscow. The only thing which could definitely sink or destroy Soviet influence in the Middle East would be the disappearance of the state of Israel. If there were no Israel, there would be many more Arabs turning to Washington for their development needs and very few Arabs going to Moscow. This in itself creates a Soviet incentive for keeping that "minor irritant," Israel, alive.

On balance, what is known as a Geneva-type settlement would have the advantage of recognizing formally something which the Soviets have all over the world tried to get consecrated as if this were the key objective of their policy: to put on sacred, hallowed paper, known as a treaty, the Soviet right to have a say in the area. It is not enough for them to have a say de facto, just as they have had their glacis in Europe de facto; they also want it de jure.

This might be worth granting, since I do not think that the Soviets could by themselves really endanger the stability of the area as much as seems feared all over Israel. The area does not need the Soviet Union to have its stability endangered! Natural forces can take care of that extremely well—especially in the absence of peace. There is very little to justify the fear that Geneva would somehow put the Arab world, which is getting richer, under Soviet control.

There is a counterargument that in the absence of a settlement Soviet influence would actually shrink: that the Arab states would get economically and financially involved with the West and Japan, whereas Geneva, by giving to the U.S.S.R. an important position as negotiator and guarantor, would reverse this trend. However, we are faced with a vicious circle. This very Arab involvement only puts more pressure on the United States to use its influence in Israel in order to push Israel back—without Israel obtaining a settlement in return. And should the United States refuse to carry such a burden, or fail to deliver the goods, there is nothing but the Sisyphean prospect of more wars—which inevitably re-injects Moscow into the picture, as protector of the Arabs against ignominious defeat, and as pressurer on Washington to stop Israeli advances.

IV

These reflections suggest some major guidelines. The first one is that Israel should take the initiative of demanding an overall peace

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agreement, to be negotiated with its Arab opponents, and with the help of outside powers. In order to make such an agreement possible, Israel should at the same time declare what, in its eyes, constitutes the essential features of the agreement. There is, of course, a risk in international negotiations that whatever are presented as maximum concessions and minimum demands become treated as minimum concessions and maximum demands. But there are greater risks in the present stance: especially the risk that it leads nowhere or only to unmatched concessions by Israel. What is required is a willingness on the part of Israel, in exchange for its recognition and the signature of a peace treaty, to accept categorically and in specific terms its withdrawal from occupied territories. What Israel should emphasize is the creation of conditions under which this restitution would not threaten its security, instead of *subordinating* a recognition of the Arab right to these territories to the prior creation of these conditions. Thus, the emphasis would not be, let us say, on the strategic need for *Israel* to remain on the Golan Heights but on the danger that would exist if *Syrian armies* were again on the Golan Heights.

Israel should present its final view, concealed until now, if only in order to avoid giving the Arabs the impression that it is making its gradual concessions and is retreating due to weakness and outside pressure, with its back to the wall. Since most people within Israel and outside assume that, at the end, something very much like a return to the 1967 borders will be unavoidable, an Israeli initiative would have the advantage of shifting attention and the burden of proof. Instead of Israel having to prove its willingness to withdraw and the Arabs mobilizing opinion in the world against Israeli occupation, Israel could rally support behind its demand for recognition, and it would be up to the Arabs to meet Israeli security needs. To be sure, the bargaining would still be very tough, since the prize which the Arabs have withheld so far—recognition of Israel and a contractual peace—could be held up by them until Israel has considerably reduced its security demands or its demand for a change in the 1967 borders around Jerusalem. But here we come to a second imperative.

It would be intensely desirable that Israel implicate in the negotiation as many external powers as possible, not only the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite all of the disappointments which the Israelis have experienced with the West Europeans and the Japanese, once these countries no longer perceived Israeli immobility, or felt that Israel was still placing all its eggs in the American basket, they would again be able to play a useful role in trying to moderate the Arabs and regain an interest in Israel's own security. In the specific

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case of the West Europeans, it is their exclusion—by Israel and the United States jointly—their fear of seeing the Middle East become merely a theater of the cold war, and their preference for something like the course suggested here, much more than their dependence on Arab oil, which explain their recent attitudes. All of them are on record on the subject of Israel's right to existence and recognition.

To be sure, in an overall negotiation, the risk of Arab extremist positions exists. Yet once the principle of a return to 1967 is established, there is also a chance that the nuances among Arab parties could grow. A wider framework of bargaining would still leave room for separate negotiations with each party. The present approach, on the contrary, prevents those nuances from spreading and preserves a strong joint Arab interest in pressure and maneuver. Moreover, the presence of outside powers interested in a settlement would serve either to magnify these nuances or to create pressure toward a moderate rather than an extreme Arab position.

Third, any agreement could be carried out in stages. A proposal has been made by one Israeli scholar, Saul Friedländer, for a solution consisting of an Israeli statement of willingness to accept Resolution 242, and then to carry it out in stages.[3] His formula is "a little bit of territory against a little bit of peace." This is a fundamentally valid approach, but *only* in the context of a general agreement. The kinds of steps which he demands of the Arabs in exchange for Israel's partial withdrawals are inconceivable for them unless they have already granted Israel recognition. To suggest, as he does, that recognition would be the last Arab act, in exchange for the last piece of territory, presupposes an agreement on a calendar in the absence of a contractual settlement—something of a contradiction in terms—and in effect makes the territories' return into a reward for good behavior: a psychological error, for, as Friedländer's Egyptian interlocutors put it, "Arab opinion cannot bear any longer the notion that what's possible or not should be determined by Israel alone."[4]

Moreover, even in the framework of a settlement, the best that can be hoped for is a calendar of measures of two types: general measures benefiting Israel but not involving overt cooperation (a reopening of the Suez Canal, the passage of Israeli ships through it), and the end of hostile measures (propaganda, boycotts) that are obviously incompatible with peace. To be sure, one could theoretically link each stage of withdrawal to a cooperative Arab measure if one dragged out the

[3] See Saul Friedländer and Mahmoud Hussein, *Arabes et Israéliens*, Paris: Ed. du Seuil, 1974, pp. 138 ff.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 157.

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process long enough. But to obtain Arab cooperation in trade, tourism, or joint patrols, by subordinating to such concessions the return of territory, would be resented by Arab countries as a patronizing, even blackmailing policy, and go against the very reasons for suggesting a new Israeli initiative.

Fourth, we come to the key question of security guarantees. For a long period, the sides will have to be militarily separated. The aim ought to be the stationing, in the Sinai, at Sharm-el-Sheikh, in the Golan Heights, and in those portions of the West Bank that are geographically closest to the Mediterranean, of international peace forces not composed of soldiers of the superpowers. Should Washington and Moscow insist on having their own soldiers there—as a way of underlining their guarantee of the settlement—there should at least be soldiers of other powers. And there must be an agreement by all the parties, and all the contributors to the forces, against the arbitrary dismissal of the peace forces by one of the countries in which they are stationed, or the arbitrary removal of a national contingent by the country of origin. The tragic experience of UNEF in 1967 cannot be repeated. But a new status of U.N. peace forces can only be defined in the context of an overall agreement.

In addition, there is the problem of outside guarantees. Clearly, every power in the area would prefer to be able to rely only on itself, and to have an agreement that is self-enforcing. However, mutual security fears are likely to persist, as well as misunderstandings about each other's intentions. The role of outside guarantees is to deter a new war.

Three sets of measures can be of help here. One is a guarantee of the borders by the powers involved in the negotiations. This would take the form of a collective guarantee given by them to all parties, but it could be supplemented by individual assurances given by one great power to its closer friend(s) in the area, as an assurance of privileged support should the collective guarantee for any reason be paralyzed. (Until now, Washington has been most reluctant to envisage such a guarantee—but this is precisely in order to retain leverage over Israel in the step-by-step approach; should Israel call for an overall settlement, it would be much more difficult for Washington to withhold a guarantee in this context.) Also, the outside powers should guarantee the provisions on demilitarization against unilateral repudiation by one of the parties, and commit their support to whatever state is the victim of such a repudiation. This would not be aimed at freezing the status quo, but at assuring that its revision would have to be agreed upon by all the interested parties in the area. Last but not

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least, an agreement by outside powers to curb their arms sales to the parties would be important. To be sure, Arabs and Israelis could still manufacture their own weapons, but there would be a significant qualitative and quantitative difference.

Fifth, there is the problem of Jerusalem. There is no doubt that negotiations will be difficult, if only because of the considerable expansion of the new Jewish Jerusalem into previously Arab territory. An exception to the principle of a complete return to the pre-1967 borders will be necessary here. But Israel should declare its willingness to return to the Arab part of Palestine the predominantly Arab sections of north and east Jerusalem, currently included in the municipal boundaries of the city, as well as the Arab sector of the Old City, and to place the holy places of the three religions under international jurisdiction. The entire area should be an open city, whatever the division of sovereignties. If, as Jean Giraudoux suggested in *Tiger at the Gates,* law is the most powerful training ground for imagination, it should not be impossible to reconcile the demands of both sides through a complex legal formula.

Sixth, we come to the most difficult issue: the specific problem of the West Bank. Here, Israel should declare its willingness to grant to the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip the right to self-determination. It will have to give up deciding who is the legitimate spokesman of the Palestinians, even if this means foreclosing an increasingly hypothetical "Jordanian solution." Such a declaration would throw the ball back into the Arabs' court. If—as is likely—the Arabs designate the PLO, it will be up to Arafat to face a difficult choice. Either he gives priority to setting up a state on the West Bank; but this will mean negotiating, directly or indirectly, with Israel, which is not likely to withdraw unless it obtains security guarantees. Such a negotiation would amount to de facto recognition. Or else Arafat will refuse to accept even this, declining to settle for less than his "dream." But in that case, it is likely that other Arab states, and his non-Arab supporters, will put strong, tangible pressure on him to get him to stop preventing a settlement that entails a return to the 1967 borders. The Israelis have been demanding de jure recognition of Israel by the PLO, as well as by other Arab states. But it would be enough at first to obtain de facto recognition from the PLO through the presence of a PLO delegation on the basis of Resolution 242 in Geneva, and its participation in a settlement.

It is foolish to expect, at this stage or in the near future, any West Bank state to give up on paper what Arafat calls his dream. It is always foolish to ask people to give up dreams. The essence of inter-

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national relations simply consists in creating the conditions in which those dreams cannot be carried out, and the only way this can be done is a combination of Israeli strength, outside guarantees of Israel's borders, and some demilitarization of the West Bank state. There are a few precedents in international law for neutral states with only limited military forces; one of them is Austria (although any resemblance between the country of the waltz and Mr. Arafat's movement is a coincidence). To be sure, it would be courting failure to ask the new state to be entirely without forces: it will have security fears of its own. But it can be partly protected by international peace forces. And the most decisive limitation would result from an agreement by the great powers present at the settlement not to sell arms to the Palestinian state, and to consider any presence of foreign armies, or the entry of certain kinds of weapons, on the soil of the new state as a violation of the settlement.

V

These are the outlines of the settlement which, in my opinion, it is in Israel's best interest to initiate. Three questions remain. What are the assumptions behind this program? What are its chances of domestic success in Israel? What happens if it fails?

There are two major assumptions. The first one relates to the issue of time. One can argue that such a settlement is quite unlikely at a moment when the Arabs ride the crest of a wave of wealth and success; that it is imperative to postpone a global negotiation until the combination of strains within OPEC, successes in the American strategy on oil, and growing Arab concern for economic development results either in Arab disunity or in Arab moderation.

But while at present there exists a risk of Arab self-intoxication and intransigence, one has to weigh two factors on the other side. One is that intra-Arab strains are likely to be subdued as long as a state of political war and a climate of anticipation of war exist between the Arabs and Israel. While the concern for development is real, the new Arab resources also allow the Arabs to buy weapons they need to reconquer what they lost: Egypt may want peace for reconstruction and development, but not at the cost of sacrificing its claim on its own territory. Even though oil money will accelerate the development of the Arab countries, the notion that a richer Egyptian or a fatter Syrian is necessarily going to be less demanding of the Israelis strikes me as very debatable. The formidable social problems which development will create in Arab countries could all too easily be displaced on the foreign enemy, and the gap between Israeli society and culture, and

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Arab society and culture, which is partly social, partly economic, partly psychological, will remain for a long time to come.

The other factor is the decline of support for Israel in the world, and, if not the weakening of sympathy for and aid to Israel in the United States, at least the increasingly more conditional attitude of the American Congress, the realization of the need for a more balanced American policy in the Middle East. In the *long* run, time may well be on Israel's side in one respect: Arab acceptance of its existence and irreversibility. But in the *middle* run, time is on the side of Arab pressures and drives toward Israeli withdrawals. Immobility leads to war. Thus it is in Israel's interest to try to obtain sooner rather than later its recognition as well as guarantees in exchange for what it will have to give up anyhow.

Another assumption refers to the nature of the peace to be negotiated. Today, in Israel, there is a most striking confusion in the public mind. On the one hand, there is profound pessimism about its Arab neighbors ever accepting Israel, in the words of a distinguished retired general, as "a normal Jewish state." There is a fear that its neighbors will never consider that a Jewish state is normal, or that a normal state can be Jewish in that part of the world. On the other hand, there are nevertheless various forms of wishful thinking. Retrospectively, there is some regret that the United States prevented Israel from inflicting a "definitive" defeat on Egypt in October 1973. Now, peace is unlikely to result from a "sound" thrashing of the Arabs: 1967 did not bring them to Canossa. Prospectively, there is a belief that peace will come only when there has been a "change of heart" on the other side. Without such a change, it cannot be "real peace." Hence a notable contradiction. There is a strong emphasis on the strategic importance of every piece of conquered territory (especially the West Bank: if it were given up to hostile hands, no plane could take off or land in Israel because it could be shot down from the West Bank, a few miles away). And yet, there is also a perfectly genuine willingness to return almost everything in exchange for "real peace."

But "real peace" is conceived in terms that make it unrealistic. For what is called "real peace" is a set of attitudes and modes of behavior that would normally *follow* from peace rather than precede it: exchanges of tourists, of trade missions, of journalists, of sports teams, communications links. Now, if one has to wait for those modes of behavior and attitudes in order to know that one has real peace, one will have to wait for a very long time indeed. As we have learned from the history of the cold war, full reconciliation and exchanges are slow to come. Israelis must give up confusing peace and the ultimate bene-

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fits from peace, just as they can no longer confuse military triumph and peace.

But does not that Israeli state of mind suggest the unlikeliness of the kind of initiative I have been suggesting here? There are, indeed, many reasons for pessimism. One lies in the conviction about Arab hostility, which explains why there are very few "doves," in the sense in which the word was used here during the war in Vietnam. Arab threats and imprecations, and Arab refusals to make visible, formal concessions are taken very seriously. This also becomes an alibi against initiatives, because of the fear that Arab dictatorships could always outdo Israel in pure propaganda, and because of the fear that a domestic initiative could disrupt the Israeli body politic, thus weakening the nation. The millennial hope for a "change of heart" explains how an enormous concentration on the short run coexists with strategic immobility. Another reason for pessimism is the insulation of Israel from the outside world, already mentioned. A third is another contradiction between a proud emphasis on self-reliance, and a recognition of dependence on the United States or, as one important minister has suggested, of the fact that a nation of Israel's size has no foreign policy, only a policy of survival. Both facets of the contradiction lead to fears of negotiation, which means both involvement with others, and the risk of replacing the relative certainties of the battle for survival and the reliance on the United States in this battle, with the uncertainties of diplomatic maneuver and concessions.

Fourth, one may ask this question: to what extent has a 27-year-old state of war, unwanted by all, nevertheless become functionally necessary or useful, in order to assimilate the immigrants, to make out of the many one, to get outside support; to what extent does this state of war play the useful role of displacing ideological and tactical differences on the domestic scene, where they could be explosive, to the foreign policy scene, where they remain in the realm of ideas, since there is a general immobility? Lastly, there is the political system. Israel's parliamentary balance and governmental equilibrium remind one of the Fourth Republic in 1957. Their delicacy is worthy of a watchmaker. There are within the government not only different parties, but different factions of the main party, the Labor Party. There is a formidable opposition outside, and of course the fear of either a disintegration of the cabinet or of new elections that could mean a reinforcement of the Right is constant.

But there are also some reasons for hope. The public may *dream* about military victory, but most people *realize* that there is no "military solution." There is a growing conviction that it is impossible

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for Israel to achieve a political solution by military means, if only because the Soviet Union and probably the United States would save the Arab countries from total defeat. Nor is there any Masada complex. Even those who are most pessimistic about the possibility of peace are convinced that somehow, through U.S. support or whatever other means, they would "find a way." There is no grand romanticism about "us versus the rest of the outside world." There is a kind of tough realism—perhaps mistaken—about the consequences of what the outside world seems to want Israel to give up or to do.

The confusions and contradictions I have stressed point to bewilderment rather than extremism. The deepest obstacle to a change of policy does not lie in the public but in the political system. The public would probably, as it has done before (for instance after Suez), follow a strong leader willing to accept concessions in a way that suggests Israeli mastery. The problem is that current leaders are either reluctant to change course, because they fear the collapse of the government and the rupture of the parliamentary majority, or else—in open or partial opposition—eager to equate strong leadership with toughness, especially insofar as the West Bank is concerned.

But it is not absurd to believe that the present leaders would want to change course once they conclude that the present one leads Israel into a dead end, and could then demand and receive a public vote of confidence for a new course. Nor is it too much to believe that if they hesitate or if the policy with which they are associated fails, they might be replaced by strong leaders, currently in semi-opposition to or semi-concurrence with the Rabin-Kissinger approach, who would temper their toughness once in control. (I am obviously not thinking of the leaders of the Likud.)

And yet, even if this should happen, it is still possible that the Israeli initiative called for here would be rejected by the Arabs, or that a complex negotiation would fail because of such intractable problems as the PLO, or because of irreconcilable clashes over security and recognition. Such failure would indeed make war once again likely, and probably remove for a long time any prospects of a settlement. But the very fact that a general failure would not only be a setback but a disaster explains why all the participants in the complex process of negotiation I have suggested, and particularly the outside powers, would have an interest in dragging out the Geneva process, if only in order to postpone the day of reckoning.

Moreover, from Israel's viewpoint, there are three decisive reasons for trying, whatever the risks of failure. One is that a bold Israeli initiative would restore Israel's diplomatic position, and make it far

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more difficult for Israel's critics in the United States to argue that the responsibility for deadlock in the Middle East is evenly divided or even largely Israel's. Again, this perspective of a restoration of Israel's position, and of less hesitant support in the U.S. Congress, would make the Arab states think twice before scuttling the negotiation. The second reason has to do with Israel's own moral position. By offering a scheme that tries to reconcile the reasonable interests of all sides, replaces grudging small bargains with an overall conception, and above all provides a home for the Palestinians, Israel would reverse a dangerous trend that equates conscience with good conscience, and the latter with toughness alone. For without sacrificing its security, it would offer a vision of peace and make it possible for the Palestinians to stop being—as refugees or exiles from former Palestine, and as pariahs of the other Arabs—a modern version of those displaced persons the Jews themselves had suffered the fate of being until the state of Israel was founded. One sometimes suspects that the vehemence of Israeli fears about a Palestinian state is due not only to security concerns, but also to a half-repressed awareness of the depth of the resentments created among the Palestinians outside the West Bank by their tragic fate over the last 27 years. The equally vehement Israeli denials of guilt prove, if not its presence, at least a fear of its justification. The initiatives suggested here could serve to drive such doubts and demons away.

The third reason concerns Israel's destiny in the world. After this period of an intense and almost exclusive American connection, it is time for the Israelis to start thinking of a very distant, very ultimate vision. It may seem terribly utopian at this point—another dream, this time of a Middle East in which all would live in peace, and in which Israel would not be the exclusive ally of one power, but a Jewish state intent on good relations especially with the two countries which have, and are likely to keep having, the greatest number of Jews outside of Israel, the United States and the Soviet Union. Israel as a partner in the development of the Middle East, yet neither a stake for nor a party in the political and military competition of the great powers—this may appear as an irrelevant ideal today. But for the sake of Israel's own spirit and promise, only the presence of an ideal such as this can lift the hearts and inspire the minds of the Israelis beyond the bitter sacrifices, the fears and the dreary prospect of the continuing state of siege.

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NATIONALITY: "END OF THE ROAD"?

By Harold R. Isaacs

WE are experiencing on a massively universal scale a convulsive ingathering of men in their numberless groupings of kinds, a great clustering of separatenesses in which people feel they can find the physical and emotional security they find nowhere else. These are the basic group identities that all people possess by virtue of having been born into a particular family at a given time in a given place. They are tribal, racial, religious, national. These elements cluster in each person in endlessly varying ways. Their sources and their power are rooted in physical facts, in history, in language, in systems of belief and values that make up our cultures. For most of the people on earth in our own time, these elements of identity have come to be embraced in what we call our "nations." It has to be seen in its other shapes and guises, but basic group identity does come most largely into view dressed in its national colors, marching under its national flag, wearing its national tag. In its many definitions and usages, the "nation" or "nationality" appears as the ultimate, the most political, the most inclusive, even the "terminal" form of the basic group identity itself.

The nation, writes Rupert Emerson, is "the largest community which, when the chips are down, effectively commands men's loyalty . . . it is for present purposes the effective end of the road for man as a social animal, the end point of working solidarity between men." Other groupings have played this role—the family, the tribe, religious communities—but "all of these, without vanishing from the scene, have bit by bit, often after harsh struggle, yielded pride of place to the nation in the sense that for constantly growing numbers of men the claims of the nation have come to be accepted as taking priority over claims coming from any other source." The nation has come to be seen as "the community which makes the nearest approach to embracing all aspects of their lives."

In one form or another, the strong identification and feeling of loyalty attached to the idea of the "nation" has always been present in human affairs. "It has been a mark of nature, if not nurture," wrote Carlton Hayes, "for human beings since the dawn of history to possess some consciousness of nationality, some feeling that the linguistic, historical, and cultural peculiarities of a group make its members akin

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among themselves and alien from all other groups." Attachment to one's own family and the locality where one was born has always been part of its beginning; hence *patria,* one's birthplace, and on from there to all that "fatherland" and "motherland" eventually came to mean. The very use of these terms carries the powerful primordial associations projected from one's own birth and one's own parents to all others born in the same place, the same country. The word *nation* itself is from the Latin *nasci,* to be born. The emotions and attachments first focused on family, tribe, clan, or other kinship group extended gradually outward to larger bodies of belonging and connectedness, to local regions, towns, cities, city-states, religious bodies, the realms of lords and kings. These came to command, in the words of a fourteenth-century Arab philosopher, that "unique mutual affection and willingness to fight and die for each other."

In Western Europe three to four centuries ago, these various claimants on group loyalty began to be absorbed into what became the modern "nation," a political entity whose demand for loyalty overrode all others. "Love of fatherland," said a bishop at the court of Louis XIV, is "all the things which unite citizens together: the altars, the sacrifices, glory, peace, and security, in a word the society of divine and human things." A century later the French Revolution made the transfer from the divine to the national quite literal and explicit: it built its altars only to the fatherland; *La Patrie* took over from God. From Napoleon's time until now, taking on its modern shapes in Europe in the nineteenth century and in Asia and Africa in the twentieth, the idea of the "nation" and the driving force of "nationalism" have dominated the making and the wielding of political, economic, and military power in every kind of society and under every kind of ideological banner. The presence of nationalism is everywhere, its prints on our history and our lives huge and deep.

Yet for all this pervasiveness, all this dominance in all our affairs, an extraordinary fact: even at eyeball range, neither "nation" nor "nationality" comes clearly into view. As in so much else, it depends on who is looking. One distinguished scholar after another has made the safari over time and come back to describe what he has seen, but each, like an artist, has painted his own vision of what he saw, and no two portraits have been quite alike. All writers of this century make the same acknowledgment to those of the last—almost always, for example, to John Stuart Mill, Lord Acton, Ernest Renan—who had preceded them on the same quest. Nearly 50 years ago, Carlton Hayes began his own classic study of the subject (published in 1926), with the observation that the word "nation" was "tantalizingly ambig-

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uous" and that "nationalism" appeared as "vague and intangible and mysterious" and that "there is no agreement as to precisely what it is." Twenty years later the British historian E. H. Carr, who headed up a special commission to examine the subject, concluded that "the nation is not a definable and clearly recognizable entity." Others, estimable scholars all, have written landmark works on the matter—among them Alfred Cobban, Boyd Shafer, Hans Kohn, Louis Snyder, Rupert Emerson—without coming, even among themselves, to any commonly accepted view of what "nation" and "nationality" actually look like, full face on. We obviously do know a great deal about the subject, thanks in good part to their works, but what we do not know, as Rupert Emerson ruefully acknowledged in his own notable study (published in 1960), "adds up to an impressive body of ignorance and an uncertainty."

Everyone has his own list of parts that go into the making of a nation. Give or take an item or two, they all include the elements of what I have called the basic group identity, usually mentioning shared culture, history, tradition, language, religion, some adding "race" as well as the elements of territory, politics, and economics that all go in their varying measures into the making of what is called a "nation." On closer examination, it seems, no single part could be shown to be unique or indispensable to nationhood, except perhaps for some version of the idea of a shared past and a shared common will noted earlier by Mill and Renan and included as standard elements in every definition offered since their time. His own search through these thickets of definition led Emerson to join most of his predecessors in concluding: "The simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it is a body of people who feel that they are a nation; and it may be that when all the fine-spun analysis is concluded, this will be the ultimate statement as well." We cannot ever really be certain what it is that makes "the existence of a singularly important national 'we' which is distinguished from all others who make up an alien 'they'." As state of mind, shared consciousness, or other version of Renan's "soul" or "spiritual principle," or Otto Bauer's "community of fate," that "nation"—so formidably real in the real world of everyone's everyday existence—has eluded all efforts of scholars to agree on what precisely it is. The abominable snowman again.

Finding such imprecision more abhorrent than any vacuum ever was, latter-day social scientific political science has tried to re-objectify the "nation" and "nationalism." Karl Deutsch, notably, has tried to sort out the graspable, countable, measurable "building blocks" of technology and communications that go into the making of a "na-

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tion." To this beacon, many of the tired and weary of academia have flocked in these years, only belatedly to find nestling among Deutsch's tidy formulas, diagrams and tables the same old ambiguities, elusive, subjective, uncontrollable as ever. They pollute the scientifically antiseptic precincts from which some thought they had finally been banished, or where, at least, it was thought they could simply be ignored.[1] If there is some arrangement of the various indicated ingredients which somehow creates a "nation" as hydrogen and oxygen at two to one make water, no one has found the formula. "The combinations in which they appear," concluded the quietly despairing Emerson, after long toil, "defy orderly analysis."

II

This uncertainty about the meaning of "nation" and "nationality" has been reflected and compounded by a corresponding confusion in how these words are used, whether by official bodies, scholars, lexicon-makers, or in the common parlance of various languages. As with the substance, so with the names: the same words arise in different meanings and versions out of different outlooks and experience. In all that there is to read about the politics, diplomacy, wars and revolutions of the last several centuries, these terms contradict and trip over each other, adding their additional blur to the miasma-like quality of the history itself. In one text or context or another, the word "nation" has been used interchangeably with "tribe," "people," "ethnic group," "race," "religion," "nationality," "country," and "state," among others. Distinctions are variously made among and between these terms, having to do with ideas about size, territory, "stage of development" or measure of "backwardness," the level of "consciousness." In the end, such distinctions may reflect only how the particular writer feels about it.

The facts, past and present, seem to suggest that the formula whereby a "tribe" or a "people" do or do not become or remain a "nation" depends mainly on the conditions of power or the lack of it, and the given political circumstances of the time. The World War I peace settlement promised "self-determination of nations," presumably to all. As the victors rearranged the map at the expense of the vanquished, new "nations" were carved accordingly out of the lands

[1] In an examination of Deutsch's theories about nationalism, Walker Connor lists ten major works of the 1960s by important American political scientists concerned with theories of "nation-building" and "integration." Not one, he found, "dedicates a section, chapter, or major subheading to the matter of ethnic diversity" and in six the indexes show "not a single reference to ethnic groups, ethnicity, or minorities." "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" *World Politics*, April 1972.

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of the defeated Central European empires, each new "nation," to be sure, made up of a mix of subnationalities each of which in turn would have dearly wished to become a "nation" on its own. But the Versailles formula was not considered to apply at all to the multitude of "nations" locked into the colonial empires of the Western powers: when *they* tried in the next few years to exercise self-determination they were put down by main force.

One world war later, the United Nations went the League one better and proclaimed the universal right of "self-determination of peoples." But no formula about what constituted a "nation" or a "people" was applied to any specific outcome, only the concrete circumstances of the forces in play. Only these circumstances could explain why, after World War II, the ex-colonies in Asia and Africa were simply converted from quite arbitrary colonial administrative conveniences into "nations." No formula, only particular conditions and relations of power and interest, could explain why in the decades following 1945 little Gambia and the tiny islands of Fiji, Nauru, and Grenada could become "nations" while big Biafra could not; why Pakistan, a patchwork of Punjabis, Sindis, Pathans, Baluchis, etc., could become a nation while Nagaland, with *its* patchwork of separate tribes, could not; why the Pathans of Pakistan could not have their own Pushtoonistan, at least not yet, while the Bengalis could, after a bloody amputation, finally create their own Bangladesh. Tiny Abu Dhabi could become a "nation" but the Kurds must still fight on to establish their own Kurdistan. The Filipinos, Indonesians, Burmese, all acquired sovereignties of their own, but not the Muslims of Mindanao and Jolo, the Achinese of Sumatra, or the Kachins, Shans, or other peoples living on lands they held long before there was a "Burma."

If by "nation" we mean a culturally homogeneous group, then what is being said here is that some "nations" become states and some do not. If, as is so much more commonly the case, we use "nation" to mean the same thing as "state," then by some unkind fate, all claimants to nationhood who are unsuccessful in winning sovereignty for themselves cannot be referred to as "nations" but have to remain "tribes" or "minorities." This fate, it should be clear, has nothing to do with whether they are indeed "nations" by this or that definition. It has to do only with the fact that at the given time they lack the power or other fortuitous conditions in which, weak as they might be, they could set up "states" of their own. This terminological blur between "nation" and "state," often blurred further as "nation-state," is probably the most common and the most important of all these con-

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fusions. Thus the League of Nations.[2] Thus the United Nations. Thus all the official bodies, agencies, and organizations that use the word "international" in their names when, as Walker Connor has pointed out, they have to do not with "nations" but with sovereign states, most of which are made up of many "nations." These confusions of usage have been noted, not always without further compounding, by various writers and it is happily not needful for us to review them at any greater length here.

One principal clarifying distinction does emerge. It lies between defining "nation" or "nationality" as in essence *cultural* or *political*. These two views do not appear to develop separately, but they do wind in and out of the design, making different patterns as they go.

The cultural concept of nationality in its modern European context is usually traced back to the eighteenth-century German poet-philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder, who conceived of a *Volk* formed around the core of a common language as the keeper and carrier of the common heritage. This idea played a guiding role in much of the further course of nineteenth-century European nationalism—Mazzini adopted it and gave it his own rhetorically universalistic setting—and it appears and reappears in the turbulent history of European politics. Herder, who was more concerned with culture than with politics, apparently believed that if each *Volk* could be a nation unto itself, all would live at peace among themselves and in amity with others. The mystique of the German *Volk* he so passionately espoused ultimately became, as he could not have dreamed in his own universe, the driving spirit of Hitler's Reich. Believers in the positive power of self-determined homogeneous peoplehood of this kind do have to ponder the fact that the two most conspicuously successful examples of this type of national development occurred in modern times in Germany and Japan, with a third possibly in the making now in Maoist China.

The political concept of the nation took shape not out of any cultural or group matrix but out of the ideas and events that created the new states of post-Reformation Western Europe. It came out of the social transformations and political revolutions in England, America and France. This was essentially the great shift of power from the kings to the newly rising bourgeois class. The guiding ideas were Social Contract and General Will and Democracy in the tradition usually ascribed in its beginning to Rousseau. The evolution of the

[2] At Versailles in 1919, when the delegate of Portugal "suggested that the new organization would more correctly be called a League of States, Lord Robert Cecil replied that he thought the difference between the word 'nation' and 'state' was a very small one." Alfred Cobban, *The Nation State and National Self-Determination*, New York: Crowell, 1970.

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"nation" that grew out of these ideas moved, not like Herder's, from the cultural to the political, but from the political to the cultural. The rise of the bourgeoisie, the development of modern capitalism, the Industrial Revolution, the establishment of new systems of government based on popular sovereignty, all created their own new cultures in the "nations" that came into being in this process. Where this happened, "nationality" came most generally to mean, especially in official usage, passport-holding citizenship in the state regardless of the individual's country of birth or origin. But it also became the symbol of a new cultural identity which in some degree displaced or at least shared place with any older ancestral cultural legacy an individual might also have. Such were the degrees of relative assimilation of different peoples that took place in Britain and France and other European countries, but most especially in America. The stamp of a uniquely new Americanness became visible on all immigrant groups, especially as they moved into their second and third generations, becoming much deeper and more strongly marked without ever quite effacing the older imprints of remoter cultural origins.

In eastern Europe and beyond, on the other hand, "nationality" remained the term applied to particular communal groups whose cultural features were their own but whose political status was fixed by the places they held in some larger imperial power system, as under the Habsburgs, Romanovs and the Ottoman rulers. These groups were defined by region, by language, and in the Ottoman empire especially, by religion. No Jew in Poland was ever a "Pole" by nationality, no Ukrainian or Georgian or Tatar or German in Russia a "Russian," no Greek or Bulgarian or Syrian or Kurd in old Turkey a "Turk." In the Ottoman empire, separate groups enjoyed separate local rule under the "millet system"—millet coming from the Arabic *millah,* meaning religious community. Under this system each group had a large measure of jurisdiction over its own purely internal civil affairs, usually as defined by its religious code and administered by its religious leaders. Out of these separate enclaves eventually came the various nationalisms that split the crumbling old empire and formed the new states that were carved out of it. The millet system that existed in old Palestine under Turkish rule was maintained through the decades of the British mandate and provided the framework in which the Zionists were able to organize and maintain themselves as the national force that finally established its own power in Israel. The millet structure was carried over essentially untouched into the new state, which is in all respects a modern democratic state except that all matters touching on the civil status of its citizens—birth, death, mar-

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riage, divorce, recognition as "Jews"—remain under the effective control of an archaic religious establishment much as they did in Ottoman times, only subject now to occasional contention in the secular courts set up by the new state.

III

In older times in much of the world, nationality and religion were commonly fused in the society, in the single body of the divine or divinely ordained ruler or in some other form of entwined religious and temporal power. Such was the case too in Europe until the Reformation. The creation of the modern European "nation" as we know it now began with the noble princes of the land taking over from the holy princes of the Church and proceeded with the bourgeois princes of wealth taking over from the noble princes of the land. The newly risen bourgeois class created governments based, in theory at least, on the sovereignty of the people. The power and the glory passed from God's Chosen Church to God's Chosen Kings to God's Chosen People.[3]

In his discussion of the transfer of the "religious sense" from religion to nation, Hayes noted that like declining Rome where "pagan skepticism" among the elite led to the popular deification of the emperors, eighteenth-century Europe, amid similar elite skepticism about all religion, witnessed the elevation of the "nation" as the "central object of worship." In revolutionary France this was most ardently and explicitly done. Altars to the fatherland were erected everywhere bearing the words: "The citizen is born, lives, and dies for *La Patrie*." The new regime instituted civic excommunication, civic baptism, civic marriage. It dedicated hymns, prayers, feasts to the new national deity. In modified and adapted forms this became the style of all the new European nationalisms. The believers in the Age of Reason who founded the American Republic believed in the

[3] Shakespeare had personified and glorified the England ruled by the Tudor kings, but it was Milton who registered the transfer of Heaven's mandate from the kings to the people. "God is decreeing some new and great period," he wrote. "What does he, then, but reveal himself to his servants and, as his manner is, first to Englishmen?" Cromwell believed that the people of England were "a People that are to God as the apple of his eye." Quoted by Carlton Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion,* New York: Macmillan, 1960, p. 41.

Since choosing the ancient Hebrews and then Cromwell's Englishmen, God has clearly collected an orchard-full. "It would appear," said Nnamdi Azikiwe, the Eastern Nigerian nationalist leader, in 1949, "that the God of Africa has especially created the Ibo nation to lead the children of Africa from the bondage of the ages." (Quoted by Emerson, in *From Empire to Nation,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, p. 356.) "As black preachers we must tell our people that we are God's chosen people and that God is fighting with us as we fight. When we march, when we take it to the streets in open conflict, we must understand that in the stamping feet and in the thunder of violence we hear the voice of God." Albert Cleage, *The Black Messiah,* New York: Sheed & Ward, 1969, p. 6.

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higher calling, ideals and mission of their new nation: the new American "civic religion."

This was one of the great shifts in human affairs, one of those great turnings from all that had gone before toward much that would try to become new under the sun. For all its shoddy or ironic features and all its great failures, it was still one of history's finer hours of aspiration, as the historian J. L. Talmon's statement of it should remind us:

> The recognition of the right of the individual to be his own lawgiver, the challenge directed to him to express his personality spontaneously instead of submitting to god-given or time-hallowed prescriptions for the expiation of his sins, to work for the triumph of progress on earth instead of waiting for divine judgment—all these were extended to the collective personality of the nation. Moreover man's own smallness and unworthiness could be sublimated into the greatness and power of the nation, as they were formerly into the glory of the Church.

These rearrangements of religious and secular value systems and interests were all part of a revolution that was taking place. As Weber, Tawney, and of course much earlier in their sharper way, Marx and Engels showed, it was not always possible to distinguish between the lofty and the low, the heavenly and the earthly orders of self-interest that operated in those turbulent times of change. It was a massive transfer of power between classes and it was quite possible, even reasonable, to interpret the whole process as one of identifying the interests of God with those of the creators of the new capitalist system and with the cause of each of the aggressively contending national powers they created to advance their own particular interests. To put it in its bluntest and non-loftiest form, it was a matter of refashioning the old-style religion to fit the new-style rapacity. "The upshot of the whole process," to quote Hayes once more, was "that a nationalist theology of the intellectuals"—and, he might have added, of the new ruling classes—became "a nationalist mythology for the masses." A new religious syncretism was achieved, the continued adherence to the various ancestral faiths adapting obediently to "the exigencies of nationalist worship and discipline." The cult of the nation, the worship and reverence of national symbols and heroes—the cult of Washington in early America came close to using the language of deification—became entwined and incorporated into the more traditional religious symbols and objects of worship, characteristic behavior that history had known long before and has known only too well since. Traditional religion was duly bent to all these purposes and the autonomy of religion progressively brought under the control of these new national forces. "The universal in religion," as Rupert Emerson put it, was made "to bow to the tribal gods of nations."

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Tribal gods were obviously much better suited to national purposes than any other kind, especially the kind that spoke for the brotherhood of man. Tribal gods, plainly earthier, more practical and more "national" in every way, required brotherhood only among fellow-members of the tribe, and that only when faced by their natural enemies, or all who belonged to other tribes. One of the great advantages of tribal-nationalist religion was its ability to blunt contradictions between universal moral professions and parochial self-serving practice. Believers in God usually require their God to be always right; in the cult of patriotism—the highest form of nationalist religion—believers were licensed, indeed required, to believe in their country right or wrong. Before this time there had been tribal wars, dynastic wars, religious wars; but national wars have surely outdone them all, as David did Saul, in the business of mutual slaughter. In the celebrations of nationhood in song, story and sacred ritual, indeed, no matter how far back one goes, these slaughters and their heroes and exploits are celebrated most of all, as a look at the words of almost any national anthem will attest.[4]

Some of the loftiest spirits and best minds of many generations have struggled to see how it might be otherwise, but the "nation" and the power of "nationality" have bested them all, whether as political fact, fiction, goal, idea, myth, or state of mind.

IV

"Nationality," then, comes in different sizes, shapes and colors, and, as always in such matters, styles have been subject to change. But "variable and malleable" as Alfred Cobban suggested it might be, it remains in all its varieties a primary shaping ingredient in the formula of every person's life.

As identification by birth with a "nation"—meaning a group with certain shared holdings of history and culture—it fixes certain features of every person's existence no matter what other features he takes on. It establishes where one belongs or is seen by others to belong. It fixes the place that is "home," whether it be a country, a region, a neighborhood, or simply the bosom of the group. It is where one lives or is entitled to live, physically, emotionally, psychologically, and it underpins and in some way shapes us, no matter how we change or how far away we move. From this basic attachment, as so much art and literature attest, much nourishment has come. "Nationalities," wrote Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in his undelivered Nobel

[4] See Martin Shaw and Henry Coleman, eds., *National Anthems of the World,* London: Pitman, 1963; *cf.* Oliver Jensen, "Letter from the Editor," *American Heritage,* August 1974, p. 2.

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Prize lecture in 1970, "are the wealth of humanity, they are its crystallized personalities; even the smallest among them has its own special colors, hides within itself a particular facet of God's design." From it too, and presumably also part of God's design, have come the hatred, violence and bloodshed that resulted as these colors clashed, as these crystallized personalities confronted each other over their differences and over how to distribute humanity's wealth, whether spiritual or material.

As citizenship in a state, "nationality" has been hardly any less governing or influential, providing the individual with whatever security —both physical and emotional—it can create in a remarkably insecure and unsafe world. However oppressed, disaffected or alienated the individual might be within his own "nation," the unhappy fact is that everywhere else in the world he is more alien still, unless, as the great masses who migrated to America in the century past were uniquely able to do, he could carry his "nation" with him and acquire a new "nationality" that served him better than his old one. To be deprived of nationality in the sense of having citizenship in a state is to be cast out into the desert of homelessness, out among the beasts of prey that roam the wild world outside. To suffer this fate, as millions have in this era of the Refugee, the Stateless and the Displaced Person, is to learn, as Hannah Arendt has written, that "the abstract nakedness of being human" is not enough to entitle one even to the least of so-called "human rights," that in our age nationality has become "the only remaining and recognized tie with humanity." To belong to a nationality that is defined by birth rather than by citizenship has meant for millions of people in our time to be doomed to banishment and death. In Hitler's Germany, German Jews who thought they were Germans turned out, for purposes of their end, to be Jews. In Stalin's Russia, millions of Ukrainians, Germans, Tatars and other peoples were transported to exile and death. Even in Franklin Roosevelt's America, Japanese-Americans who thought they were Americans were abruptly uprooted and moved to detention camps because they were seen, and feared, as Japanese.

By its various definitions, in all its varied appearances, "nationality" is clearly, however, the most inclusive and the most explicitly political of all the elements that go into the making of every person's basic group identity. If "group belongingness is the haven of personality," as R. M. MacIver has written, "it is strongest and most enduring when it achieves the form of nationhood." The "nation" is the most persistently surviving unit of political organization in human affairs, remaining so in a world that has outgrown its limitations and

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can no longer afford its drawbacks and dangers. Since it is politics—relative power or powerlessness—that decides the fate of any community of people, nationality is in the end the most critical of all the identifications an individual carries as part of this group identity.

V

The history of world politics during the last two centuries has consisted primarily of the increasingly more explosive appearance, disappearance and reappearance of "nations" or states, wars and revolutions changing their placement and displacement in relation to each other and to the distribution of resources and power. Every aspect of the world's political landscape, post-colonial, post-imperial, post-revolutionary, and in the United States, post-illusionary, is dominated by the problems of nation, nationality, nationalism. These impinge on every person's existence. They press their reshaping forms on all our group identities as we come through the great political changes that are now the common experience of all. The massive rearrangements of power that have taken place in this century have brought on deeply wrenching rearrangements of all group relations and mutual perceptions among different kinds of people everywhere on earth. It has made of everyone's world a heaving, blurring landscape on which there are no fixed markers, no security of any kind for anyone, not even the kind that used to be provided by commonly accepted pecking orders of superiority-inferiority, mastery-subjection. This is the condition that produces so much of the tumult, so much of the killing of our time, with much more clearly yet to come.

Writing of this condition in the context of his own country's affairs, the Mexican poet Octavio Paz says:

> We Mexicans have always lived on the periphery of history. Now the center or nucleus of world society has disintegrated and everyone—including the European and North American—is a peripheral being. We are living on the margin . . . because there is no longer any center.

In another passage and another image, Paz writes: "The past has left us orphans as it has the rest of the planet. . . . World history has become everyone's task and our own labyrinth is the labyrinth of all mankind. . . ." And in still another: "Our century is a huge cauldron in which all historical eras are boiling and mingling."

Centerlessness, labyrinths, boiling cauldrons—the pictures in the poet's mind vary but they are all of the same condition: the plight of people who until only yesterday were held together by some central and controlling system of dominance, of political order and accepted beliefs. They were held by these mystiques and realities of power in

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their high or lowly status, esteemed or unesteemed by others and esteeming or unesteeming themselves accordingly. Now the great net or field of image and self-image held together by the gravity of that ruling center—ruling imperium, ruling race, ruling class, ruling caste —has been torn apart, the whole system disrupted by power failure. And here we all are, clinging to our peripheries, stumbling around in our labyrinths, boiling in our cauldrons. The poet chooses his images meaningfully: these are all intolerably disorienting and frightening situations to be in.

No wonder, then, that in the panicky rush to be as physically safe and emotionally secure as they can in a world full of danger and normlessness, more and more people are driven to rejoin and cluster more and more with their own kind, to cling all the more tightly to the primary group in which they can at least feel they inalienably *belong*. The image that comes to mind is that of the House of Muumbi, the home of the progenital mother of the Kikuyu tribe of Kenya which all Kikuyus swear they will never leave, of everyone's "home," the place where, as Robert Frost put it, "when you have to go there, they have to take you in." The image corresponds to some of the deepest-laid psychological realities: Muumbi's house is also that womb to which we all strain to return. At its most, it provides us with the nourishment of security and self-esteem; at the least, it provides a refuge from being alone. It is precisely because they provide such shelters in a world that offers no ampler satisfaction of profoundly pressing human needs that the separate basic group identities remain so strong and survive so powerfully, despite all the changes we go through under the homogenizing pressures of power and technology. These pressures should have long since flattened these differences into common shapes, and so they have to no small extent, but yet without being able to obliterate them.

In all their racial and religious or "ethnic" varieties, these differences resurface now with sharpened edges and with great effect, inside our various societies and in all the world's politics. Arrayed in their most distinctively political form—the national states where power is wielded—these edges become sharpest of all. The biggest of them, the superpowers, confront each other with weapons of total destruction, making the ancient goal of world hegemony even more strikingly unreasonable than it ever was. All the smaller states are riding out around those centerless peripheries, groping in dark labyrinths without threads, boiling in cauldrons without handles. As the world's population swells and bulges and the profligacy of the industrial system brings the earth to an awareness of limits to its resources

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in food, energy and raw materials, the best we have been able to do politically is to multiply the number of national states. The "world" that meets periodically to mirror its conflicts and confusions at the United Nations is now made up of 138 separate states, more than half of them created since 1945. No one would mistake the United Nations for a political instrument capable of solving world problems. Unfortunately, there is little or no evidence that the national state is any more capable now than it ever was of solving its own most pressing national problems by itself. All that happens is that the older states dig themselves deeper into their self-made morasses and the "new" ones dig "new" morasses of their own.

It remains true that the relative position of any group is measured by its degree of power or powerlessness relative to others. Until now, in the absence of any workable system of larger political, social and economic coherence, the national state has remained the only available instrument of this kind of power. For some, as in the case of Israel, it has served—at least so far—the purposes of survival. It has been the only form of power that could replace foreign rule in the colonies. The reality is, however, that with only very few exceptions, the power that could be generated by national sovereignty has been just about enough to run a new flag up the pole, put local rascals in place of the foreign rascals in the seats of local power and send a delegation to the United Nations to make what it could of its single vote in the new game of international politics as it is played in that forum. It is not enough power to turn the wheels of needed social and economic change, solve the problems of internal diversity, or assure physical and emotional security. There are of course examples that partly or temporarily contradict this proposition: China with its great size and numbers, the oil countries with their valuable but exhaustible and ultimately replaceable resources. The urge to nationhood may be one of the strongest and most persistent urges known to man; but the fact remains nevertheless that for most human beings on earth in these late decades of the twentieth century, the road to national statehood is the road to frustration and impotence. The dream of national self-determination becomes a nightmare from which no one, it seems, is able to awake.

Independent statehood, moreover, does not by itself provide the means of maintaining all the separatenesses that people want to maintain. If the homogeneously national nation-state ever did exist anywhere, it does not exist any more, except perhaps in one or two places on earth, as in Japan. Just about every society on earth is heterogeneously composed, and in almost every one, indeed, one of the most

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pressing of today's political problems is how to deal with this heterogeneity. Statehood is not available to all candidates for it. All sorts of illogical but powerful circumstances get in the way. The chances are that more people have killed each other for this reason in the last decades in Asia and Africa than in any previous time. In a different though not much less pressing way, the same issue presents itself in the changing societies of America and Europe.

Hence the great and bewildering paradox of our time: we are fragmenting and globalizing at the same time. We spin out as from a centrifuge, flying apart socially and politically, at the same time that enormous centripetal forces press us all into more and more of a single mass every year. World power is more concentrated and more diffused than ever before. We reach the limits of the earth's resources while increasing every year the numbers of people who have to share in them. We have entered the post-industrial age before two-thirds of the world has barely begun to emerge from the pre-industrial era and before most of the world's people could glean any advantages at all from industrialization and modernization. The fundamental and decisive conflicts grow ever sharper over the hard stuff of wealth, access to sources of energy and other raw materials, over production, food, trade and military power. These are the conflicts that will decide the fate of the world and its peoples. But these conflicts continue to be ribbed and shaped and fleshed by the soft stuff of group identities, by the ways people see themselves and are seen, how they feel about themselves and about others, and how these feelings cause them to behave.

These are matters of skin color and other physical characteristics, names and language, history and origins, religion, and nationality. Generations of students of society, unlike artists and poets and masses of ordinary people, have stopped looking at group identity except in its national forms, regarding it as an incidental feature of evolving human affairs. Some of them did so because they simply took for granted the governing conceptions of their own times and their own national cultures about human differences, about progress and backwardness, superiority and inferiority, power and powerlessness. At another level, some believed that insofar as these differences were unfortunate or undesirable, they would be flattened out under the pressures of modernization or kept under control by the benign power of superior peoples carrying out their divinely ordained civilizing missions. At best, possibly, they believed that conflict over differences of this kind rose out of ignorance and superstition, and would be erased by advancing knowledge and enlightenment along with improved

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well-being; or else that they rose out of class and economic exploitation, in which event they would be done away with—"nations" and all—by revolutions that would create a seamless and classless world socialist order. For socialists, more than for any other aspiring improvers of the human lot, the element of "class" dominated both description and prescription. All traditional systems were hopelessly reactionary—"feudal"—and all national governments in bourgeois states were simply executive committees of capitalist ruling classes. The tribal gods must have had a good laugh in their caves as they watched the socialist hope for a better future based on international working class solidarity founder precisely on the rocks of "national" and "ethnic" differences.

With all appropriate humility, then, one has to state as a conclusion what has been well-known to great masses of people for a long time but not to generations of elite humanistic scholars and strivers for human perfectibility: namely, that our tribal separatenesses are here to stay. Barring total extermination, they cannot be indefinitely contained. They are not about to dissolve into any new larger human order. And a good thing too, some argue, since, as Solzhenitsyn said, these diversities are the wealth of humanity, inheritances from the past that are the main sources of the enhancement of life, of art and beauty and elevation of the human spirit. They stand as a present bar to the aridity and homogenized cultures created by modern industrial societies. This is strongly argued, and there is certainly more in human experience to support it than any contrary notion that we might still be able to create some better kind of existence than we now have by detribalizing ourselves and ordering our lives by some set of more universal human and humane values.

On the other hand, with all the beauty goes all the blood. If tribal separateness and its life-giving qualities are here to stay, so are intertribal hostility and its death-dealing consequences. The coin of this realm, like all others, has two sides. Along with all it has contributed to the enhancement of the human spirit, tribal distinctiveness has contributed more than any other single cause to the brutalization of human existence. If anything emerges plainly from our long look at the nature and functioning of basic group identity, it is the fact that the we-they syndrome is built in. It does not merely distinguish, it divides. It provides the substance of an active, value-laden, emotionally-supported separation of one's own kind from all others. It develops in virulence and violence in direct ratio to the extent of contact with others. The relative license or relative constraint with which this hostility is expressed depends on the prevailing system of power, that

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is, who is ruling whom, and how. Where there is contact or propinquity between sufficiently different groups, the normal responses run from avoidance to suspicion, to fear, to hostility, to violence. Such violence occurs along a scale, depending on the power relations between them and the interplay of other interests, from indifference to depreciation, to contempt, to victimization and, not at all seldom, to slaughter. There is nothing in our present condition to suggest that any significant numbers of people are any more prepared now than they ever were to act any differently in these matters, even when they have just emerged from being victims and acquired the power to become victimizers in their turn. The only "new" question has to do with what kind of power systems, what kind of politics, might cope with this condition in its present form in any "new" way. The problem as always, if we wish to preserve and enjoy the enhancing pluses of our tribal uniquenesses, is what to do with their destructive minuses.

VI

The underlying question is still: can human existence be made more humane, and if so, how? For a long time answers to this question bore on varieties of the belief that the tribes of men would eventually, through Reason or Faith, come around to discover their One Humanity and would thereupon organize themselves to live more happily thereafter with one another. This belief survives only with the greatest difficulty in some of its religious versions. In its secular/political forms, whether in the humanistic tradition created by the Enlightenment or the materialistic tradition of socialism, it barely survives at all. But the question remains and one must still doggedly ask it: how can we live with our differences without, as always heretofore, being driven by them to tear each other limb from limb? This is at bottom a question of power, of the relative power or powerlessness of groups in relation to each other. If there is any substance to the now-universal demand of all groups for some decent equality of status in all societies, how might this demand be met? What new politics might meet these needs, what new institutions? What new pluralisms?

This is a "new" question, of course, only in a relative sense. Up until now, it was generally "solved" by the creation and maintenance of power systems based on pecking orders, rulers and ruled, masters and subjects, empires and colonies, etc. These systems, usually created by the sword, usually came to an end the same way, falling apart or being cut to pieces, whereupon the old pieces would be rearranged by another ruling group in some new design. The repetition of this

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process and the reproduction of some such system remains the most possible, even the most probable outcome of the present centrifugal whirl. Examples are common enough in the so-called socialist world and among recent ex-colonies.

New models more in tune with modern capabilities suggest themselves in the control system created by positive reinforcement and the meeting of primary needs of masses of people, as in Maoist China, where results—no one yet knows how effective or how fragile—are achieved through a combination of physical force and high suggestibility. Much surer methods are being developed in laboratories at the frontiers of biology and biochemistry, where it begins to appear that the stuff of group identities and behavior in the future may be put together not in the messy confusion of human existence but in tidy test tubes. The degree of control and manipulation already made possible by the new technologies in modern society may not be as far as we might like to think from the concentration of such control—of numbers as well as kinds—in the hands of any who get to push those buttons on those black boxes and give their own shapes to our future outcomes, some ultimate kind of homogenization. The question would be whether events are moving more rapidly in that direction than toward the even more radical "solution" of nuclear war. Meanwhile, it is simply factual to say that we do appear to be approaching systems of total control or total destruction more rapidly than we are creating new political systems that promise to be not just less bleak but more hopeful.

Yet the options continue open. This is still a time of confused and chaotic passage. All the old pecking orders have been pulled down or at least been pulled apart for some rearrangement. In all kinds of clustering, people hitherto deprived are reaching for some better distribution of the rights and privileges of belongingness and the satisfactions of self-esteem. There are still choices, still directions open, still new outcomes to seek. It is still possible to imagine systems of power, new pluralisms, in which human beings may be able to live with each other in some more satisfying and mutually satisfactory way. Those who still believe, in the face of all the irreducible and stubborn facts to the contrary, that some more humane arrangement of human affairs is possible can still gamble on some right things happening even if—as is most likely—they happen for some wrong reasons.

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ENERGY AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

By Henri Simonet

MUCH water has flowed under the bridge since Henry Kissinger made his much-publicized "Year of Europe" speech in April 1973. It was, one will remember, rapidly construed by some member countries of the European Economic Community as a device to restore American leadership in an Alliance weakened by years of tussle between the EEC and the United States. The two sides had been at variance over money, trade and defense, to mention only the major issues. And the then-Special Assistant to the President already perceived the emerging issue of energy as one of the most ominous problems that faced the industrialized countries. Unfortunately, although he referred to this issue in the April 1973 speech, the United States itself was hardly moving toward a national energy policy, while in Europe the EEC preferred to ignore the problem almost completely, as was evidenced by the abortive meeting of the Energy Ministers of the Community in May of 1973.

So Mr. Kissinger's call elicited from the Community countries only an evasive reaction. First, they decided essentially to ignore the American demand that trade, money and defense should be seen in a common perspective. Then they insisted that before they could negotiate even on trade or money they must work out a common position, and applied the same rule to the broad redefinition of Euro-American relations. The result was a long process that lasted through the summer of 1973, finally producing a "declaration of the European identity" and a draft of a U.S.-EEC declaration mainly focused on their economic relations.

Even from the Community standpoint, however, the new primacy given to political cooperation seemed to some Europeans a latent threat to the "interlocking" process that lies at the foundations of the Community. The temptation to opt for the path of least resistance is always very strong among the Community countries; thus they will more readily accept a common stance on a political issue where it does not carry with it any possibility of giving more substance to a Community decision-making body. Political decisions can seem painless; they can also be a distraction from the main business of the Community, the arduous ongoing process of forging economic links to meet felt needs.

Obviously the two, political and economic, cannot be separated. Indeed, from the start, the ultimate aim of the "founding fathers" of

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the Communities was the political unification of Europe, and this aim was reaffirmed unequivocally when the Community decided in 1972 to move toward Economic and Monetary Union. But as the earlier experiences of the ill-fated European Defense Community and European Political Community demonstrated, it is all too easy to overreach for a political objective. Hence the careful treading of the path of economic integration had come to seem more hopeful, leading inevitably to a high degree of interdependence and thus paving the way for eventual political solidarity and political union.

Whether one accepted this thesis or not, there could be no question that in the fall of 1973 the shaky political state of the Community was revealed all too clearly in the glare of the October War. Neither as a Community nor as an intergovernmental organization was Europe able to display the solidarity and the cohesiveness Europeans were supposed, after 15 years of relentless efforts, to be able to summon up in an emergency. As a matter of fact, the joint statement the Foreign Ministers of the Community issued on November 6, 1973, did represent a common position on a major issue of foreign policy. But most Europeans could not hide a feeling of deep uneasiness, not so much about the tenor of this statement as about its timing. It conveyed the implication that when faced with the economic, social and political consequences of a sustained oil embargo the Nine had chosen the path of appeasement at any price.

Besides, it was a sad irony that among the countries which had pleaded most forcefully for a Community which would be something other than a "Community of Tradesmen" ("l'Europe des Marchands"), none of them was able to take up the challenge which the oil embargo presented to the Community. Instead, they turned to the tradesmen, i.e., the major oil corporations. These often-reviled "multinationals" were asked to share the available supplies in such a way as not to antagonize the Arab countries. The fear was expressed that any specific move by the member countries to lend substance to the principle of Community solidarity could lead to a further curtailment of supplies by the Arab producing countries. Proposals by the Commission of the European Communities, tabled in order to maintain some cohesion among the member countries, were not even taken up formally by the Council of Ministers.

No wonder then that the summit of the heads of state and government convened in Copenhagen in December in a mood of despondency. These individuals reaffirmed the aims of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and asserted their claim to an active participation of the Community in world affairs. That this pronounce-

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ment was little more than a ritualistic statement was conspicuously evidenced by the failure of the Foreign Ministers, three days after the Summit Meeting, to agree on any of the topics which had been singled out for a quick decision in Copenhagen, namely regional policy and energy policy. And one further event occurred which was bound to entail new difficulties with the United States. During the Copenhagen meeting, four Arab Foreign Ministers popped up and started a round of talks with their European colleagues. This was the origin of the Euro-Arab dialogue which a few months later was to spark off a brief but rather hot row between the Community Ministers and Secretary of State Kissinger.

So it was difficult by any stretch of the imagination to think of 1973 as the "Year of Europe," either as Mr. Kissinger had conceived it or in a specifically European sense. The dialogue between Europe and the United States had not taken off. On the other hand, the Community itself had widely exposed its inability to face a major challenge in a way commensurate with its claim to be a major economic power evolving progressively into a political one.

II

Thus one of the shrewdest French commentators wrote at the height of the oil crisis that it had provided the "revelation" (as of a camera film suddenly developed) of the political impotency of the Europeans and of the deep strain in the relations between Europe and the United States.[1] For plainly the differences that arose in 1973 and carried over to some extent into 1974 had deep roots. Over the preceding two or three years the deterioration of the U.S. balance of payments and the ensuing dollar depreciation, coupled with the rapid expansion of the European economy and the soaring value of some European currencies, had somehow distorted the general assessment as to the relative strength of the two economies. Similarly, the European will to assert itself as a political entity, with its own "identity," had evoked the prospect of a Community pursuing a course more independent of the United States. This idea gained momentum each time either Congressmen or members of the executive branch alluded to a possible reduction of the U.S. military commitment in Europe. In fact, neither partner was immune to inner contradictions. It was unreasonable, for instance, to blame the United States for lack of leadership and then to resent any American proposal as an attempt to reassert its grip on the Atlantic Alliance. Neither was it very logical for the

[1] André Fontaine, "Une Dernière Chance pour les Neuf? Le Révélateur Pétrolier," *Le Monde*, November 7, 1973.

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American administration to prod the Europeans "to speak with one voice" and then to react to a common European stance as if it was the outcome of a deliberate attempt to put before the United States a fait accompli, leaving no other choice but to take it or leave it.

The oil crisis has created a lot of scope for these mutual grievances. Since his Pilgrims' Dinner speech of December 1973, some dark ulterior motives have been ascribed to the Secretary of State. On the other hand, the latter had developed an ambivalent attitude when the Community attempted to reach common positions. Sometimes the European countries were viewed as a rather loose aggregate of weakened states, utterly unable to work out a common political answer to the challenge they were faced with, or even to the solutions put forward by the American administration. But any attempt by the EEC countries to implement a common decision was regarded as useless procrastination or even as counterproductive.

Yet with all these difficulties the year 1974 produced some accomplishments in the crucial field of energy. The Washington Conference of February highlighted the split that had developed between France and the other members of the Community over the twin issues of close cooperation with the United States and the pursuit of a largely multilateral approach by the major oil-consuming countries. In the end, eight of the Nine decided in favor of coordinating their policies with the other industrial countries, while France, which had objected to this course ever since the Pilgrims' speech, opted out.

Above all, the Washington Conference led to the establishment of the Energy Coordinating Group (ECG), embracing the United States, Japan, Canada, Norway, and eight of the nine members of the Community. At first, in the aftermath of the Washington Conference, the United States seemed to display an ambivalent attitude. While pressing the members of the Energy Coordinating Group to devise an oil-sharing scheme and at the same time castigating the attempts to strike bilateral bargains with oil-producing countries, Washington was also trying to convince Saudi Arabia to lower its prices. But the American officials failed to persuade King Faisal and his advisers. This tentative move helped to foster the belief that the U.S. interest in an oil-consumers' organization had somewhat cooled off. This could be one of the clues to the wavering of the French government about whether or not to join the ECG. Indeed, a tug of war on this issue was going on inside the French inner power circles, and the fact that, for a time, the U.S. administration conveyed the impression that the then-Foreign Minister Michel Jobert had been right after all when he had forecast that "the Washington Con-

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ference could only come out as a total failure,"[2] strengthened the hand of those who, notwithstanding the shift in leadership and the change of style under Giscard, were stubbornly opposing any change in foreign policy. But before the summer recess, it became obvious that the United States meant business when it talked of mustering the oil-consuming industrialized countries in one international organization able to cope with OPEC.

The two main elements of the American long-term energy strategy were, on the one hand, the implementation of an oil-sharing mechanism in order to protect the oil-consuming countries against a new embargo, and on the other hand the shift from a seller's market to a buyer's market by the enforcement of oil-saving measures and the switch to other energy sources. The latter was intended to create a surplus which would have put before the producing countries the dilemma of lowering prices or curtailing production. The basic assumption was, of course, that a cartel cannot withstand a lasting surplus, and that the allotment of production quotas among the producing countries would in the end topple the cartel, or at least weaken its negotiating position, if it ever came to political discussions between producing and consuming countries.[3]

Thus, in November 1974, the countries participating in the ECG were able to agree not only on the establishment of an International Energy Agency—to which several other nations promptly adhered—but on a far-reaching program for emergency sharing of oil in the event of another cutoff. To this program, which may be activated by a majority decision, the United States has pledged its own oil resources, thus providing a strong earnest that it is ready to take whatever economic measures are required to preserve the economic and political stability of the Western countries.

From the Community standpoint the new agreements are also striking. In them the eight participants have accepted a whole set of commitments that go far beyond what they had been prepared to consider in the framework of the Community. In addition, countries which had been loath to accept any idea of formally sharing oil with the other Community members when they were in dire straits

[2] ". . . la Conférence de Washington ne pourrait déboucher sur autre chose que le néant," Michel Jobert, *Memoires d'avenir,* Paris: Grasset, 1974, p. 287.

[3] In that respect, it is worth mentioning that in 1973 the Commission of the European Communities made a proposal to the Council of Ministers of the Communities which enshrined consumer solidarity coupled with a dialogue with the producing countries. At that time, France dismissed the idea of solidarity among the consumers because of fears that this would reaffirm U.S. leadership and allow the Americans to achieve their alleged aim of regaining their grip on the Atlantic Alliance. The idea of initiating a Community dialogue with the producing countries was also discarded on the ground that there was no common foreign policy.

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during the oil embargo are now ready to do so.

Indeed, if one looks back at the work the ECG has accomplished, one is struck not only by its substantive importance but by the speed with which the drafting of a technically intricate and politically far-reaching agreement was completed. The fact that it was a highly technocratic exercise, though conducted with a great deal of political acumen, is unmistakably one of the reasons for the rapidity of the proceedings up to the signature of the agreement establishing the IEA. The political motive behind the decision of the member-states of the Community to accede to the IEA lies in the realization of their predicament. Faced with the success of the organization of the oil-producing countries in establishing a cartel for a commodity, the vital character of which was forcibly demonstrated by the embargo and ensuing price boosts, they concluded that the only safe course was to rally behind the United States in the latter's bid to build up a countervailing power to OPEC. In doing this, they expressed their preference for the American strategy over the French strategy of shunning any formal agreement among the industrialized countries.

III

One by one, then, the elements of a coherent strategy and policy among the major oil-consuming countries have been brought into place. In December 1974, Presidents Ford and Giscard d'Estaing were able to agree at Martinique on a compromise that accepted the necessity for a full-scale dialogue and conference between producers and consumers, but at the same time stressed the need to coordinate the positions of the major consuming countries in advance. Now both processes are unfolding alongside each other, and agreement was reached in Washington in January on one of the three critical elements of a common position for the consuming countries, namely financial solidarity, secured through adequate financial arrangements to cope with the plight of individual industrialized countries faced with particular difficulties because of their oil deficits.

The history of this agreement on financial measures is important. As in the work of the Energy Coordinating Group, there was a clear interplay between efforts to provide new multilateral financial facilities and the separate policy being pursued by the United States in a largely solitary effort to bring down the price of oil. Thus, all through the summer and fall of 1974 the American authorities privately resisted—and publicly almost ignored—the issue of new financial measures, on the ground that these could interfere with their

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private efforts on price. Only in November, after these efforts had apparently been judged fruitless at least for the time being, did Messrs. Kissinger and Simon propose the so-called "financial safety net" of $25 billion.

By then the European Community nations were far along in their own thinking, and had taken the concrete action of setting up in early November a Community Loan System. This system allows the Community to take up medium-term loans with the oil-producing countries—initially up to three billion dollars—and to re-lend the money to the central banks of member-states experiencing balance-of-payments deficits. The re-lending is made under certain conditions of economic policy, and this could be the first effective step toward common European decision-making in the field of economic policy. It would also mean a unique form of monetary solidarity, the most effective indeed that seems attainable, in the short run, for the Community as a whole. Thus, while not enormous in size, the arrangement had an important "European" element that added to its appeal.

Specifically, the European Community members felt that new facilities should have the strongest possible participation and interest from the oil-producing countries themselves, whereas the American "safety net" tended to exclude the producers (while of course depending on their financial resources as the basis for the redistribution effort needed to help afflicted nations). The European viewpoint was reflected in the plan associated with Chancellor Healey of Britain, i.e., to expand the International Monetary Fund (IMF) facilities involving direct contributions, and a share in voting, by the producers.

In the end—and this is the striking fact—a compromise agreement was reached. Many of the Community had been—as is well known in Europe—opposed to the Kissinger-Simon plan and disposed to reject it out of hand and to use the voting power of Europe and others to ram through the expanded IMF scheme. On reflection, however, such counsels yielded to others, and the EEC was able to come together on a common position and thus to negotiate as a unit for an effective compromise. While I do not mean to suggest that the outcome was wholly decided between the Community and the United States, the fact that a major difference of views existed in this case between these two—and above all the fact that the Community spoke as one (through Mr. Healey principally)—made the agreement between Americans and Europeans decisive.

IV

I come, then, to the crux of my argument. Two methods have been

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used in the past year to concert, as between America and the European Community, the necessary common positions on the central issues of energy policy. One, represented by the negotiations of the Energy Coordinating Group and the prospective operation of the International Energy Agency, has seen the Europeans acting as individual nations, closely linked but not seeking to form a single solid position in advance. The other, the negotiation of financial solidarity, has seen the Community operating effectively as a unit. Now the question is which of these two methods is most appropriate for the remaining critical negotiations among oil-consuming countries.

Put differently, the issue for the European Community countries is how they will reconcile the need, pressed on them by the American administration, for a broad solidarity among consumer countries—and for fairly rapid decisions on key issues—with the need and present possibility of working out a common energy policy among the Nine. Such a common energy policy for the Community involves much more than the mere implementation of economic and financial measures to sustain coal production or to step up nuclear energy production. It extends to the whole area of energy conservation and the development of non-oil energy sources—and at its outer limits must encompass, at least for the time being, the broader issues of relations with Arab countries, the maintenance of the Alliance, and for some European countries even sheer economic survival.

The development of a common energy policy is basically a matter for the Community nations themselves. Yet American energy strategy, and the way the American government seeks to work with the countries of the Community, can make all the difference to the chances for a successful European energy policy. Inevitably, it is the United States that has had to take the lead in bringing together the major oil-consuming countries and in defining the agenda of cooperation. And, equally inevitably, the external components of U.S. energy policy cannot be disentangled from the policy the United States pursues on the domestic level. President Ford's initiatives of January, even if they should now be modified by the U.S. Congress, have given a much clearer picture of where America intends to move domestically, at least in the short run. And more recently Secretary Kissinger has defined in detail the American approach to the key issues that remain unsettled among the consuming countries—namely energy restraint (or conservation) and the development of alternative sources of energy.

It is precisely in connection with these issues that the need for a Community energy policy is greatest and most apparent. For the

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Community, with only incidental differences among its members, occupies a position vastly different from that of the United States both in respect to possible energy savings and in respect to the development of new sources of energy. On these matters there *is* a true "Community viewpoint," there *is* an evident need for common guidelines for action, and there *is* a clear case for rationalizing the affirmative actions taken within the Community so that they make the greatest possible contribution to the Community as a whole. It is these factors, I believe, which now bring within grasp a true Community policy on energy, and give promise of overriding the differences of economic philosophy and analysis that have hitherto prevented the development of such a policy.

In a sense, as the American government continues to take the lead, its initiatives could be the impetus the Community needs to design its own energy policy. Indeed, this is already starting to be the case.

For example, the American "Project Independence" has already forced the Community to define its basic objectives in relation to the use of imported oil. Project Independence suggests that at a continuing price of $11 per barrel (in 1974 dollars) for imported oil, demand in the United States would fall and alternative sources be developed, so that by 1985 the need for imported oil would be substantially eliminated.

Even if the price per barrel were reduced (for instance, to a basic $9 a barrel, with an escalation clause) it would spell difficulties, economic and political, for the Community. In economic terms, the consumption problem of the Community countries is not the same as that of the United States. The level of dependence on energy imports is as high as 63 percent for the Community countries versus a corresponding level of 17 percent in the United States. For oil consumption the situation is the same: 98 percent of the oil consumed in Europe is imported, while the United States imports only 35 percent of its total needs. The conclusion is very clear: it is impossible for Europe to be independent; we cannot achieve the same goal that the United States has set for itself with the formulation of the so-called "Project Independence."

We are thus trying in the European Community only to reach a point of "less dependence." The Council of Ministers of the Community approved, in December 1974, a resolution in which the target for the Community's indigenous production was defined as half its total energy needs. The means to reach this goal have yet to be specified, but we know that it will be very expensive and difficult to carry through such a program.

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While the task of moderating demand and increasing other supply sources is hard enough even for the United States, it is certainly very much harder for Europeans. The slowdown in Europe in energy consumption in 1974, when this demand component fell by 1.6 percent in comparison with the 1973 figure, was due far more to the combined effects of higher prices for imported oil and the slowdown in general economic activity, which curbed demand, than to official action. It is true that certain countries—including France—are running ambitious energy economy schemes; but if progress is to be made in terms of quantities, what is needed is a concerted and significant effort at the Community level to implement specifically tailored policy measures having a precise consumption-reduction objective. This is the context in which the Commission is proposing that the Community countries, on a voluntary basis, agree to a seven percent cut in oil imports for 1975–76, through implementing a range of specific measures. However, the European countries can commit themselves to an effort of this kind only if they have the feeling that similar measures are being implemented seriously in the other oil-consuming countries, notably the United States. Thus, here again, concerted action is essential, whatever the framework in which it is pursued.

As for the development of alternative energy sources, the immediate question arising in this connection is how the new sources are to be paid for: would the correct policy be to work on the basis of commercial profitability against the background of current world prices, or should the firms developing alternative energy schemes be given cost-plus contracts by the authorities and should there be financial support machinery? Here again, it is important to establish exactly what approach is to be adopted, particularly at the European Community level, for the pursuit of differing policies could well jeopardize the entire effort committed by one or another member-state which had adopted in advance an action plan of its own devising. If the challenge is to be properly met, a great deal of money will have to be spent: this is another good reason for eliminating any risk of making a mistake.

It is against this background that the European Community has started to come to grips with what concertation procedures its members should adopt vis-à-vis the other industrialized countries which are anxious to achieve the same energy independence objectives within the framework of the International Energy Agency. The first alternative would be to seek the establishment of a consensus on this question within the International Energy Agency, and then to ensure that this consensus is accepted by the countries which are not members of the

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Agency, including France, through the development of diplomatic contacts. The other alternative would be to arrange, *prior* to any important decision committing the IEA member-states, for concertation of the nine Community member-states, which should, if there is to be any consistent action, have worked out among themselves a common policy and a common attitude.

The Commission believes that, in institutional and political terms, the second is the only possible approach. In institutional terms, it is certainly right, since concertation among the Community countries is expressly provided for by Article 116 of the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community, which requires that in its economic relations with international organizations the Community must express itself and behave as a single entity.

On the other hand, the first alternative—despite its degree of success to date in the Energy Coordinating Group—is bound in the long run to produce contradictions and difficulties. In political terms, the Community, which has a policy and internal unity, will always be dependent on a consensus of views of a hypothetical nature liable to vary according to circumstances and the specific formulation of any given issue. And, more basically, under the approach of dealing only through the IEA, members of the Community are bound to commit themselves to whole sets of policies which, if not coordinated with a Community policy, could water down any such policy or even make it wholly superfluous. If there is ever to be a Community energy policy, it must be worked out soon. And if there is not, then the whole fabric of the Community could unravel.

It is with these arguments in mind that the Commission has proposed to the Council, which accepted this suggestion on January 20, 1975, that any important issue involving the eight Community member-states within the International Energy Agency should be harmonized in advance through concertation procedures among the Nine, i.e., with France. In taking this position the members of the Community have assumed a heavy burden—obviously the process of bringing together all the major oil-consuming countries cannot wait on a laggard Europe. But I believe the time is ripe for the Community to act on the key energy issues. Some member countries have readily granted to the IEA authority to make decisions according to majority rule, on matters for which they have declined so far to concede any competence to the Community, even under the unanimity rule. So it seems at first sight difficult for them to deny to the Community what they conceded for the sake of the International Emergency Program. Otherwise, the conclusion would certainly be drawn

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that they put Atlantic above European solidarity. At least the issues of energy restraint and alternative sources should now be susceptible to a high degree of common attitude and policy approach within the Community.

There remains one point, which impinges especially on the problems connected with the establishment of an external policy for the European Community. This is the question of the development of direct contacts between the European Community and the Arab countries in the Arab League—the Euro-Arab dialogue dating from the Copenhagen Summit Conference in December 1973.

The problem is a delicate one in many respects. In the first place, it is bound up with the question as to whether Europe has a political identity of its own. The establishment of relations and contacts, and the opening of a dialogue, must have a deeper objective than that of eliciting recognition of the Community as a fully qualified partner with diplomatic status, enjoying treaty-making powers. The European Community does not in fact yet possess a political personality of its own; it constitutes only the beginnings of the expression of the joint political will of several states. This is probably what upsets some people in the United States, who may take the view, not wholly without reason, that the protagonists in the Euro-Arab dialogue are only the actors, not the authors of the play.

The second question is the involvement of the Community in the changing pattern of international relations in areas where the United States has its own policies and strategies and, of course, speaks with one voice. And this is a situation which is extremely hazardous, since the existence of a state—Israel—is at stake, which is the same as saying that world equilibrium is at stake. Is there not a danger that Euro-Arab cooperation may render even more complicated efforts to find a solution to the problem arising from the situation in the Middle East? Is there not a risk that the Community's political coherence may be put to the kind of test to which it is at present unable to respond—as indeed the Arab countries seem to have realized, in that they are now blocking any progress in the discussion by insisting on the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the dialogue?

Mere mention of these questions is enough to indicate the complexity of the present situation, but it is also an admission that the Community is not—yet—a political power in a position to adopt decisions and exert influence. Europe can act as a single entity, here as elsewhere, only if a twofold requirement is already met—there must be consensus among the member-states and there must be the basis

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for a common policy. This is not yet the case, far from it, with regard to the foreign policies of the Community member countries, and this accounts for the U.S. attitude of "active reluctance" toward us in this field.

V

During the transition year of 1974, the unfolding impact of the staggering increase in oil prices has markedly changed the whole context of U.S.-European relations.

Because of their thriving economies, some member countries had indulged in the thought that they could steer a new course in their relationship with the United States. Now, they begin to realize that the time has come again to harmonize views and to work out common designs. The tone also has progressively lost the abrasive character it had for many months. Though some suspicions as to the role the United States has played in the oil crisis still linger,[4] nobody now thinks, as some once did, that it was all engineered by the United States or at least that the Americans had endorsed it. The very fact that such utterances circulated in some European quarters shows to what a point of bitterness and distrust relations had sagged.

On the other hand, there have been fits of anger at the highest levels of the American administration, which tended to confirm the Europeans in their suspicion that the United States was trying to reassert its leadership, and sometimes in the most ruthless way.

A satisfactory deal has been struck on the issue of mutual consultations. On trade, the EEC and the United States have successfully completed the negotiation of Article XXIV-6 of the GATT agreement. On money, the currency problems stemming from the oil surpluses have been coped with, at least in the short run, by the various accommodations which I have referred to above; however, the bulk of the problem remains unsolved and will remain unsolved as long as neither the issue of a balanced structure of energy prices is settled nor the design of a workable international monetary system is achieved.

But there is at least the first outline of a new partnership in the limited though essential field of energy. True enough, new difficulties could arise, especially concerning the way the dialogue with the producing countries is to be conducted; for example, some European countries might go along with a preparatory conference without any prior agreement on the three issues which the Americans consider as

[4] I refer here mainly to the alleged role of the five American oil majors, which in some quarters was viewed as being as instrumental in the price increases as that of the oil-producing countries and whose connections with the American administration were put forward as the evidence of some obscure maneuvers of that administration.

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paramount. Yet slowly, even painfully, the dialogue on the momentous issues which face and will face the industrialized countries of the Alliance is taking shape.

Does this mean that at last the Year of Europe has come?

It will depend mainly on the ability of the United States to come forward, most probably under the pressure of an emergency, with the kind of inventive leadership it has so far displayed on energy. But this could mean only the early initiation of multilateral talks and negotiations with various European countries, discounting the Community as such. This would be a tempting course to follow, because it could make for expediency in a period of emergency. But, as we all know, shortcuts are not always the surest way, nor even the shortest one, to get to a point. Fundamentally, it is more in the U.S. interest to rely on a European partner, difficult though it can be at some times, than to lean on a loosely-knit group of so-called sovereign states. This was the main thrust of the American attitude toward Europe for about 20 years, since the immediate postwar period. Why should this course be reversed when the challenges that face the West, and especially the Alliance, are different but portend as gruesome a situation if they are not met as the threats posed by the cold war itself.

We come in the end to the main issue which has always weighed on the whole Euro-American relationship. Do the Europeans want to live up to the stern conditions of a real Community that involves not only a common market and common economic and financial policies but also a common political vision and a common decision center, on all the issues which are of a fundamental European concern and interest? It is only when they are able to answer that question that the Year of Europe will have arrived and that they will have discarded the prophecy made some 50 years ago by Paul Valéry: "L'Europe aspire à être dirigée par une Commission américaine. Toute sa politique l'y dirige."

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DÉTENTE OR ENTENTE?

By Richard Rosecrance

THE U.S.-Soviet détente is neither fully understood nor certain to endure. The sheer complexity of détente balancing—holding the Soviet Union, China, the Western allies and Japan in a complicated network of associations with the United States which involve conflict as well as cooperation—may not last. Even if it could be sustained, some argue that American interests dictate that it should be dropped or radically modified. To others détente is an attitude, but not a policy. It represents a desirable and overdue recognition of realities in foreign policy—the need to achieve better relations with the Soviet Union and China. But it does not specify where the United States should go from there. Détente without a positive core of policy goals could jeopardize American relations with Japan and Western Europe without gaining any durable benefit from the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet-American trade agreement makes it seem even less likely that the United States can use détente as a means to extract important concessions from the U.S.S.R.

Other critics contend that whatever the merits of détente policy, the political costs it imposes cannot ultimately be borne. Congress and the American public can understand and support a policy which clearly discriminates friend from foe. They can accept a policy of nonintervention and reliance upon allies. But they can neither understand nor fully support a policy which switches back and forth: now balancing for one state, now for another.

Such shifts in policy depend upon a bureaucratic mastery of the defense and foreign policy apparatus that has seldom existed in American history. Today they rest on the personal ascendancy of one man, Henry Kissinger. But even in 1975 new centers of opposition to Secretary Kissinger—on the President's staff and in the Defense Department, to say nothing of Congress—were threatening his unparalleled sway. No successor seems likely to achieve a similar primacy.

Entirely aside from its apparent structural weaknesses, the opponents of détente now note the presumed advantages which the Soviet Union may be coming to derive. Pentagon and congressional critics see the United States being lulled into a false sense of security while the U.S.S.R. makes signal advances in international power and influence. The SALT II agreement reached at Vladivostok does not allay critics' fears because it perpetuates Soviet advantages in strategic throw-weight and allows such a large number of multiple tar-

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geted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) that U.S. land-based forces are likely to be vulnerable to attack. In the economic field as well, the Soviet Union and its militant Arab allies, so it is argued, have put the industrial countries, including the United States, on the defensive. Western states are now squabbling about economic policy, and Russia has gained a significant edge militarily.

It is useful to record these negative estimates of the value and viability of the détente if only to lay the ground for counterargument. For it is this writer's view that the superpower relationship must be preserved, and that if it collapses a much greater tension and polarization in world politics will follow. At the extreme this could lead perhaps to overt conflict between America and Russia. The choices that American and Soviet decision-makers face are similar to those confronted by European and American statesmen in eras past. Before World War I and immediately after World War II, critical decisions were made by European and American leaders which led directly to major periods of conflict or war. These decisions were by no means inevitable: they were the result of conscious choices, not the impartial and irresistible pressure of circumstances. The parallel is that today the world is moving toward possibly similar and equally disastrous decisions, decisions which could affect mankind for decades to come. The choice that is involved is essentially between a mixed international system in which allies and potential adversaries are held together in a network of fundamental cooperation, and a system in which lines of conflict are starkly drawn, with the United States and its allies more or less firmly on one side, and its enemies more or less firmly on the other. It is a choice between a new form of bipolarity and an ambivalent system in which neither cooperation nor conflict is permitted to dominate patterns of alignment.

The point of decision is coming nearer if only because conflicts in world politics are becoming sharper: the détente has suffered important reverses in the past 18 months—the Soviet-American accord linking trade and a greater freedom of emigration has foundered; the Middle East war of 1973 raised important and still unanswered questions about détente's value in both Moscow and Washington. Meanwhile the oil crisis has signaled new and yet-undigested shifts in economic power, and compounded the already grave twin problems of inflation and recession throughout the world.

But equally important and in a longer term sense more critical, the political basis of Western progress and stability may be cast into question. It has frequently been observed that democratic political structures have become more fragile. They cannot abide inflation, yet

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neither can they tolerate the remedies which would be necessary to stop or contain it. Even more certainly, however, they may not survive a prolonged period of economic dislocation. Any sustained industrial or economic chaos would create a belt of discontent and political ferment running across Western and central Europe which could ultimately undermine the bases of internal politics forged after World War II. Depending on the choices that are made in the next several years, the basic political world of the post-World War II period could come unstuck.

II

The historical parallels for this situation are at least three in number. The first is to be found in German policy in 1890. Prior to Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's dismissal early in that year, European diplomacy had been dextrously bound up in a network of alliances and alignments that linked Germany with every major state except France. Bismarck had been particularly successful in preventing the chronic rivals, Austria and Russia, from coming to blows over Balkan real estate. The alliance ties with Austria dated back to 1879 on a bilateral basis, and they had been reaffirmed in the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. The Russians, on the other hand, had not lacked for German support and friendship. Their aims had been supported nationally by Bismarck but the German Chancellor had also been careful to sponsor an opposing coalition, including England, Austria and Italy, to prevent Russia from actually taking military steps to realize them. In 1887, Bismarck had negotiated the Reinsurance Treaty with the Tsar, to secure Russia against Austrian expansion. Bismarckian alliances were condemned as "inconsistent" because the alliance with Austria was directed against Russia, and the alliance with Russia against Austria. At the same time it was precisely the "inconsistency" of Bismarck's central position that allowed him to keep on good terms with both protagonists, and to prevent them from going to war.

After Bismarck's fall, the new German Emperor and his Chancellor, Caprivi, decided to drop the Russian connection. It was thought to prevent an alliance with England, and it made their link with Vienna much more difficult. It was simpler to eliminate the inconsistency and take sides in world politics. As it turned out, of course, England was not ready to be one of Germany's formal allies. She was willing to cooperate only on limited bases in particular parts of the world. When this was proved, it was already too late for Berlin to reverse its course: Russia had already allied with France, commenc-

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ing a new process of polarization in European politics.

The polarization was not yet complete, however. England remained unconnected with the Triple Alliance or with its Franco-Russian adversary. Nor were the British ready to join one against the other. In 1904, in Lord Lansdowne's ministry, the British concluded a colonial entente with the French which was supposed to alleviate the friction over Egypt and Morocco. But the entente was not a general alliance, nor was it directed against Germany. Lansdowne had treated overtures from Germany and France evenhandedly. He had worked together with Germany in Venezuela, and the prospect of a more far-reaching accommodation with Berlin had not been ruled out. The defeat of France's ally, Russia, by Japan in 1905 made the reconciliation with France still less attractive, and France's own obeisance before German pressure in that same year cast doubt on her solidity as a useful makeweight in world politics. Lansdowne's understanding with the French was based on previous British policy: it was limited; it operated in specific areas of the world; it was not intended to circumscribe British freedom of action.

But Sir Edward Grey, Lansdowne's successor at the Foreign Office, began in 1906 to treat the French entente as if it were a fixed and general article of British policy, almost as if it were an alliance.[1] Grey did not seek to keep on good terms with both France and Germany. The Germans also ceased trying to lure England into their net. They sought rather to build a continental position which was unassailable.[2] Once again, consistency was chosen at the expense of general cooperation, and the European international system became finally polarized into two camps: Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. World War I followed shortly thereafter.

But the most salient blunder in modern international relations occurred after World War II when Russia and America lurched into a cold war that neither wanted or could easily afford. President Roosevelt knew that the United States would never fight the U.S.S.R. over the Soviet position in Eastern Europe; intermittently, he understood how important the East European buffer was to Premier Stalin. Yet he and President Truman allowed themselves to be trapped into a policy that made conflict with the Soviet Union inevitable. It was not possible for the United States to meddle in the Soviet sphere of occupation and still maintain Russian friendship.

[1] I am indebted here to recent research in Grey's papers by Mr. Alan Alexandroff.

[2] Fritz Fischer argues: "Up to 1911 Germany had not succeeded in adopting Britain's policy of concluding compromises with her competitors, for she had equated moderation with an inferiority incompatible with the world power status which was her aim." *Germany's Aims in the First World War,* New York: W. W. Norton, 1967, p. 24.

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Similarly, Stalin made egregious errors in his relations with the Western powers. He did not realize that Roosevelt's offers of friendship were genuine, and that in any event the American leader was not in a position really to oppose Soviet policy in Eastern Europe. The very abrasiveness in Soviet dealings with Western statesmen after 1945 actually made easier the creation of the strong group of anti-Communist nations that it was in the Russian interest to avoid. Here the issue was not that of choosing between two possible partners, but of maintaining tolerable relations where interests were partly opposed but also partly harmonious. Bismarck had maintained good relations with Russia in similar circumstances in the 1880s. In 1945, however, rather than live with the ambiguity, both Russians and Americans lapsed into more "consistent" modes of diplomacy. The result was the cold war, and an ensuing series of major crises in world politics.

III

Today similar temptations beset the two major powers. The American case against superpower détente is well known and needs only brief restatement here. Critics claim that the United States has gained little and lost much from its "special relationship" with the U.S.S.R. In the Middle East crisis of 1973, it is contended, the Soviet Union did little to restrain its clients, but then threatened to intervene to save them from Israeli counteroffensives. Despite American efforts to pledge Moscow to a "hands-off" position, the Soviet resupply of the Arabs took place at the first sign of an Arab deficiency. Only after the Soviet effort was in full swing did America reluctantly begin to aid Israel. Americans ponder the value of détente in managing crises if on each occasion the Soviets still threaten unilateral intervention.

In economic terms, it is held, the Soviet Union only seeks high technological inputs from the United States and other industrial countries, not a stable trading relationship with two-way advantages. Even in the agricultural field, the Soviet Union will use its access to Western food markets merely to supplement harvests, buying episodically and with little warning.

In the military realm, congressional and Pentagon specialists fear not only Moscow's strategic rearmament but also the growing power of its conventional land and sea forces. The Soviet threat to the central region in Europe is greater now than it was five years ago, and Western, particularly American, strength has declined.[3] The Soviet

[3] *The Military Balance, 1974–75* points out: "In 1962 the American land, sea and air forces in Europe totalled 434,000; now the figure is around 300,000. There were 26 Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe in 1967; now there are 31." International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1974, p. 101.

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Navy is not growing in size, but is definitely increasing in capability. The danger it poses to U.S. carrier forces has considerably increased.[4] The Soviets, it is argued, will use their growing might to gain political influence in Europe, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.

Finally, the Soviets are seen as encouraging the militant oil producers to take advantage of the economic troubles of the West. Growing talk of counteraction against Arab states—whether it be political, economic or military—has downplayed the Soviet role. Yet the more U.S. leaders think about intervention, the more surely they must consider Soviet involvement.

In short, the opposition to détente in America—while diverse and inconsistent from one group to another—must be rated today as strong. One could well imagine developments that would make it predominant in the next few years.

IV

It is not generally recognized, however, that the Russian case against détente is fully as strong as the American one. For many reasons it is a pity that the Soviet Union is such a closed society. If we knew more about opposition in Soviet bureaucratic and political circles to Brezhnev's policy, perhaps some Americans would see it in a more favorable light. In any event, from a variety of Soviet bureaucratic perspectives it could be argued that many of the supposed advantages to the U.S.S.R. of the détente policy have not in fact accrued. America did not remain in a state of post-Vietnam paralysis after 1972. The revulsion against the war and things military did not lead to a drastic cut in the U.S. defense budget. The weakness of U.S. foreign policy in Europe was not as great as the Russians had thought it might be. Russia's Westpolitik was a successful reciprocation of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, but it did not lead to European political weakness nor to a favorable environment for the reception of Soviet policy. In the Vienna mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations, the Europeans, not the United States, have pressed for tough negotiating stances. In the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Europeans, more than the Americans, were unwilling to concede on political and economic issues unless the Soviet Union would yield important concessions in the field of information and cultural exchange. Far from softening up European populaces for more far-reaching Soviet gestures, a limit to the rapprochement appeared to have been drawn.

[4] James R. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975,* U.S. Department of Defense, March 4, 1974, Washington: GPO, pp. 11–12.

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In the Middle East the United States rebounded with vigor after October 1973. The Russians lost leverage with Egypt and Syria and had little in Tel Aviv. Secretary Kissinger, on the other hand, maintained and increased his influence on both sides. At minimum the October War showed that the Arabs might win battles, but that they could not force Israel to withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967. This meant that a solution could only be found diplomatically. Kissinger was in a unique position to negotiate the beginnings of such a settlement. The American reconciliation with Egypt even improved his negotiating position with Israel: Tel Aviv could no longer take American support for granted. His position was also enhanced by his style of negotiation: taking a leaf from Bismarck's book, he refused to take sides. He knew that opposite numbers cannot simply be "forced" to agree. The art of gaining diplomatic acceptance depends upon a subtle mixture of constraint and volition. Whatever the realistic pressures, a statesman has to be persuaded to reach an accommodation, if it is to endure. This policy was in direct contradiction to that used previously in dealing with the militant Arab world; it was also in sharp contrast to the cold-war diplomacy of 1945–47. From the Soviet standpoint, therefore, American foreign policy success in the Middle East was completely unprecedented. Brezhnev's doctrines of U.S. weakness and passivity had not prepared the Russians for such an outcome.

Equally important, though the U.S. military position might seem weak to Americans, it looked formidable to the Russians. To be sure, the U.S.S.R. gained important advantages in the 1972 SALT negotiations. The Soviets were building launchers, the Americans were not. The former had to be persuaded to stop. At the same time, the United States was into the full rush of its MIRV (and follow-on MARV [maneuverable, independently targetable reentry vehicles]) technology. In numbers of warheads and in accuracy, Washington remained far ahead of Moscow. It was not until the announcement of four new Soviet missiles (three initially equipped with MIRVs) in August 1973 that it began to appear that the Russians would catch up.

The failure to reach agreement on limitations on MIRVed missiles in June 1974, and the relatively high levels (1,320) set for such missiles in November, however, did not leave the United States in an inferior position. Both larger and more accurate warheads (the Mk 12A and a terminally guided MARV) were in prospect for Minuteman III.[5] Either or both will permit the 550 advanced Minuteman

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 52–55.

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missiles to pose a hard-target threat to a substantial portion of the Soviet land-based missile force. With terminal guidance it will not be long before U.S. CEPs (circular error probable) fall to less than 700 feet. With a 200-kiloton warhead, such accuracies will permit target overpressures of well beyond the 300 pounds per square inch needed to destroy many current ICBM silos.[6]

The superior accuracy of present and prospective U.S. missiles over systems the Soviets have in prospect also has an important bearing on the effectiveness of warheads deployed against a single target or a cluster of targets.[7] American accuracies may more than counterbalance Russian superiority in throw-weight for some time to come, so that by 1980 U.S. first-strike capabilities against Soviet land-based missiles may be considerably greater than corresponding Soviet capabilities against the American fixed-base force.

The 1974 Vladivostok agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, while placing rather high limits on MIRVed missiles, in no way constrains the research and development race in sophisticated warhead technology, mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, and antisubmarine warfare. Any such competition will almost certainly underscore American advantages, not only putting some Soviet systems under constraint or pressure but also demonstrating American prowess before the rest of the world. Very accurate missiles, higher-yield warheads, maneuverable reentry vehicles are only some of the innovations that will follow from the reopening of the Pandora's box of American technological wizardry. Despite the U.S.-Soviet *aide-mémoire* of December 1974 and the offer to negotiate lower ceilings on MIRVed missiles, the completion of currently planned U.S. deployments and force improvement programs at levels

[6] Dr. Kosta Tsipis in *Offensive Missiles,* Stockholm Paper No. 5, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (1974), develops a measure of the lethality of U.S. and Soviet warheads. If the United States adds terminal guidance and doubles the yield of Poseidon and Minuteman III warheads, "the total (kiloton) value of the U.S. arsenal will rise to over 110,000, that is, to a value five times more than the Soviet nuclear arsenal could possibly have by 1981–82, and high enough to threaten the Soviet silos with assured destruction" (p. 27).

[7] These conclusions are reinforced by recent revelations concerning the "fratricide" effect which limits the number of reentry vehicles which can be deployed against a single target in rapid succession. The detonation of the first warhead may disable subsequent ones before the latter can hit the target. In addition, when a number of incoming warheads are targeted on a relatively dense cluster of ICBM silos, their explosions cause crater debris, shock waves and nuclear clouds which reduce accuracy and penetration of subsequent warheads. This makes U.S. Minuteman fields particularly difficult to attack. The answer to this problem appears to be higher accuracy, so that no more than one reliable re-entry vehicle need be allocated to a single target. Testimony of Secretary of the Air Force John McLucas, *FY 1975 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, etc.,* Part 2 *Authorizations,* Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, February 7, 19 and 22, 1974, Washington: GPO, p. 317. This issue is extensively reviewed in Lt. Col. J. J. McGlinchey and Dr. Jacob W. Seelig, "Why ICBMs Can Survive," *Air Force Magazine,* September 1974, pp. 82–85.

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below the agreed ceiling will put considerable pressure on Soviet systems.

The détente can be attacked from other Soviet standpoints. In the traditional Soviet lexicon the strength of adversary coalitions has been roughly assessed in terms of their cohesion. This is not a surprising criterion because it is one the U.S.S.R. uses in its relations with Eastern Europe. A cohesive Soviet bloc, from Moscow's standpoint, is ipso facto a strong bloc. Conversely, a Western alliance in disarray is automatically weaker: it is both more vulnerable to Soviet pressure and more open to Soviet blandishments. These assessments are made independently of the basic strength of the component units of the alliance. On the other hand, while it is true that American relationships with traditional allies are somewhat looser than they were ten years ago, it is also true (except in raw materials) that the strength of U.S. allies has grown greatly over the last ten years, certainly in economic and to some degree even in military technological fields. Thus the Soviet Union now faces a stronger alliance than it did previously, if one that is less tightly knit. Where previously the Soviets encountered a single American-allied response, now there are several. But in certain areas British, French, and even Japanese objections may be harder to deal with than American ones.

In other words, détente, by drawing the United States slightly closer to the Soviet Union, has not simplified the U.S.S.R.'s negotiating task. Because of greater independence within U.S. alliances, American assent is no longer the assent of the developed world. Even after U.S. concurrence, Paris, Bonn, London and Tokyo must still be dealt with. If détente is to be fully implemented, Moscow should even want a more cohesive Western alliance, if only to be sure that its tentative agreements with the United States will be endorsed by other powerful states.

A final thorn in Moscow's side is the U.S. connection with Peking. The American rapprochement with Russia's major enemy is hardly likely to make American policy more consistent with Soviet aims. Of course, long-term normalization of the Sino-Soviet relationship is not entirely out of the question. But neither the Soviets nor the Chinese appear willing to make the fundamental concessions that would make that possible. The Chinese assert their independence at every point. If the current regime will not accept dictation from Moscow, their successors seem even less likely to do so. They will not give up their nuclear weapons; nor will they concede Chinese territory. The Russians, on the other hand, are likely to demand far-reaching concessions for any accommodation. China's very power and inde-

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pendence will lead the Soviet Union to insist upon the most formal and complete coordination of all policies from Moscow. Nothing short of this will assure Russian leaders that China would not use an accommodation to further its own divisive policies. The Russians view China as an "apostate" power which must make no small obeisance to be admitted back among the "faithful." Thus the terms for a resumption of normal relations between them will be very stiff. There is little evidence that any Chinese regime would be willing to pay them.

But if the Sino-Soviet split is a relatively dependable reference point in interstate relations, the United States gains major advantages. Secretary Kissinger, like Bismarck, is in the position of being "honest broker" between them. Kissinger formally declines such a role. He told James Reston recently: "The current policy for the United States is to take account of what exists and to conduct a policy of meticulous honesty with both of them, so that neither believes we are trying to use one against the other."[8] It remains true, however, that Washington has approached Moscow through Peking. Just as Bismarck's Dual Alliance with Austria in 1879 made possible the Three Emperors' Alliance in 1881, so it is that good American relations with China make the Soviet Union more pliable. Only after the China visit in 1972 could Kissinger and Nixon have expected such a profitable reception in Russia.

It could even be argued that the solidity of the Chinese military position on the Soviet border, tying up 1,000,000 Soviet troops, had some useful implications for European defense. In Secretary Schlesinger's Fiscal 1975 posture statement it is noted that the West may be able to counter a Warsaw Pact mobilized threat to central Europe of 80 to 90 divisions if NATO continues and expands its force-improvement programs. But it could not hope to cope with the threat of up to 130 divisions that would result from a transfer of Soviet troops from the eastern regions of the Soviet Union. Since the Soviet Union has to be concerned with the Chinese theater, however, NATO can effectively concentrate upon meeting the designated threat of 80 to 90 divisions.[9] This means that Chinese forces are an essential analytical ingredient in European defense. As long as Sino-American ties remain tolerable, Russia faces complications if she exerts pressure on either front. Some experts have recently speculated that if Russia sought to attack China or to eliminate Chinese nuclear capabilities, she could not be certain that Chinese nuclear weapons

[8] *The New York Times*, October 13, 1974.
[9] *Defense Report*, p. 89.

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might not be replenished from the American arsenal,[10] adding additional uncertainties to the Soviet calculus.

V

With such pervasive reasons on both Soviet and American parts for distrust of détente, it may seem surprising that it has lasted this long. There is certainly nothing automatic in its continuance, nor has it become an accepted article of policy in either Washington or Moscow. Important political and bureaucratic groups in each capital almost certainly oppose it. On the other hand, there are overriding claims in its favor. One very important consideration is that international politics would become a much more unpredictable arena if America and Russia were not frequently able to coordinate their policies. And policy coordination, at least episodically, has become possible because the Soviet Union has begun to recognize that it derives important benefits from the existing international situation which might be jeopardized by radical adventures.

The Soviet Union and the United States are now at the summit of the international power and status pyramid. Both are conscious that there are forces and nations in world politics that are rising to challenge their ascendancy. China and Japan, the Arab nations, Iran, Brazil, and even India, to say nothing of the states of Western Europe, may be much more powerful relative to the superpowers ten years from now than they are at present.

In years past, Russia probably believed that forces producing domestic unrest or revolution would greatly improve her international position while harming that of the United States, the apostle of the status quo. Today, it is no longer clear that Moscow calculates that it would be the beneficiary of domestic chaos. Domestic progress and economic growth seem to be the sine qua non of political stability in Eastern Europe. If this growth should falter, or if local Communist regimes sought to deny their citizens a better life in economic and social terms, the pattern of Polish resistance might be repeated in a variety of contexts. As the Czechoslovakian example in 1968 showed, these developments would produce political currents and eddies in the Soviet Union itself.

A total disruption of international trade and a severing of economic relations with the West could have grave effects, particularly in Eastern Europe where trade with non-Communist industrial countries has helped to make a better life possible. Indeed, it has been the development of East European economies, partly through West-

[10] See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1973*, May 1974, p. 69.

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ern technological cooperation and trade, which has sustained the momentum of the Communist bloc in its competition with the West. The drive to true "modernity," as many Communist leaders are now beginning to recognize, cannot be sustained in isolation from the rest of the world.[11]

From an opposite point of view, it is no longer unequivocally clear (if indeed it ever was) that it is in Moscow's interest to have local Communist parties triumph in Western states. In the aftermath of World War II and the vacuum of power which resulted, the Soviet Union organized the countries of Eastern Europe through the device of military occupation. Where Soviet troops did not penetrate, as in Yugoslavia, Moscow did not have dependable or controlling influence. Even where Russian troops were present, as in Rumania, the longer term evolution of the regime could not be predicted. The fact is that the Soviet Union bought control only through military power, and even that control is not absolute. It is therefore questionable whether governmental coalitions including Communists, where Moscow has no military presence, would represent unalloyed boons. Coalitions tend to co-opt local Communists, to make them work within the system. That they would call the tune politically is far from transparent.

But even if Communists were to dominate a government, the independence of European Communist parties has been amply demonstrated in a series of episodes since 1956. These unruly parties would not be a dependable instrument of Russian will. They might even contribute to what has probably been one of Moscow's greatest headaches and fears—the need to commit itself to support regimes which de facto it does not control. Cuba was a major lesson to Russian policymakers in this regard, and they may not want to repeat the experience.

Ultimately, of course, such evolutions would look problematical from Moscow's viewpoint because Western responses could well be unpredictable or severe. Khrushchev's policy was to challenge the West, to take risks, to probe for weak spots. But he did not add much to Russian power and influence. He neither improved the Soviet position in Europe nor in the developing world. He did not prevent China from leaving the bloc. He did not gain an edge over the United

[11] It is significant that in the leading industrial sectors, East European dependence upon imports from the West has been very marked. The Joint Economic Committee study on *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies* observes: "The degree of dependence in fact is considerably greater than the share of the West in total East European imports would indicate. The industries dominating East European growth are leading the way in imports from the West." Joint Committee Print, Ninety-Third Congress, June 27, 1973, Washington: GPO, p. 39. Statistical information for all countries but Bulgaria indicates that if Western trade were cut off, East European development would be considerably affected.

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States technologically or militarily. Nor did his domestic schemes solve the problem of agriculture, or production of a wide variety of sophisticated industrial goods. Rather, he provoked a Western response that greatly fueled the arms race, provided major counter-challenges in Berlin and Cuba and kept the Soviet Union off-balance. Khrushchev, in this respect, can be held responsible for Kennedy's anti-Communist "world policy."

It is an important question whether the Russians now wish to press a maximum international offensive against the West. They might urge their more militant Arab clients either to reimpose the oil embargo or to raise the price greatly; they might put more pressure on in certain domestic contexts. But the ensuing Western and American response could not be foretold: how much industrial chaos would Western countries accept *without* intervening militarily in the Middle East? And if they did intervene, would the Russians have improved their position? They would then face the alternative either of accepting the local success, and a large-scale and perhaps permanent Western presence in the Middle East, or of very high risk opposition to Western forces. Neither could possibly be attractive to Moscow.

The policy of maximum pressure and "adventurism" also has other defects. During Khrushchev's rule, the Soviets' challenge to Western governments kept them in the position of international "pariahs." Russia was distrusted by many, including some of her titular allies. She was not in a position to forge useful contacts with capitalist economies. The current Russian leadership, in contrast, has sought to stress the Soviet Union's responsible international role, and for the first time Russia has in effect been admitted to a Western system of international relations. Her initiatives are no longer immediately and categorically rejected. Her advice and help are sometimes sought. She has a certain standing in the international community. The long-term goal of recognition and acceptance by Western nations has in effect been achieved.

From a Western point of view, such gains may seem ephemeral, but to Soviet leaders accustomed to backwardness, isolation and exclusion from international contacts, they are of first importance. One should remember that the Soviet Union is a "new nation" unused to patterns of Western diplomacy and initially incapable of participating in them. Russia's international policy, originally based on a rather vulgar Marxism, was crude. In her Communist lexicon other nations would favor her only if it was in their manifest economic and military interest to do so. If cooperation was not given automatically

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on the basis of such interests, the only leverage the U.S.S.R. had was through the threat of force and the building of substantial military power. In this sense after World War II, the Soviet Union had "power" in international relations, but it did not possess "influence." For the attainment of "influence" depended upon a strict disciplining of power, and a rather complete avoidance of threat and bluster in world politics. It depended in short on "responsibility" and the development of a more or less predictable policy in international politics. Crises could not be staged from year to year, if the Soviet Union hoped to gain cooperation and help from Western and non-Communist regimes.

Today the Soviet Union faces the choice between crude power and responsible influence in world politics. The attempt to use the former will surely undermine the latter. Since this dilemma is coming to be understood in Moscow, there is reason to believe that Russia's "revolutionary" policy may well be nearing an end. Henceforth it seems likely that Russian gains will be sought through marginal increments in her own domestic political, economic and military position, and through ties with other nations that do not commit her to crisis intervention. If gains are not sought in this marginalist fashion, the ultimate achievement of modernity in the Soviet Union itself may be jeopardized.

VI

Détente has other important foundations. The pattern of international change today is anarchic. Economic trends, the exhaustion of critical raw materials, the spread of nuclear weaponry, the rapid mobilization of domestic crisis all mean that nations have to react to a much more bewildering and dynamically changing international and domestic environment. Givens of yesteryear are dubious today. Monolithic domestic stability in Portugal, Greece and possibly also Spain has eroded. There are fissures in the Soviet bloc as well. Rumania has achieved and continues to express a distinctive and independent position in foreign relations. As Czechoslovakia showed in 1968, the placidity of East European Communist regimes is marred by deep currents of unrest. If these rise to the surface, Communist leadership in several countries, not least Yugoslavia, would be affected. Nationality problems continue, along with desires throughout the Soviet orbit for a much greater degree of personal and political freedom, and for access to the Western storehouse of ideas, and industrial and consumer goods. The very "slab-like" solidity of Communist governments means that there are few political safety

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valves for the outlet of discontent. Domestic crises within communism are thus extremely serious, imperiling the regime itself. The Russians have not forgotten that the most unregenerate and thoroughgoing autocracy of the Tsars ultimately collapsed of its own weight. International connections with Western states may not prevent domestic change, but they may very well mitigate the advantage which capitalist powers might otherwise seek to gain in such circumstances. Here the Russians clearly bear in mind the danger of interventionist precedents set after World War I.

Trends in the international economy also hold dangers for the Soviet Union. Despite large apparent reserves of oil and natural gas, Russia in recent years has become more dependent upon Middle Eastern sources of supply, and she has coincidentally reduced her fuel and energy exports to Eastern Europe. This paradox is explained by the fact that the new reserves in the northern part of Western Siberia are exceedingly difficult to develop. Thus far, Soviet and East European technology and resources have been inadequate to the task. Western help seems absolutely required if substantial production is to be realized. A measure of Soviet incapacity in this realm is the fact that Moscow has actually been increasing exploratory efforts in the European regions and offshore where new finds are likely to be high-cost. Coal presents equivalent problems. Even if it can be extracted, Siberian coal will be difficult to use because of a completely inadequate transport system. Thus the U.S.S.R. has tried to make expensive energy sources in the western regions do additional service, so far with little success.[12] But if the Soviet bloc must import more oil, increases in the price of Middle Eastern crude will have growing significance for Moscow and an even more dynamic impact upon Eastern Europe.

The West, however, should not take comfort from Soviet energy dilemmas, for the world industrial system, capitalist as well as Soviet, may be nearing a crisis created by temporary or permanent limits to expansion and welfare. The availability of food, oil and raw materials may be less than that needed by Communist and Western states in the next decade. The West is vulnerable on oil, and the Communist states may be becoming increasingly vulnerable on both food and oil. Only a sharing of total world supplies of both items may ultimately suffice.

The spread of nuclear technology and ultimately weaponry also provides new justifications for cooperation with the West and the United States. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has failed to

[12] For a definitive review of Soviet energy problems see Marianna Slocum, "Soviet Energy: An Internal Assessment," *Technology Review*, October/November 1974.

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prevent the dissemination of such technology. And even where the treaty remains formally in force, nations may develop their nuclear power programs to a point where a weapons option can be taken up in short order. India's "peaceful" detonation will certainly not slow down the nuclear arms acquisition process in the Middle East and South Asia, and it seems to be providing an additional spur to Japanese and Australian efforts in the general nuclear field. No new nuclear decisions can be expected in the next few years, but the process of industrial and technological familiarization with nuclear techniques will, if anything, accelerate.[13] Meanwhile, existing nuclear forces in China and France, and perhaps also in the United Kingdom and India, will become less vulnerable and more sophisticated.

If and when major nuclear capabilities are possessed by five, seven or more powers, the international strategic environment will undergo important transformations. It is seldom understood that deterrence was a fundamentally bipolar doctrine, requiring clear identification of an attacker and depending upon the possession of relatively modest retaliatory capabilities. As long as each of the two superpowers had only to retaliate against the other, deterrent requirements were not onerous. When China became the fifth nuclear power, however, the retaliatory requirements of "assured destruction" capabilities against "any combination of attackers" became much more stringent. If Indian targets are eventually to be added to superpower lists, the task will become still more difficult.

The development of new nuclear powers raises deterrent requirements because it increases the population that any global deterrent power must be able to hold at risk. It also heightens the deterrent threshold in another way: the size of the aggressive coalition that might seek to launch a disarming attack against a single power is now at least potentially greater. For multilateral deterrence, one wants relatively equal, invulnerable forces. But since at least the first-generation capacities of new nuclear states will be much smaller than those of established powers and also vulnerable to attack, neither of the conditions is likely to be met.

Entirely aside from global deterrent problems, nuclear rivals may possess local first-strike capabilities. China's nuclear force may deter an attack by Delhi on Peking, but the converse may not be true. In much the same way a fledgling nuclear force in Pakistan might be vulnerable to Indian attack while India would not have to worry about a first strike from Karachi. In the Middle East, two-sided vul-

[13] George Quester takes a slightly more optimistic view in "Can Proliferation Now Be Stopped?" *Foreign Affairs,* October 1974.

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nerabilities could exist. The inability of conventional capabilities to force a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict will tend to encourage the development of nuclear capabilities in the region. With adequate intelligence, however, victory in a local nuclear war could depend upon who struck first.

Failures of deterrence in such cases could place enormous strain on the general structure of peace in world politics. A small client of one superpower might act, relying on his major power guarantor to prevent counteraction by his opposite number. If, on the other hand, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to act together, the local aggressor might be inhibited from either the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, it may even be possible that some such minimal superpower cooperation will be forced by manifest and rising deterrent instabilities in the next decades.

VII

In nineteenth-century international relations, the pattern of peace or war was largely determined by the state of relations among Germany, Russia and England. When despite their differences, basic agreement was obtained, war could not take place. The Austrians were dependent upon Germany, and the French could not act without an ally. When the three great powers fell out, however, no recombination or alignment would prevent war. War actually occurred when each of the three began to treat its combination with a lesser power as decisive, ruling out a more general accommodation in world politics. Britain and Russia began listening to France, while Germany gave all its attention to Austria. In this respect, the role of allies as a conflictual factor in world politics has not been sufficiently stressed.

After World War II, the United States and Russia initially made conservative choices, preferring known associates and probable outcomes to the "leap in the dark" that would have been involved in an attempt at general reconciliation in world politics. Today, the interests of allies or associates might also take precedence. In the Middle East, it is now possible that either or both sides will take matters into its own hands—the Israelis militarily, the Arabs through the use of the oil weapon. Israeli action would be strongly resisted by the Soviet Union. It would be difficult for it to tolerate another Arab defeat. The United States and Western Europe, however, could scarcely acquiesce in another application of oil sanctions. If either superpower yielded to such temptations, however, the contemporary system of international relations would be overthrown.

But in the longer term the détente will not be maintained simply

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by avoiding entanglement in the disputes of allies or clients. The European system of international relations ultimately collapsed when there was no one who understood its complexities to run it, as did Bismarck. In the final quarter of the twentieth century, the world cannot tolerate dependence upon the bureaucratic skill or diplomatic prescience of a single statesman to perform a similar sleight of hand. Some new institutional and political structures may have to be developed to ensure that legerdemain is not the only policy instrument.

As nuclear weapons spread and the economic disruption of industrial economies proceeds, nothing short of a partial Soviet-American entente will provide the necessary structure in which present destabilizing currents can be contained. Such an entente, of course, could not be a condominium, nor could it deal with all important issues. It should not prevent even closer Sino-American relations. It would not substitute for NATO, a European defense system, or from the Soviet point of view, for the Warsaw Pact. It clearly could not hope to regulate the world's economic and financial system, in which the United States and the Soviet Union are important but by no means dominant participants. It could not be used as a means of repressing the poorer, less satisfied fraction of the globe in hopes of maintaining a permanent inequity in the division of world wealth. Above all, it could not repeat Grey's error: of forging ties with one nation or group at the expense of another, and thereby creating a new polarization in world politics.

A policy of significantly strengthening American-Soviet links, however, should now be embarked upon. Without its opposite number neither power can expect to cope with the increasing disorder of international relations at political and military levels. As nuclear weapons spread, some joint "crisis control" measures may have to be taken. Common positions on peaceful nuclear explosions and their implications for arms control and development will have to be worked out. There will have to be a substitute for the now defunct Soviet-American trade agreement. In the Middle East there must be a greater concert both to prevent war and to agree on the outlines of future peace. Perhaps there should be informal bureaucratic links across the range of ministries and functions. The issue becomes all the more important as the prospect of change in either Soviet or American leadership beckons. Short of such major ties, the fruitful but still insubstantial rapprochement of the last few years could dissolve as its authors leave the political scene.

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A NEW RUSSIA? A NEW WORLD?

By Robert Conquest

THERE is a growing feeling, in the West as well as in the Soviet Union itself, that there are prospects, growing prospects, of a "New Russia." There is a feeling, whatever the immediate state of Brezhnev's health, that the fairly near future must see a break-up of the logjam created by a top leadership all of whose members are aged around 70. But the impression, one feels, goes deeper than this. Russia is seen to be at a social and economic dead end. Forthcoming political changes must, in this view, lead to radical and beneficial change over the whole field.

In examining the possibilities, our own first thought in the West is naturally in what way developments in the U.S.S.R. of which there are any real prospects could affect the international scene; and in particular, of course, whether they might contribute to a firm and lasting peace. It is quite true that the internal and international attitudes of the Soviet leadership are closely interlinked—indeed, are aspects of a single worldview. And this again is bound to make us consider what actions, or policies, on the part of the West can best help to turn Moscow in a favorable direction.

The root of the problem of understanding this great central crux in foreign affairs—and one which needs to be insisted on with the utmost emphasis on account of the neglect and misapprehension which are all too common—is fully to grasp and to master the true nature of the Soviet political culture. A vast amount of well-intentioned comment in the West is almost totally vitiated by failure to study and understand the motivations of the Kremlin leadership. In large part this is no doubt due to a perfectly natural habit of extending the assumptions of one's own culture more or less automatically, as if they were universally applicable. In his Nobel Prize speech, Alexander Solzhenitsyn penetratingly noted that in the old days disparate cultures were physically separated. Men were "guided by their own experiences in their circumscribed localities, in their community, in their society and lastly on their national territory. Then it was still possible for a single pair of eyes to perceive and accept some common scale of values." The extraordinary differences between the polities of different parts of the world were known to, and astonished, only a handful of travelers. Nowadays (he remarked), mankind has become "united," not in the old natural way of communities, but rather simply in a crude physical sense, with instant communication

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of superficial information, while at the same time "people in various places apply their own tried and tested scale of values to events, and insist self-confidently and stubbornly on judging only by their own scale and never by anyone else's."

It follows that a powerful effort, both intellectual and imaginative, is required if we are to have a sound view of the true nature—and prospects—of the Russian system. I must confess—and it is an interesting fact, to put it mildly, that almost all those who have made a special study of the Soviet Union are substantially in agreement with me—that I have little confidence that these necessities are widely enough taken into account in all the political and media circles whose responsibility it is to form or propagate policy.

For the Soviet polity is one whose characteristics are almost extravagantly different from those of our own. Russia was, indeed, for centuries a very awkward member—to the degree that she was a member at all—of the Comity of Nations. I once noted in these pages the names of Marx and Engels among those who saw in Russia, from the time of Peter the Great, a general tendency not merely to expansionism but to "universal supremacy."[1] This tendency, only partly explicit in those days, was of course subsumed into the new Soviet-style universalism. Just as absolutism was replaced by totalitarianism, the roughly formulated claim to world supremacy became the hard notion that the only truly legitimate states were those founded on—and not deviating from—the Soviet model, a state of affairs only attainable in practice where Soviet troops are present, or can effect an entry.

Today we are used to the Soviet Union, and in spite of what, regarded in any depth, must be seen as an almost unbelievably aberrant and deviant political culture, we tend to treat it as just another foreign state, a powerful rival no doubt, but little more: a country whose rulers certainly conduct their internal affairs in a way we can only deplore, but who in the international field are to be regarded as more or less like anyone else. Even after a particularly evidential act, such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia, old habits of mind gradually restore the mistaken image. There is a residue of quite inapplicable "good sense," which insists that a new Russia has since emerged, or is emerging, or will emerge. Every verbal assurance, every minor real change, is taken as at least a harbinger of the desired result.

And indeed a real New Russia, in the sense implied, would indicate the total transformation of the world scene; would be the one single event which could bring true and lasting peace to our planet. Is it emerging? Will it emerge? Can we help it to emerge?

[1] Robert Conquest, "The Limits of Détente," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1968, p. 733.

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II

When we are considering these grand perspectives of world change, the state of Brezhnev's jawbone or Kosygin's windpipe may appear rather minor matters. But we must not fail to bear in mind that the whole system created by Lenin and Stalin had as its main political achievement precisely a mechanism, an Archimedean lever, whereby a single man or a small group could exert the political weight elsewhere available only to whole social classes. Even if the view is taken that a decisive evolution is due in the Soviet Union, the first break must occur at the top political level.

And so we must first turn to the balance of forces in the Politburo. The growing impasse, the lack of any natural method—even by Soviet standards—of transferring power to a fresh generation is largely due to the very collegiality of the present leadership. When Stalin died at the age of 73 he had already groomed for the succession a man 22 years younger than himself, Georgi Malenkov—and even the other possible contenders, Khrushchev and Molotov, were 14 and 10 years younger respectively. Khrushchev in his turn maintained a series of heirs-presumptive, Kirichenko, Kozlov and Brezhnev, 14, 14 and 12 years younger respectively. But both Stalin and Khrushchev were leaders who had achieved working supremacy, and also effectively eliminated all credible alternatives of their own generation.

The present top five—Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov, Podgorny and Kirilenko (aged 68, 71, 72, 72, and 68)—are in a different position. In spite of Brezhnev's general ascendancy, neither he himself nor any of the others has been able to bring to the fore a successor from the younger generation in the Politburo. None of the latter has the long experience and prestige in work at the highest level which Malenkov and Brezhnev had at the time of their successions. None has established the credibility and authority required—perhaps particularly required in present Soviet conditions.

This is not the place for detailed speculation about the probable prospects of individuals.[2] It has been commonly taken that if Brezhnev were to be politically or physically incapacitated, Kirilenko would become the leading figure in the Party. But Kirilenko is, or has been, no more than a follower and rather pale echo of Brezhnev himself, right back from when he became his client in the Provincial Committee at Zaporozhe in the 1940s. Far from representing any "renewal," he is a less impressive figure even than Brezhnev, who has had his own difficulties in holding power. Such an appointment could

[2] I have described at some length the personal backgrounds of those now in power, or contending for power, in "Stalin's Successors," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1970, pp. 509–524.

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be no more than a lame duck Brezhnevism. We are told, too, that the Brezhnevites favor Fedor Kulakov (born in 1918) as the eventual younger successor. But Kulakov, whose specialty is the unfortunate one of agriculture, has only been three years in the top leadership. On the face of it, Alexander Shelepin, who is the same age, is incomparably more credible—as, indeed, are several other younger men.

Politics is, indeed, a devious art and one can envisage maneuvers in which weak leaders—or ones who are simply not given adequate powers—are accepted with a view to their fall being encompassed in short order. One can, indeed, envisage a scenario by which power *could* be transferred both smoothly and credibly: the takeover of the top party position by Mikhail Suslov, a senior of far longer experience and higher repute than Kirilenko, and not himself supposed to be ambitious for personal rule, who would mediate the succession of (say) Shelepin to the General Secretaryship and Kiril Mazurov (currently First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers) to the Premiership. But, leaving aside the fact that a Suslov once in power might not after all want to give it up—a situation of which history gives us a number of examples—this (and any detailed discussion of the sort) depends on the relative health and longevity of the individuals of the present septuagenarian supremacy.

As perhaps the closest student of modern Soviet politics, Michel Tatu, has observed, anything is possible in a succession situation, including a political impasse and even a virtual collapse at the highest level, possibly involving military or police intervention, or some other form of coup. It is perfectly true that developments in the Communist countries contain possibilities of every conceivable sort. Who in 1953 would have predicted correctly any of the main events which followed in the Communist world—the Khrushchev speech, the Hungarian Revolution, the Sino-Soviet confrontation, the Rumanian defection, the Prague Spring...? And today there are political, national, intellectual and economic forces in the U.S.S.R. which but for the existence of machinery designed to contain them would be fully capable of destroying or totally transforming the political order.

But that machinery does exist and, created by the horrible genius of Stalin, it is powerfully adapted to its purpose. Of course a breakdown involving the overthrow of apparat rule would lead to a New Russia, whose nature cannot be predicted. But the power of the apparat—and its motives for sticking together—are so strong that we had best confine ourselves to the more probable, and more analyzable, prospects. My example of a Shelepin-Mazurov regime represents perhaps the strongest and most credible succession, but even a much

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weaker team would still find itself in charge of the Party apparat, the Committee of State Security—and the vast armed forces of the U.S.S.R. It would be, in short, essentially a continuation of the present system.

III

The question then becomes whether, how, and in what sense a New Russia, or the conditions for one, could *evolve* from the present system.

The difficulties of such an evolution are great. In the first place, the Party machine itself is a structure whose very purpose is bound up with the perpetuation of the present order. Even in the economic field —and contrary to the views of those in the West who imagine that "managerial" types are bound willy-nilly, through mere economic laws, to favor a more efficient and "convergent" structure—such technocrats (as Zbigniew Brzezinski has pointed out) have shown themselves highly conservative both politically and economically, since they are precisely the people trained for and experienced in operating the present inefficient system, and would lose by change. And the apparat (the managerial élite too) is recruited on principles which tend to ensure that the younger men promoted are the copies or toadies of their predecessors. From this point of view there is little use, for example, in looking to the bright new intake from universities, for it is the hide-bound young careerist and Marxist-Leninist, who is secretary of his University Komsomol, who will be the one so recruited.

When we discuss the motivations of the Soviet leadership, we often hear comments roughly to the effect that "ideology" means little to them, and that their main motivation is the preservation of their power and of the system which gives it to them—as if the two factors were in conflict. The question of the relation between a man's actions and his formal beliefs is an old and difficult one and, as Lenin himself pointed out, it is impossible in any case to devise a "sincereometer." Again, there is a difference between the ingrained and automatic attitudes of the "ordinary" believer and the perpetual meditations of the theologian. No one, I imagine, thinks that Brezhnev recites the *Theses on Feuerbach* every night before retiring. The point is, rather, that "Marxist-Leninist" belief is the sole justification for him and his regime—and further, not simply belief in a particular political theory, but belief in the transcendental, overriding importance of that political theory. As George Kennan has remarked: "It is not so much the actual content of the ideology . . . as the absolute value attached to it."

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But we can, in fact, document—and without much difficulty—the attachment to actual dogma of the Soviet leadership. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was a notable act of doctrinal discipline. Another striking example was the extraordinary and clearly long-considered advice given to the Syrian Communists in 1972, and leaked by nationalist members of the local leadership. In two separate sets of conversations, with Soviet politicians and theoreticians respectively, even the former group, two of whom have been identified as Suslov and Ponomarev in person, advised in the most scholastic terms on the impossibility, according to Marxist principles, of recognizing the existence of "an Arab nation." Or, to take a more important matter, the Soviet agricultural system is based on, and rendered grossly inefficient by, nothing but dogma.

The normal way of adapting in adult politics, at least on practical matters, is to keep the label while altering the substance. But when Gennady Voronov faintly adumbrated such an approach in the early 1970s, he was removed as a result. Again, the economy was somewhat reformed in the late 1960s, but only to the degree of taking up a measure of slack in the old system, rather than implementing such plans as the Liberman proposals, which might have been highly effective but only at the cost of a theoretically unacceptable relaxation of political control. As a Soviet economist remarked to a Western left-winger, "I thought they understood, from their experience, that repressive measures would never achieve results, and that they were therefore ready to employ purely economic tools. Now I see there was nothing in it."[3]

But, indeed, to think in terms of "doctrine" is to give only a partial picture of the sort of process involved. The Marxist-Leninist language used by the ruling Party is not merely some sort of formula. It is the only way in which the leaders are able to represent to themselves the phenomena with which they deal. "Each language cuts out its own segment of reality. We live our life as we speak it. . . .": this fairly typical comment by a prominent student of language (George Steiner) is certainly applicable to the use in politics, from birth onward, of a particular political dialect. Soviet leaders are, it seems clear, simply unable to think in any other categories. Nor can we understand their outlook by "common sense" of our own style.

IV

What, then, are the limits within which any apparatchik regime of the near future could vary its policies, both internal and external?

[3] K. S. Karol, *New Statesman*, January 1, 1971.

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This raises the perennial Western press picture of "hard-liners." These (it is argued) are powerfully represented in the Politburo, and if we do not give in to the demands of the present leadership, these "harder" figures will take over and make things much worse. This is an old thesis, ever since Edward Stettinius warned Roosevelt that he should accede to Stalin's demands, since the latter was hotly pressed by a group of extremists who would otherwise overthrow him. Given that there are different attitudes among the current leadership to a certain extent—and given, too, that anyone seeking power will hold himself ready to attack any policies that have failed to produce results —nevertheless, so long as Brezhnev has in fact been able to obtain foreign policy advantages without giving anything in exchange, there is little that the "hardest" could object to. This is particularly so when we consider that internally he has exhibited a very high level of dogmatism and authoritarianism in all matters: on agriculture (as we have noted) ; on the persecution of heterodox thought; and in the suppression of certain "liberal" tendencies within the Party toward the national feeling of the peripheral peoples—as with the removal of Shelest and his supporters in the Ukraine.[4]

Thus a successor regime that continued the basic Brezhnev policies seems substantially the most likely outcome. At least so long as the Western response continues to give Soviet leaders the best of both worlds, we may expect no change in policies that are in effect the international and internal faces of a single attitude.[5]

There is, however, one possible future scenario—within the evolutionary non-breakdown framework—for which there are parallels in Russian, and not only Russian, history. Radical change, of whatever type, has always been put into effect in Russia by unchallenged autocrats overriding their own traditional apparats. This was true to a considerable extent of Peter the Great, truer still of the far more important reform of the 1860s by which Alexander II put through the Emancipation of the Serfs, and true (to the extent that they were successful, being incomplete in each case) of the Stolypin modernization in the first decade of this century, and of the Khrushchev episode itself. Thus it is at least possible to envisage the coming to power of a single man with enough insight and force of mind to impose on the Soviet Union the new deal it really needs. The difficulties are of course twofold: first, one does not see the candidate for this operation. And, moreover, as has been obvious over the past ten years, the ap-

[4] See Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Soviet Nationalities Policy and Dissent in the Ukraine," *The World Today* (Royal Institute of International Affairs), May 1974, pp. 214–226.

[5] See Wolfgang Leonhard, "The Domestic Politics of the New Soviet Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1973, pp. 59–74.

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parat has grown particularly apprehensive—and vigilant—at the prospect of one-man rule.

There is one other evolutionary possibility: it is not by any means excluded that a new faction could come to the top using the "Khrushchevite" line. Of course, Khrushchev himself had no intention of dismantling Party rule. He was a typical interim figure who saw that there was something badly wrong with Soviet society and yet could not see any answers beyond the system. This led, internally, to a cycle of bold but superficial initiatives in every field. Yet his rule was, in Russian circumstances—as Solzhenitsyn has described it—a miracle. The attempt, in particular, to renew the Party itself, to reestablish truth as a possible criterion—however partially fulfilled—opened perspectives which might conceivably have led to better things, had Khrushchev himself been a better tactician.

As we have noted, however, Khrushchev's personal primacy is not very likely to be repeated, at any rate not soon. One would expect a Shelepin (let us say), even if he elected to play the Khrushchevian card in the future, to be more cautious and careful. Shelepin, Mazurov and others of the younger (late 50s) group seem in fact to be motivated in favor of at least a certain increase in economic and administrative efficiency; but, as we have noted, efficiency need not equate with liberalism and indeed such moves have in the past tended, on the whole, to go with harder internal policies. In any case, as a fresh style of motivation this does not amount to much.

Nor, if we seek more broadly, is there any sign in or around the Central Committee (at least since the removal of Tvardovsky from candidate membership nearly a decade ago) of a genuine trend even by individuals in the direction of Communist-style "liberalism," such as occurred in the quite differently recruited Hungarian and Czechoslovak Communist Parties in 1956 and 1968. In short, the prospects for a radically favorable evolution among the ruling group or their visible successors are minimal, except under very heavy pressures indeed.

V

If we accept that Soviet principles are not changing, what are we to make of current Soviet foreign policy? Or rather, since the assembly of a huge armament and the avoidance of nuclear war have been part of that foreign policy for three decades, what are we to make of that specific tactic for which we employ the word "détente"?

In the first place, that (as has been frequently stated by Brezhnev himself and others) it is itself, from the Soviet viewpoint, "a form of

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struggle" with the West. We can note, too, that it is actually compatible with—indeed an aspect of—a policy of matching or overmatching the United States in arms. The novelty, insofar as it is a novelty, is not so much the utterance of pacific phrases or the conclusion of successful negotiations on particular issues. These, of course, marked the era arbitrarily and verbally distinguished from the present by the horrid title of "cold war." Then, too, endless assurances of peaceable intent were present. There were periods of a comparative relaxation of tension, and even the reaching of agreement on issues of great danger, as with the ending of the Berlin blockade in 1949 or the negotiations ending the war in Korea in 1953 or the easing of the Berlin and Cuba crises in 1962. There were even periods of "cultural exchange" at more or less the present level. The true characteristics which mark, or appear to mark, the present period as different are first of all a measure of mutual agreement on arms limitation; and secondly a perfectly serious Soviet campaign for "trade."

The question of Soviet-Western trade, in fact, goes to the heart of the conflict of political cultures between Russia and the West. It is represented as something desirable for its own sake, and something in itself automatically contributing to the establishment of a long-term peace.

This correlation is an extraordinary naivety. Witness only the curious facts that Soviet-American trade declined considerably after the United States recognized the U.S.S.R. in 1933, and that Russian-German trade reached its highest points in 1913 and 1940 respectively. But over and above this, the mere prospects of Soviet-American trade, taken at the most commercial-traveler level, have always been absurdly exaggerated. The naivety I speak of has always been particularly strong among businessmen: Ronald Hingley of Oxford has noted of his various stays in Moscow that (apart from some scientists) Western businessmen there were incomparably top in misapprehension and general silliness about all that went on around them. And this seems to be true at a more formal level. The catalogue of ridiculous overestimates of trade with the Soviet Union since World War II, especially by business leaders, is a long one—as Walter Laqueur in particular has demonstrated.[6] As he notes, U.S. trade with the Soviet Union is bound to remain only a small fraction of U.S. trade with Canada, while West German trade with the Benelux countries, for example, will surely remain roughly ten times as great as West German trade with the Soviet Union.

[6] See *Negotiation and Statecraft,* Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, April 17, 1973, Washington: GPO, 1973, pp. 14–16.

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Trade in the normal sense has not become and will not become a major factor, for the perfectly simple reason that *Russia has practically nothing the West needs* (and even the keenest trade-fans are no longer urging a natural gas deal by which the West would put itself even more abjectly at the mercy of the fuel producers). Of course, there is the odd million to be made here and there. But this is emphatically not a case of what is good for Corporation X being good for America. There are indeed innocent and constructive deals, like Pepsi-Cola's. But others tend to resemble Lenin's remark about Western hemp-manufacturers—that they would happily turn a fast buck by selling him the rope to hang them with.

When we come to the main crux of Soviet trade, we are considering a matter involving the profoundest historical and political-cultural considerations. For the Soviet quandary is one which has affected Russia for nearly three centuries. Since Peter the Great, that country's rulers have sought the technology of the West with the purpose of arming and equipping a political culture based on totally anti-Western standards. Indeed Peter, and Stalin after him, sought Western techniques with the greatest assiduity at the precise times when they were enforcing serfdom and autocracy on an unprecedented scale.

The trouble is, and always has been, that to obtain Western technology while rejecting the civic culture of the West is in the long run not satisfactory—a connection Marxists should be the first to admit. The newly imported techniques may render armaments superior for a certain time, as they did the Russian artillery industry in the 1820s, at a period of maximum political regression. But sooner or later these transplants wither on the vine. Now, at a time of quick technological change, Moscow once again seeks the fruits of—on this occasion—the Third Industrial Revolution: that is, electronics, computerization and so forth.

Having, back in the fifties, challenged the United States at the most sophisticated level of armaments—just the area in which they should not have provoked competition—the Soviet leaders are in principle in a position from which there are few obvious ways out. Not only is there a built-in tendency to fall behind technically, but the Soviet economy is simply not strong enough to support the mere financial strain of the armaments with which they have equipped themselves. To maintain the present system, and keep it viable for the future, they need not only Western techniques but also what would ordinarily be regarded as "aid" of the type sent to backward countries: long-term credits at low rates and cheap agricultural products to buttress incompetent local agriculture. As the Liberal leader, Jeremy Thorpe, re-

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marked on February 18 of Prime Minister Wilson's latest deal: "It is ironic that we are borrowing from the Shah of Persia and extending credit to the Soviet Union."

In both these spheres, clearly, the West is mainly engaged in equipping, or indirectly subsidizing, armaments directed against itself. As Lord Kennet, the Labour defense and foreign-affairs figure, has often pointed out, the Soviet economy could solve all its own problems but for its distortion through vast arms production. Not only has a heavily disproportionate part of their economic effort been put into armaments, but it is also true that in their conditions the skills and resources put into the armaments effort have been totally diverted. There has been virtually no "spin-off" to the benefit of the civilian sector.

And, more important yet, the mere existence of an enormously powerful and efficient armament, including a ballistic missile system matching that of the United States, has its own logic. In Russia, as Max Hayward has pointed out, nothing works except, unfortunately, the armed forces and the KGB. This is an exaggeration, but not a gross one. The Soviet leadership find themselves in possession of vast and efficient fighting machinery, and little else worth boasting about. Governments incompetent at home but capable of demagogic expansionism abroad have traditionally—one might almost say automatically—turned to foreign adventure.

Thus, these huge armed forces constitute a factor in themselves. Their mere existence, and the absence of any other horizons for the Soviet leaders, certainly tend to attract those leaders—and any but the most clear-headed of their successors would have the same temptation—toward *using* this rare success, this actual resource. This would not indicate any wish actually to loose the nuclear weapon. (I speak now of the Soviet-Western rather than the Soviet-Chinese relationship, since the latter poses particular problems.) But they naturally tend to employ the political pressure of this military power: to use the threat of their armaments on what they would regard as weak sections of the surrounding world. Indeed, even apart from nuclear weaponry, there is no justification, even on a traditional Russian-expansionist view, for such vastly expensive items as their blue-water fleet. This has been justified by Gromyko himself, on the ground (reminiscent of William II of Germany) that Russia's voice must be heard the world over.

And if this situation continues, any "new" leaders in Moscow would find themselves with this same physical equipment and, if they wished to reverse or ameliorate the position, would have to take a

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major decision—against the grain not only of their universalist ideology but also of a vast established momentum, and in the absence of other successes—to reinforce their position.

VI

In short, there is a direct and inescapable connection between the Soviet desire for trade and the acquisition of Western technologies—on their own terms—and the maintenance of an enormous military establishment which in itself tends to impel any Soviet leadership in the direction of thrusting, if not downright aggressive, foreign policies. And the question whether there can be an evolution in these foreign policies comes in the end to turn heavily on the Western response, particularly in matters of trade.

Even if there are virtually no economic concessions, as such, by which the U.S.S.R. could pay for Western economic assistance, the Soviet leaders could hardly expect in the long run—however lucky they have been in the short—to get something for nothing at all. And what is it that would be of substantial value to the West if we cannot find an economic quid pro quo?

It is in this light that the Jackson Amendment is to be regarded. And when we speak of that Amendment, we should note that it is only one of various initiatives in the West designed to secure at least the beginnings of progress toward an easier world. Just as Senator Jackson has sought to commence the erosion of the siege mentality and siege polity of the U.S.S.R. by asking freedom of emigration, so the European statesmen have, since Chancellor Brandt's speech of May 1970 in Kassel, regarded the free movement of ideas and people as one of the necessary bases for real peace. President Pompidou raised the issue clearly during Brezhnev's visit to France in 1971, and the Danish Prime Minister during Kosygin's visit to Denmark. And since 1973, the Germans, the Danes, the Dutch and other progressive Westerners have continually pressed it, particularly at Helsinki in the Conference on European Security and Cooperation. To the extent that there are now some useful results in this forum, it will be because the West has stood firm.

So we may take the Amendment as representing a whole attitude, widely shared, about the issue of a real détente, of a real progress toward an authentically peaceable state of affairs, rather than a mere truce covering a period of technical reequipment. Such an attitude goes to the heart of Soviet intentions. It is not merely a matter of trying to get some quid pro quo for economic aid—though even that is hardly illogical. Far more profoundly, it goes to the center of the

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whole question of the possibility of a lasting world peace. Represented by some as a mere moralistic exercise, it is nothing of the sort. It is not just our principles which are involved, but our interest too.

The recent Soviet rejection of the American trade terms—whether or not partly, or largely, influenced by the later reduction in the economic inducement of loan levels—merely shows that one's general analysis of Soviet motives was correct. The Soviets have, as it were, been flushed out into the open. And they are now in a position, one hopes, where they know they can no longer get something for nothing, and will seriously feel the various pressures which may make them, or some of them, begin to recognize the dead end of their total policy.

Basically, the West seems to be faced with a choice between two policies with regard to the Soviet Union. First, it can purchase a temporary and partial truce, by not merely accepting Soviet international and internal conduct as perfectly natural, but also giving it the equipment its system needs to maintain itself as it is, and to make it a far more powerful threat during the next phase. The other is, while giving no opportunity for desperate action, to show Soviet leaders that their current policies are a cul-de-sac which can produce neither empire nor prosperity nor political success even for them. To make it clear, in fact, that—whether under them or as a result of their disappearance—a New Russia must indeed emerge. And, on this latter view, there is a basic fallacy in the idea of economic or other aid to the Soviet Union while it maintains its position of total hostility to the West and all the West stands for.

As for the problem of armaments and arms limitations as such, it is in the interests of both sides, however considered, to reach a measure of agreement. Hence, to a quite important degree these can be considered a separate issue, with similar policies imposing themselves on the West from both "Kissingerites" and "Jacksonites." It is natural that Senator Jackson should be in the forefront of those urging that we should be working for a reduction rather than a maintenance of armaments levels on both sides.

But again there is a direct connection between Soviet decisions on arms limitations and their prospects for maintaining through external aid their present military-industrial system (dwarfing any such "complex" the United States has ever known). While rebuffing the West on human-rights issues and reaffirming the principles of struggle against all Western ideas, the U.S.S.R. may still take practical steps to avoid nuclear war, to ease situations of potential confrontation (such as the Middle East) and to limit arms—*if* it is made clearly in its interest to do so. The true Soviet economic interest does tend in the

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direction of some limitation of armaments. But only if the Soviet leaders see that the West is not going to bail out their economy as much in the future will that economic interest predominate in the face of the political-ideological drives that now prevail over it. Once again, as in the thrust for human rights, "détente"-style pseudo-trade cannot be seen as a pressure for peace. On the contrary.

VII

The opposing argument, from what might be called low-level détente fanciers, has always been that trade, cultural exchange and all those things will erode the harshness of Soviet policy and gradually lead to a true entry of Russia into the Comity of Nations. Except in the minimal sense that a few minor Russian officials and citizens may indeed become politically civilized for these reasons, there is no sign of this—and little prospect of it either, as far as the Party and the State, the ruling caste and its ideology, are concerned.

This is not, of course, a flat condemnation of what Secretary Kissinger stands for. There is no reason to imagine that he is deeply deceived about Soviet motivation. The trouble seems to be rather that, in the first place, his brilliant skills as a negotiator are only relevant when it is a matter of getting the optimum result from a set of variables which a less adept man might mishandle. But the area within which this applies, fairly large between states with similar attitudes toward compromise, is severely limited when it comes to the Soviet Union. And there are always, alas, political and other pressures in the West, failures of nerve—and even more of knowledge—which are bound to exert pressures on Western negotiators not so much to provide the appearance of agreement when none has been reached, as to exaggerate, and represent as deep and substantial, accords which only skirt the superficies of the fundamental situation.

The main problem remains Western misunderstanding of basic Soviet attitudes and of the dynamics of the Soviet power structure—whether due to ignorance, or parochialism, or automatism of thought. Is it presumptuous for a London observer to feel that these tendencies are now particularly acute in the United States? At any rate it is instructive to read, on this side of the Atlantic, the impatient outbursts of those who have studied the Soviet Union professionally. I have cited Professor Laqueur and Dr. Hingley. I might equally have called on Professor Leonard Schapiro or Dr. Leopold Labedz, or half a dozen others. But I cannot resist quoting once again the sardonic comment of a renowned academic, Hugh Seton-Watson, who is noted for his restraint and amenity:

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What 200,000 Communist party officials, from Brezhnev down to the secretaries of party branches in factories or collective farms, tell their subjects is all camouflage: the *real* views of the Soviet leaders are what some nice guy from the Soviet delegation at the U.N. said over a quiet drink, or what an itinerant Midwestern scientist heard from some friendly academician in Novosibirsk.

Today, more than ever, there is too much of this kind of naive thinking. Even in theoretically serious circles debate has centered, in a manner more appropriate to teenage debating societies, around the simple labels, "détente" (good) and "cold war" (bad). As the current efforts to close or emasculate Radio Liberty indicate, it is suggested that international relations would be improved if Westerners ceased to express opinions, or draw attention to facts, unpalatable to the Soviet leadership—though not, of course, vice-versa.[8] Jacksonian, and European, attempts to verify whether the U.S.S.R. has really mitigated its adverse attitude to our general concepts and the norms of civilized international conduct are even more reprobated.

And, in the last analysis, the validity of Western policies cannot be separated from the atmosphere of public opinion that surrounds them. On a realistic basis there is a perfectly good case for a variant of the Kissinger policy of détente—so long as it does not give incentives to Soviet know-nothing dogmatism by unnecessary and unrequited concessions, and so long as it is not conducted under the pressure of uninformed opinion exhausted by unpleasant reality and incited to unrealistic hopes. A Western policy both encouraging to any potential Soviet tendencies to real accommodation, and discouraging to actual tendencies to long-term hostility, is clearly the best. But part—and perhaps the most important part—of such a policy must be the maintenance of vigilance, among the West's peoples as well as its politicians. In this respect, quite clearly, Senator Jackson's posture is sounder than that of the American administration.

VIII

Within the Soviet ruling group, as with any other, there are doubtless disagreements on matters of tactics. Internally, repression produces difficulties, and so does concession. Externally, in a given situation, there are arguments for advance, for retreat, and for standing still. But such divergences have little serious significance when it comes to the long-term prospects for world peace. They would be found, have been found, in the general staffs of countries totally com-

[8] I think, to take only one example from thousands, of the recent major Soviet work on Britain, *Under the Shadow of the Monopolies,* by Igor Biryukov. One might have thought, too, that the attendance, and speeches, by Soviet Politburo members at the Congresses of French and other Western parties devoted to the overthrow of our system could just conceivably be called "intervention in internal affairs."

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mitted to aggression. The basic problem is to convince the leadership *as a whole* that no chance to destroy or dominate the West will arrive. One component of any policy designed to do this must clearly be the maintenance of a system of armaments and of alliances which makes *every* particular aggression unattractive. All the same, this is simply the establishment, by vigilance and strength, of a long truce. That is certainly better than nothing, but it does not in itself solve the longer-term question.

Can Russia evolve? Yes, of course. Extreme fanaticisms in power have evolved, though it has usually taken a considerable period. They have evolved under pressures of reality. Those with universalist plans have evolved in the direction of abandoning them (in practice at least) when it has become clear that the program was quite incapable of fulfillment. Clearly, in dealing with such men, it is minimal good sense for their potential victims to adopt policies which contain two elements: first, as powerful a guarantee as possible that such expansion cannot succeed; and second, a clear promise that if the totalist power presenting the threat will abandon such claims, dismantle the battlements of ideological siege, and turn its energies to the problems of peaceful industry, it will be welcomed in the most cooperative manner. But not otherwise.

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DECOMPRESSION IN BRAZIL?

By Fernando Pedreira

IN recent weeks, a growing number of Brazilians are leaning toward the belief that the political regime of the country has finally made it round its Cape of Good Hope. Actually, since the middle of 1974, Brasília has appeared to be sailing on relatively smooth waters toward the reestablishment of the rule of law. Virtually no one questions the sincerity of purpose of President Ernesto Geisel—the fourth General-President since 1964, now completing his first year in office—and many are beginning to believe he will be successful in a task in which his predecessors met with painful failure.

What is happening? What kind of political miracle is this, which causes a bureaucratic-military state, consolidated and strong, successful in economic and administrative terms, to deliberately relinquish its hegemonic position and spur passive and resigned civilian elites to resume at least part of the role they should be entitled to in an open and free society?

At first glance, no significant change is detectable either in the balance of forces within the country or in the state of mind of the population in general, as it existed before and after the inauguration of General Geisel in March of last year. The tendencies at work on the Brazilian political scene—and which may be on the verge of producing startling results—apparently stem from farther back and run deep.

II

The Brazilian military regime is now in its eleventh year. This "brief period" is already longer than the Vargas dictatorship (1937–1945) or the military interregnum which took place after the fall of the Empire at the end of the nineteenth century. It should be pointed out, however, that these 11 years of military rule have not been entirely homogeneous. It might even be possible to divide the most significant aspects of the regime into two distinct stages: one from April 1964 to December 1968; and the other from December 1968 to—one would hope—the Geisel administration.

The first stage was tumultuous and contradictory, dazzling even, although marked by somber episodes such as the excesses of repression in the northeast (which brought about an investigation headed by General Geisel himself, on orders of then-President Castelo Branco), the "witch hunt" in the universities, the intervention in the state of Goias, and finally the wave of military disorder triggered by the

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results of the 1965 state elections, which culminated in the dissolution of political parties and the termination of the remaining civilian options the revolution counted on.

The main dynamic behind the events of this first stage (1964–68) was the deep antagonism between the forces forming the foundation of the new regime—primarily military but also civilian—and the top governing group, predominantly "liberal" in the Brazilian (or European) sense of the word; that is, stressing formal political freedoms, not—as in the United States—tending strongly to government economic action. Among the governing group the President, Marshal Castelo Branco, Justice Minister Milton Campos, Chief of the Civil Household Luiz Viana Filho, and Chief of the Military Household Ernesto Geisel, were all men committed to liberal thinking and convictions. The same can be said of the judicial and parliamentary leaders to whom Marshal Castelo went to pay his respects on the second day of his administration.

Moreover, although the revolution had been executed and consummated by the military, it was not carried out by them alone. The political dimensions of the movement, the careful preparation of public opinion, had been undertaken long before by a significant segment of the National Congress assembled around the former liberal-conservative UDN party, by some of the leading newspapers of the country, starting with *O Estado de São Paulo,* and by the governors of the main states of the Brazilian Federation: Carlos Lacerda from Guanabara, Adhemar de Barros from São Paulo, Magalhães Pinto from Minas Gerais, and Ildo Meneghetti from Rio Grande do Sul. That is why one can say (or recall) that March 31, 1964, was not just a military coup but the result of a broad movement, with the support and leadership of significant sectors of Brazilian society and, at the least, the passive neutrality of the great majority of the people, expressed in the reticent attitudes of the centrist PSD and even segments of the syndicalist-influenced PTB. When they fell, President João Goulart and his supporters were isolated and defeated men, not only in military but above all in political terms.

In the first months and years of the new regime, the military component of the revolutionary government could not ignore the weight of this large civilian political segment, which, although heterogeneous and frequently quarrelsome, shared a common interest in the preservation or reestablishment of the democratic-representative system. When Marshal Castelo was chosen President, not only was he the most respected army chieftain but he was regarded as "the most civilian of the military." The truth is that he, as well as his successor

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Costa e Silva, a man of the barracks, also did their utmost to preserve or reestablish the rule of law and died embittered and frustrated because of their failure to do so.

The force that brought the regime to the most extreme moment of repression, ushered in by the Fifth Institutional Act of December 13, 1968, was deeply rooted. It had been building up long before the inauguration of Marshal Castelo, and had an irresistible strength that came from what is usually called backlash: the desire for revenge, nourished by a mixture of fear and hatred. In April 1964, very few military and civilian leaders were aware how strong these sentiments were among the rightist radical groups (right-wing Catholics and extremist supporters of Governor Lacerda) and what soon would be known as the "young officer corps" of the armed forces.

During the previous regime, Goulart and his leftist followers had instigated and promoted not only every conceivable kind of strike and protest, which escalated wildly as a result of government support, but also organized insubordination and rebellion among the noncommissioned officers of the three armed forces. These episodes culminated in the "Rebellion of the Sergeants" at the garrisons in Brasília in September 1963, which took 48 hours to bring under control, and in the mutiny of the corporals and sailors in Rio de Janeiro in March 1964. The rebellion of the sergeants drove the majority of the officer corps—especially in the Air Force, previously a stronghold of Goulart supporters—to turn against the President. The mutiny of the sailors, six months later, impelled the military chiefs to act without further delay.

Once the government was overthrown, it soon became apparent that the long months of insubordination, strife and uncertainty within the barracks and military establishments had left hidden, but deep, marks on a sizable number of middle-grade officers, the ones who deal directly with the troops. These officers, concentrated in the large military garrisons, particularly at *Vila Militar* in Rio de Janeiro and at the bases in Recife, now refused to recognize any limits—political, legal or even moral—in their determination to "clean up" the country and hand out exemplary punishment even to those who had only remotely collaborated with the fallen administration.

In several instances the politicians, and even the military, used the young officers to attain higher positions for themselves or to get rid of their enemies. But the truth is that this state of mind of the officer corps and their relentless pressure upon the government turned out to be the main political factor of the first revolutionary stage; not even the considerable moral and intellectual ascendancy of Marshal Cas-

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telo over his fellow officers could contain and discipline it in its entirety.

During this period, a minimum standard of legality and discipline was maintained and, at the end of his administration, the President even succeeded in promulgating a new Constitution approved by Congress—the Charter of 1967; that is, he succeeded in imposing on reluctant civilians and the military a new juridical order that all of them pledged to support (but which in fact did not endure even 20 months). However, the "cassation" or stripping of many legal rights of politicians, such as former President Juscelino Kubitschek, the extent of the purge in the civil service and universities, the relentless repression of the leftists in the northeast, the sickening process of denunciation and accusation which would ultimately result in the federal intervention in Goias, the issuing of the Second Institutional Act which dissolved political parties at the end of 1965—all this resulted directly from the pressure exerted by the "young officers" and the frankly subversive action of extremist *lacerdistas* and other groups of radical rightist revolutionaries.

In March 1967, the second military President, Marshal Costa e Silva, took office in an atmosphere which could only be defined as a *pax casteliana*. In other words, the government and the country were to be guided by a constitutional norm, which held no appeal, on the one hand, for the majority of the citizenry who were already back to liberal normalcy, or on the other, to the military, among whom the wave of revolutionary dissatisfaction had receded to the barracks but was far from over. In the months that followed, this breach between the public and the so-called forces of order widened steadily. Former President Kubitschek was still the most popular politician in the country, and Governor Lacerda himself had gone to visit him in his exile as an expression of solidarity. The military were held responsible for the excesses of the repression from the previous period and were openly ridiculed for the exaggerations of the narrow-minded morality characteristic of such a regime.

Yet another cause of friction was economic. When Castelo Branco took over the presidency in 1964, the country was virtually at the brink of financial disaster, with an inflation rate approaching 100 percent a year; thus the government had been forced to adopt at the outset a program of severe austerity. This cleaned up the financial problem and put the economy on a firmer foundation, but also resulted at the end of three years in an appreciable erosion of the real value of wages and, more particularly, in a noticeable squeeze on the earnings of the civil servants—a traditionally large category, well protected

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by the politics of clientelism of the previous Brazilian regimes. In 1967–68, when the worst of the storm was over, and the threat of disorder that had hung over the nation during the tumultuous Goulart era was removed, these financial sacrifices appeared especially unnecessary and unbearable, particularly since the economy was beginning to resume the upward trend which had characterized it during the Kubitschek years and which would only return fully in 1970.

To a real degree these political, economic, social, and even psychological factors exacerbated the climate of systematic opposition and of natural irreverence in cities such as Rio de Janeiro. Leading newspapers such as the *Correio da Manha,* theatrical productions, humor magazines and popular songs condemned and satirized the prevailing state of affairs and its military guarantors. In this critical and delicate setting, the violent and recurring student demonstrations which characterized the year 1968 all over the world also took place in Brazil. Starting in May and June, demonstrations by students and civilians, together with police repression, often senseless and ineffectual, resulted in incidents of increasing gravity, spreading the climate of disorder and provoking friction among the Congress, the clergy, and the so-called forces of order.

If Brazil were a mature and stable democracy, its institutions would have weathered the storm, and the wave of unrest would have died down as happened in many other places. Actually, in those same months, the economic situation started to show signs of a recovery that would make possible reconciliation between public opinion and the government. However, in the prevailing climate of 1968, the crisis was solved by a brutal show of force. On December 13, the officers of the famous *Vila Militar* of Rio de Janeiro, backed by officers of other garrisons in the country, forced the government to issue a new Institutional Act, closing the Congress and suspending civil rights and guarantees. Concurrently, it also imposed severe press censorship and a wave of indiscriminate imprisonments, cassations and political purges. For the first time in Brazilian history, the country underwent a military coup without support or encouragement from any civilian political faction. The violence served to drive a significant number of militant students and militant Catholics into the arms of radical leftist groups of the Maoist or *Guevarista* style then in vogue.

The months that followed were perhaps the most somber in the political history of the country; a series of kidnappings and terrorists' attacks justified to many the build-up of a police state and the abolition of civil guarantees, at the same time increasing the importance of

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the organs of repression and security within the dominant military system. Adding it all up, the wave of terrorism actually tended to favor and accelerate the reconciliation between the military establishment and public opinion, inasmuch as, with the first kidnapping of an ambassador (which, by the way, was a Brazilian invention), it became clear that the great majority of the country repudiated the terrorists' acts and was strongly inclined to support the authorities who fought them.

Even the terrible excesses perpetrated within the context of suppressing terrorism had a contradictory political effect. On the one hand, they hindered eventual attempts to return to legality and contributed to the tightening of censorship, but, on the other hand, there is no doubt that the most brutal and shocking cases—although withheld from the majority of the public—elicited strong counterreaction within the military establishment itself. As early as 1970, the top governing group was convinced that it could not allow the indefinite continuation of a state of affairs that abetted the perpetration of such crimes under the umbrella of the power of the armed forces. This conviction resulted before long in the dismissal of the Air Force Minister and his ranking commanders.

III

Under the government of General Emilio Medici (1970–74) a climate of national reconciliation emerged, which was strengthened and consolidated by an external situation extremely favorable to the economic growth of the country, with a decrease in inflation and a series of sports triumphs which the people associated with the General-President. Although Medici was a strong believer in tight restrictions on public freedoms, and a convinced immobilist in politics, he was to become a respected and even popular President.

Right here one might perhaps point to the crossroad that has led the Brazilian regime to its present course. The very success of the Medici administration sowed among some of his main followers the temptation to institutionalize the regime, that is, to convert the authoritarian situation, so well-defined in the study made by Juan Linz,[1] into a permanent authoritarian regime. These civilian and military supporters of the President, under the leadership of Justice Minister Alfredo Buzaid, were men from a right-wing background, deriving from *Integralismo,* a party in Brazil in the 1930s that mirrored Euro-

[1] Juan J. Linz, "The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or the Institutionalization of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Brazil," in *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future,* Alfred Stepan, ed., New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973, pp. 233–254.

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pean fascism and *Salazarismo* and left numerous, albeit isolated, sympathizers in many areas of the national life.

Through speeches and statements delivered in 1971–72, this group tried to impose on the dominant system and on the country as a whole an anti-liberal and anti-democratic doctrine as a foundation for the institutionalization they desired. Reaction from the very few independent voices left in the Brazilian press, as well as the vehement opposition of the Bar Association and prominent judges, was not long in coming. The collapse of the rightist conspiracy after a few months was brought about, however, primarily by an evolution within the military establishment itself.

The determination of the political line to be taken by the regime was, in fact, unavoidably tied to the question of presidential succession, that is, to the future of the dominant military system in power. The first option of the rightists was *continuismo*; its main asset was the success and popularity of the President. Very early on, however, it became quite clear that the head of the government himself would not accept this alternative. The attitude of General Medici and the sound understanding he always shared with his War Minister, Orlando Geisel, an old comrade and an outstanding military leader, were the decisive factors in the course events ultimately took. In appointing his successor, President Medici was not just choosing the general commonly held to be the most qualified and most capable among the military. He was, in the name of the Army and the dominant system, actually exercising a momentous political option and setting the direction that would prevail in the months to follow.

By the selection of General Ernesto Geisel, former head of the Military Household under President Castelo Branco, and by his eventual inauguration in March 1974, the military movement of March 31, 1964—ten years after it was unleashed—effected a maneuver that could well be defined as a return to its origins; that is to *castelismo,* to the mentality, the methods and the principles which characterized Marshal Castelo and are today best represented by President Geisel himself and by General Reynaldo Melo de Almeida, present commander of the First Army, based in Rio de Janeiro. Thus, the process by which Geisel emerged as the official nominee in 1972–73 could not have been more significant. The Army and the dominant system were turning to a leader capable of moving the regime from the deadlock it found itself in, and of opening the way toward democratic normalcy at the very moment when the opposite way, that is, the choice of a person who would only preserve and consolidate the status quo, might have appeared considerably easier and far less risky.

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In effect, between December 1968 and the middle of 1972, the state of mind of the officer corps had undergone considerable change. Gone were the frustration, insecurity and feeling of rejection vis-à-vis an openly hostile and rebellious citizenry that had led to the coup of December 13, 1968 and the ensuing repression. The restoration of order, the quick crushing of terrorism (frequently by unspeakable means) and the economic boom brought about a reconciliation of the authorities and the people, reversing, so to speak, the previous picture. What seemed to be lacking, in spite of the popularity enjoyed by Medici and the acceptance of his administration by sizable segments of the population, was the reestablishment of civil liberties and the rule of law, characteristic of what are generally thought of as civilized societies.

In spite of tight press censorship, there is no doubt that the pressure, both at home and abroad, by the more enlightened sectors of public opinion played a very important role in the process. But the truth is that it cannot be said that the balance of political forces imposed this new opening up of the political process, or *abertura,* on the regime or that the chorus of voices clamoring for freedom could not have been ignored. (Parliamentary elections from which the official opposition party, MDB, would emerge with a very strong showing against the government party, Arena, would only take place in November 1974; this was eight months after President Geisel initiated the *abertura.*) In 1971–72, with the exception of *O Estado* and a few isolated voices, the vast majority of the Brazilian press viewed quite favorably the rightist thesis espoused by those who intended to institutionalize the authoritarian regime.

In fact, as we have noted, the change of course took place within the military establishment, and came about through factors inherent to it. Among them, one could single out the authority of Minister Orlando Geisel; disgust caused by the excesses characteristic of a police state, which was being supported by the Army's prestige and power; and finally, the receptiveness of influential sectors of the Brazilian armed forces to more democratic arguments and ideas.

IV

At this stage, many American readers must be thinking what an unfortunate country it is, in which the state of mind prevailing in the barracks determines the political course and the very fate of its institutions. Perhaps so. The fact is, however, that we count in our defence some significant extenuating circumstances. The first is that we live in exceptional times, marked by the profound social and political insta-

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bility characteristic of initial (or perhaps intermediate) phases of the process of economic development. In France, for instance, a stage similar to ours could be found in the period of Napoleon III and Thiers, not to mention what took place in England and Germany at the start of their respective industrial revolutions. The second extenuating circumstance is even more to the point. The role of the military establishment throughout the history of Brazil cannot be compared to its role in Anglo-Saxon countries. The military institution in Brazil has always been a full-fledged branch of the national political elite and has participated, together with the civilians and the clergy, in the political decision-making process.

During the Empire, in the nineteenth century, it was the Army that pacified and unified the country, which was just emerging from the clashes and strife which marked the birth of the independent nation. The inauguration of the Republic, at the end of the century, was also marked by the decisive participation of the military. Later on, the Revolution of 1930, which paved the way for the development of modern Brazil, became known as the "Revolution of the Lieutenants." By the end of World War II, after they overthrew the dictator Vargas whom they had supported for eight years, the military had evolved into a "moderating" power serving the civilian governments but at the same time remaining above them, often taking a tutelary position that occasionally even included overthrowing them.

In his excellent book on the Brazilian military, Alfred Stepan points out how this tutelage of the civilian government by the armed forces establishment until 1964 not only was implicitly accepted but even at times expressly requested by the civilian political currents of the country, including the most liberal.[2] The first dogma of this "moderating power"—a term which derives from the power of the former Emperor over the Parliament and political parties—is that the military establishment cannot be divided; it acts only when a sufficiently strong consensus has been reached within its ranks. Indeed, if the military are divided, they lose their position as political arbiter and become participants in an armed revolution, as in 1930; in a civil war, which we have never had; or in an abortive coup, as in August 1961.[3]

Obviously, the Brazilians have few reasons to be proud of this kind of unwritten juridical norm, but nonetheless it remains one of the

[2] Alfred Stepan, *The Military and Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

[3] On the basis and operating mechanism of this "moderating power" of the military, see also Fernando Pedreira, *Marco 31, Civis e Militares no Processo da Revolucao Brasieira,* Rio de Janeiro: José Alvaro, 1964.

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pillars of the great contract of the body politic. Indeed, if the military are the holders of the moderating power, it is not because they are wiser or more patriotic citizens than the others (as some of them, at times, seem to believe) but simply because they are the armed force. Faced with a united military, it is wiser and more prudent for the unarmed civilians to abide by their decisions than to challenge them.

Here again, two other considerations are important. The first is that the moderating power was not imposed on the country by the military but was accepted and requested by certain currents within important groups in the civilian society. In other words, if we have an arbiter it is because we could not do without one; Brazilian society does not find itself mature enough to compose, as civilians, its most serious differences. We ousted the Emperor in 1889, but we did not free ourselves of the need for a father figure, an indigenous Jupiter hovering over the factions and capable of settling our worst quarrels. On the other hand, the military, like any other citizens, are susceptible to the same winds that sweep public opinion in general and thus are hardly likely to arrive at a strong consensus which has not previously been arrived at by the key sectors of civilian society. This explains, at least partially, the relative ease with which their decisions are accepted and assimilated. Ambassador Carlos Alfredo Bernardes used to say that the only Latin American contribution to the international political lexicon is the word *junta*. However, the fact is that one cannot confuse Brazilian military interventions with the armed coups common to most of the continent that, as a rule, express the thirst for power of a military caudillo or some other strong man. In the 152 years that Brazil has been independent it has never experienced a single coup of this kind.

This history perhaps illuminates the cause of the most serious of our present difficulties. In 1964, when the military overthrew João Goulart, they did it not only for political reasons but also, indeed especially, for specifically military reasons. The government had instigated and sponsored insubordination and rebellion in the barracks —that is, they had attempted to destroy the very fabric of the military institution. Once the government had fallen, and contrary to what had been done on previous occasions, the military were moved to take the reins of power, especially the repressive mechanism, into their own hands, even if they shared the formal government with the liberal currents which had participated in the revolution, particularly the National Democratic Union, the second largest party in the country.

Marshal Castelo and his colleagues never admitted this state of affairs as anything but exceptional, destined to last only as long as

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strictly necessary and to be followed by the withdrawal of the military to their traditional role of a "moderating" power, leaving the government in the hands of their civilian allies. Nevertheless, as I have already mentioned, the desire of the young officer corps to go "to the very end"—although none of the officers could precisely say what that "end" would be—prevailed.

Between 1964 and 1968, pressure from the military base, often manipulated by interest groups, led to the successive political purges of, or at the very least the neutralization of, all civilian forces, allied or not. After the coup of December 13, 1968, the only ones to remain in the government, besides the military, were the technocrats. For months, real political power was directly in the hands of the military leaders, not only military ministers but also the Army commanders and the heads of the different security departments, all of whom had almost complete autonomy within their respective jurisdictions.

In October of the following year, in a meeting of the High Command of the Army specifically called for the purpose, General Emilio Medici, then commander of the Third Army, was chosen President of the Republic. Although, at the insistence of the General, the National Congress was reopened especially to ratify his appointment, all political power remained concentrated in his hands; he governed in strict accordance with the military and security departments and with no participation of civilian sectors or groups. It can be said that in administrative matters Medici gave free rein to his technocrats, but even they had to periodically account for their plans and activities to the War College—a sort of Central Committee for the regime—frequently in secret session.

On coming, therefore, "to the very end," to the complete military dictatorship, the military were left with two choices: either to stay put or to find a way to pull back. The third possible situation—wherein the military would be forced to take an active role in defending the status quo against an indignant and unreconciled civilian society—never materialized. Once the already weakened terrorist groups were destroyed, to widespread relief, and all possible leftist opposition was confined to the students and the intellectual sector, the country generally seemed to accept the state of affairs with passivity and even, starting in the middle of 1970, with a growing sense of enthusiasm. The only groups outside the far Left refusing to join in were the oldest and most respected bastions of liberalism (once again, in the European, not the American, sense of the word). However, the decision of the military to pull back, which crystallized at the time they decided upon the presidential candidacy of Ernesto Geisel in

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1973, was not easy, nor clear, nor even unanimous. Even now, it encounters doubts and resistance that are far from negligible and that may, at any time, be unexpectedly aggravated.

As we have indicated, there is no doubt that the influence of democratic opinion, at home and abroad, carried weight, especially since a number of men who believe in civil rights are always to be found among the military leaders and ranking members of the regime. But the decision of the military was not forced or imposed upon them by Brazilian civilian society. On the contrary, what actually happened was an evolution of tendencies within the military establishment itself that took place for predominantly military reasons.

In the first place, what led the more lucid and enlightened leaders of the Army to take a firm stand in favor of the *abertura* was the question of presidential succession. In a military regime the succession struggle is by necessity a military matter which tends to lead to unrest in the barracks and may end up by dividing the Army; yet the unity of the military establishment is the basis of its power and authority and, moreover, a requisite for the order and tranquillity of the country itself.

In 1965–66, only the selflessness and persistence of Marshal Castelo prevented the matter of choosing his successor from turning into a serious military crisis. In 1969, before the High Command could meet to make their decision, the question of who should succeed Marshal Costa e Silva had already unleashed many factions among the officer corps in the garrisons throughout the country. Again, in 1972–73, were it not for the well-known good sense of General Medici and the exceptional authority of Minister Orlando Geisel, the decision arrived at might not have been made without strife. As it was, the generals deemed it necessary to reestablish previous censorship of *O Estado* and forbid any public mention of the presidential succession until they had decided among themselves who the next President would be. Even the most liberal of the military leaders stated that free debate over the succession was impossible because it would inflame the barracks and end up by strongly dividing the armed forces.

The second reason for the military leaders to opt for the democratic *abertura* is akin to the first. A military regime, no matter how good its intentions, is always, or always tends to be, a closed regime. And in closed regimes it is impossible to avoid the dependence of the government on the so-called intelligence department as well as the practice of serious abuses which, if exposed to public scrutiny, might result in the collapse of the entire structure of the regime. The Brazilian experiment comes to prove, once again, an old truth. Without complete

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freedom of investigation and criticism of official acts, no regime—no matter how well-intentioned—can escape the vices of corruption and abuse of power. High credit must be given to many of our military for having themselves found intolerable the excesses of repression perpetrated under their own umbrella, even though the worst of those excesses, protected by the censorship, were never widely known and thus the reputation of the armed forces as well as of the government was never seriously compromised.

The groping and fragile political *abertura* we witness in Brazil is primarily a military initiative, backed by the remaining liberal currents. However, the conservative entrepreneurial class (quite pleased with the absence of strikes, the institution of wage controls and the exemplary social discipline of recent years) views it with some reservations as do the leftist intellectual and student sectors. Although the latter would indeed welcome a respite in the repressive pressures, they are more enthusiastic about Peruvian-style nationalism, albeit dictatorial and militarist, or the radicalism of the Portuguese armed forces movement (MFA), than about an *abertura* which will simply allow the interplay of liberal political and economic forces.

Thus the civilian political support that President Geisel can depend on is, to say the least, quite precarious. The representative political picture—composed of the two existing parties, the government-sponsored Arena and the official opposition MDB—is still without doubt poorer and weaker than what we had in April 1964 or even November 1968, in spite of the shot in the arm that the parliamentary elections of last November represented. We will have to wait for the emergence of new talents and leadership; the existing ones do not measure up to those who have left the scene because of age or cassation.

Within the military establishment there are also difficulties. The support for authoritarian tendencies—chiefly by simple souls for whom discipline and hierarchy, the bases of military organization, should also constitute the foundations of civilian society—will continue to be sizable. In addition, the security organs, so important during the fight against the terrorists, are reluctant to relinquish the power and prerogatives they have achieved. For them, the *abertura* and normalization represent loss of privileges and the risk of irritating investigations. For these reasons, this might well be the area where President Geisel will find the most delicate obstacles to overcome.

V

Still to be examined are the probable political consequences of the

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socioeconomic picture. Brazil is a developing country. Its development is characterized by a rapid process of urbanization and industrialization with massive dislocation of whole segments of the population from rural areas to the large metropolises, still unprepared to receive them. During phases of rapid economic growth, the general availability of jobs and the intense horizontal and vertical mobility of workers minimize social trauma. That is what took place in the second half of the 1950s, under Kubitschek, and again in 1970, under Medici. It is not surprising that these two governments have become symbols of popularity, success and largesse for Brazilians.

Wisely, the population esteems Medici and Kubitschek not so much for their administrative capacity, which is difficult enough for most people to evaluate, but for their "lucky star," a kind of gift for attracting wealth and happiness to the country. However, the two phases were actually determined less by internal policies than by highly favorable external circumstances. Kubitschek and Medici (along with his Finance Minister Delfim) took advantage of them but did not prepare the country for what lay ahead.

When the rate of economic expansion drops, the social trauma inherent in development becomes especially sensitive and acute. This is particularly so when the general expectations and the influx of workers to the large cities, stimulated by the preceding expansion, go on even after the job market begins to slow down. This might well be the phase we are undergoing now.

The Brazilian historical experience, however, shows that socioeconomic problems become politically volatile only when they affect key sectors of the middle class. Between 1961 and 1964, the decreasing rate of expansion (which even resulted in an absolute decline in per capita income in 1963), the bad harvests, the disordered strikes, and galloping inflation affected society from top to bottom. In 1966–67, likewise, in its phase of incipient economic revival, the austerity policy of the government had for a time severely affected such categories as urban labor, and such middle-sector groups as civil servants, teachers, bank employees and journalists, the declining purchasing power of the middle groups even causing the beginning of a recession in the auto industry and other industrial sectors. These difficulties were—for the middle-sector groups—corrected or absorbed in the following years; but the fact is that in political terms Costa e Silva's government paid dearly for them.

Since his ascent to power in March of last year, President Ernesto Geisel and his Finance Minister, Mario Simonsen, have tried to replace the statistical juggling of the last months of the previous ad-

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ministration with a more accurate picture of the economic reality, i.e., that the inflation rate was significantly higher than reported. Even though this has resulted in more generous wage readjustments, it has not contributed to improving the popular image of the government. People dislike bitter truth.

In any event, it seems clear that the President is determined to stimulate the domestic market and improve the workers' share of the national income. In turn, the discovery of new and possibly rich offshore oil deposits has contributed to restoring a mood of relative optimism. Actually, the Brazilian state is today in command of considerable resources, allowing the government to face austerity phases, such as the one immediately ahead of us, without alienating the support or at least the goodwill of the decisive political sectors of the middle class. It is to be hoped that President Geisel and Finance Minister Simonsen—a brilliant technician still lacking the needed political stature for his post—find the right answers, especially now that they have a freer press which can mirror more accurately the wishes of the people. Thus Brazil is now taking its first steps in what appears to be a delicate and long convalescence period that, at best, will return it to a civilian regime under the protection and tutelage —the moderating power—of the military.

In the decisive military area, all that can be said is that there are still recalcitrant and delicate obstacles to be overcome and that these obstacles may very well become insurmountable if the general picture is altered.

As to politics, the convalescence is probably going to progress, if it does at all, in spite of very few favorable conditions. Sizable opposition forces are not the important factor here, but rather, that after 11 years of a military regime, the political field is leveled ground. We have no parties worthy of that name and even less party leadership. We have no autonomous labor unions or trade associations. The state governors, appointed by the President, do not represent their states, nor do they speak for themselves. And the less said about most of the senators and representatives the better.

We will have to start again, if we are effectively to start at all, from scratch. And our new politicians, good or bad, will only gain substance, will only understand their tasks, if we allow them to take full command of that share of power that is their due as the people's choice. We will have to see. In these circumstances, who would bet on the success of the present political *abertura*? No one. Only, perhaps, those incorrigible optimists, the Brazilians.

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U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE: HOW MANY? DOING WHAT?

By Alain C. Enthoven

DISTINGUISHED Senators ask, "What should we tell our constituents when they ask why we should keep American troops in Europe 30 years after the end of World War II?"

The answer remains what it has been throughout that period: because it is in our best interest to keep them there. A free and independent Western Europe, aligned with the United States, is vital for our national security and well-being. The U.S.S.R. and its Warsaw Pact allies have large and effective land and air forces in Eastern Europe. If our allies are to be able to preserve their independence, NATO must have in-place forces of equal size and effectiveness, and be able to match the Pact in a mobilization. If the NATO alliance does not provide such forces, a major imbalance in military power will be an intimidating factor that cannot help but influence our allies' freedom and political alignment over the years.

American forces are necessary because they help maintain the balance, and also because they demonstrate the seriousness of our commitment. Some say, "Let the Europeans provide for their own defense." Our NATO allies do pay most of the cost of that defense. European NATO members have about 3.3 million military personnel on active duty. The United States maintains about 320,000 military personnel in Europe, about ten percent of the European total. However, our allies would not provide themselves an effective defense without a substantial U.S. contribution. They do not have the necessary leadership and unity. Although Europe has aspirations toward autonomy and cohesion, these hopes have not been realized and may never be. By far the most important unifying factor is that each is an ally of the United States. American leadership is the glue that holds the alliance together.

However, while NATO outspends the Pact by roughly a third, and has almost 20 percent more military personnel on active duty, we are not achieving the military effectiveness we need and that we could achieve with the resources we are devoting to the purpose. Making NATO's conventional forces fully effective within existing budgets and manpower ought to be the major goal of the alliance. An important part of this effort, I believe, should be a reassessment of the tactical nuclear weapons now deployed in Europe, leading to an early and sharp reduction in their numbers.

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II

When NATO defense ministers adopted the strategy of flexible response in 1967, they recognized that NATO must have strong conventional forces to ensure that it can deter, and if necessary respond to, less than total threats to the security of its members. In line with this agreed strategy, the presence of substantial U.S. forces both contributes to the necessary balance of conventional forces and gives the Europeans confidence that U.S. strategic nuclear forces are coupled to European defense. Since 1967, it has become even clearer than it was then that Europe cannot hope to replace the American nuclear guarantee, not only because Soviet nuclear capabilities have grown so much in recent years, but also because any vision of a European nuclear force under a single political authority remains remote.

In the seven intervening years, much has been done to flesh out the flexible response strategy. Yet both an adequate and effectively directed European defense effort, and a proper understanding of the role of U.S. forces by Americans and Europeans alike, have been obscured by one persistent problem that remains as serious today as it was in the 1960s. That problem is the exaggeration of the strength and capability of the Warsaw Pact forces, leading to a tendency to suppose that NATO forces are hopelessly outnumbered, and that therefore U.S. forces serve no other purpose than to act as a "trip wire." One logical implication of this view has not been missed by members of the Congress who want to bring U.S. forces home: if NATO is outnumbered in the Center Region 68 divisions to 24, as one comparison has it, they might as well be outnumbered 68 to 21, in which case we might as well cut U.S. forces to a token level.

But a trip-wire strategy would be dangerous and ineffective. Neither the Europeans nor the Soviets would be likely to believe that the United States would be willing to risk the destruction of more than 100 million Americans merely because a small number of American troops in Europe were threatened. Such a posture would not provide our European allies with the reassurance they need. Our safety requires that if we really mean to maintain our nuclear guarantee as Europe's last line of defense, we must have strong conventional forces as a first line of defense.

But equally important is the fact that NATO land forces are not outnumbered. The essential facts remain today as K. Wayne Smith and I reported them for mid-1968: NATO has more total active duty military manpower than the Pact; NATO has more total land forces manpower than the Pact; NATO and Pact land forces manpower in the critical Center Region are about equal; and NATO tactical air-

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craft are about equal in number and distinctly superior in quality to those of the Pact.[1] For example, estimates published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies for 1974 are summarized in the following table:

WORLDWIDE NATO AND WARSAW PACT MILITARY MANPOWER IN 1974
(thousands)[2]

	NATO	*Warsaw Pact*
Army	2,815	2,626
Air Force	1,166	937
Marine Corps/Naval Infantry	212	18
Navy	894	518
Strategic Air Defense (NORAD & PVO)	45	500
Total Active	5,132	4,599
Trained Reservists	5,295	5,093

With respect to the Center Region, total manpower in division forces as of mid-1968 was 677,000 for NATO and 619,000 for the Pact.[3] Using the broader, but equally relevant, concept of total men in land forces (i.e., including, for example, training base, supply overhead, etc.), Secretary of Defense Schlesinger reported to the Congress in March 1974 that the manpower in the ground forces "which the Pact could launch against the Center with very little warning . . . amounts to about 925,000 men," while "to counter this immediate threat, NATO has in the Center Region of Europe about 29-1/3 divisions . . . manpower in ground forces amounts to about 890,000, if France is included."[4] There are many sets of definitions and assumptions on which to base such comparisons. But unless we concede to the Pact a long headstart in mobilization, any balanced application of reasonable assumptions yields the same result, i.e., NATO is *not* badly outnumbered in total ground forces manpower.

With respect to the buildup of forces after mobilization begins, one recent and very useful analysis estimates the buildup of manpower

[1] Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program 1961–1969,* New York: Harper & Row, 1971, Chapter 4.

[2] The data are taken directly from *The Military Balance 1974–1975,* London, 1974, except for estimates of U.S. Army and Air Force personnel in NORAD of about 1,000 and 35,000 respectively. (There are also about 9,000 Canadians in NORAD.) U.S. Department of Defense data, which are more accurate, show a numerical balance more favorable to NATO.

Because they are grand totals, the data include about 150,000 U.S. military personnel in the Pacific and over 400,000 Soviet personnel adjacent to the Chinese border.

[3] *How Much Is Enough?,* p. 148.

[4] James R. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975,* U.S. Dept. of Defense, March 4, 1974, Washington: GPO, 1974, pp. 87–88. Secretary Schlesinger's FY 1976 *Report,* just released, does not give manpower figures, but its basic assessment of the NATO balance appears unchanged.

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available for combat in the Center Region on M-Day and 30 and 60 days later as follows:[5]

	(in thousands)		
	M-Day	*M + 30*	*M + 60*
Total NATO	660	1,045	1,105
Total Warsaw Pact	576	1,076	1,241

The estimates used by the Secretary of Defense in briefing allied defense ministers, which are based on continuing studies by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the U.S. Army, are somewhat more favorable to NATO. But the essential fact of rough equality in manpower remains.

One important category in which NATO is at a large numerical disadvantage is tanks. The Pact has about 2.5 times as many as NATO, 15,500 vs. 6,000 in the deployed forces described by Secretary Schlesinger. Yet this numerical advantage is to some extent offset by NATO's antitank defenses and the superior quality of NATO's tanks.

In tactical air forces, NATO has a distinct advantage. Total inventories on the two sides are about equal. The numbers of aircraft in the Center Region in peacetime and that could be deployed in 30 or 60 days are roughly equal. But most Pact aircraft are primarily air-to-air fighters without strong ground-attack capabilities. On average, NATO aircraft can deliver about 2.5 times as much payload as their Pact counterparts on typical combat sorties. Moreover, NATO forces have big advantages in pilot training, sortie rate capability, and highly lethal, accurate guided weapons. If appropriately trained and equipped, NATO tactical air forces could devastate Soviet armored columns with "smart bombs."

These figures do not imply either that NATO now has conventional forces equal in *effectiveness* to those of the Pact, or that NATO would defend effectively today. The outcome of a Pact attack is highly uncertain, and there are serious deficiencies in NATO's posture. But manpower figures and comparative cost estimates do suggest strongly that NATO ought to be able to organize an effective defense within existing budgets and manpower.

If these data are well-established facts, how is it possible to exaggerate the Warsaw Pact and depict NATO as hopelessly outnumbered? The main vehicles of exaggeration are identifiable and easily refutable. The most time-honored method has been to count divisions instead of counting soldiers, guns, tanks, or vehicles. But the sizes and contents of divisions vary so much as to make their number meaning-

[5] Richard D. Lawrence and Jeffrey Record, *U.S. Force Structure in NATO, An Alternative*, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974.

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less for purposes of force comparison. Not only are there more men in a NATO division than in a Pact division, but NATO generally has more men outside its divisions. NATO has over 30,000 soldiers in central Europe for each of its divisions there, and the Warsaw Pact has only about 16,000 soldiers for each division.[6]

Another method of exaggerating the threat is to assume that all Pact divisions are at the same readiness and equipment status as the Soviet divisions in East Germany. In fact, less than a fifth of the Pact's divisions have this high level of readiness and this high quality of equipment, and almost a third are cadre divisions that would need to mobilize most of their personnel and much of their equipment from their civilian economies before they could fight.

Still another method for distorting the balance is to include on the NATO side only the forces that the NATO countries formally commit to the alliance, while counting all the Pact units. In fact, although most would be available for a conflict in Europe, about a third of the military personnel in the NATO countries are not formally committed. The forces that are most often excluded in force balance comparisons are the French. This was the basis, for example, for the following description offered by Robert E. Kuenne in *The Wall Street Journal* of April 8, 1974: "NATO has about 600,000 combat and direct support troops deployed in this theater, plus 50,000 French troops, to counter a Warsaw Pact deployment of 900,000 including about 600,000 Russian troops." Professor Kuenne got his data from *The Military Balance 1973–1974*.[7] In excluding the rest of the combat forces in France's 332,000-man army, Professor Kuenne and the authors of *The Military Balance* are ignoring one of the major parts of NATO's deterrent. But on the Warsaw Pact side of the comparison, they count all the military forces in the East European countries. They are asking us to believe that Czech forces would cooperate effectively with Soviet forces in an attack on Western Europe, but that French forces would not cooperate with their NATO allies in the wartime defense of their homeland!

Finally, there is a continued preoccupation with planning against the "worst case." For example, while the Pact might attempt *either* a concealed mobilization followed by a limited-scale attack *or* deliberate mobilization followed by a maximum-scale attack, they could not have a concealed mobilization followed by a maximum-scale attack. Warsaw Pact preparations to attack NATO on a large scale

[6] Based on the data cited earlier from James R. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975*, pp. 87–88.

[7] London, 1973, pp. 88–89.

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would severely disrupt their economies and probably have to be publicly announced. NATO would surely receive intelligence reports on such activities and therefore one ought to assume that it would start mobilization no more than a week after the Pact.

Overwhelming Soviet superiority is a comforting myth; it relieves our military and our allies of the responsibility for making the sacrifices required to achieve maximum effectiveness within existing budgets and manpower levels. But exaggeration has been extremely harmful. Overstatement of the enemy leads to despair and inaction, to strategies of desperation, and to political weakness. It has made it extremely difficult to carry on a reasoned dialogue about NATO strategy and force planning, and has generated European suspicion about U.S. motives in proposing a strong conventional defense. And, as noted earlier, it has backfired and led some members of Congress to conclude that large U.S. forces in Europe serve no useful purpose.

III

Confusion over the role of U.S. forces in Europe has contributed to political pressures to bring them home. But the main source of these pressures has been concern over financial burdens of defense. The arguments are (1) that we must reorient national priorities to domestic human concerns, (2) that our European allies aren't doing their fair share, and (3) that our military spending in Europe causes an insupportable drain on our international balance of payments. As is so often the case in large issues of public policy, beliefs long outlive the facts that gave them birth.

First, we *have* reoriented national priorities. Total defense expenditures were 9.4 percent of our gross national product in 1968; they are down to 5.9 percent today,[8] and projected at 5.8 percent in the budget for fiscal 1976. In constant 1974 dollars, 1974 defense expenditures were 29 percent below their 1968 value and 6.5 percent below their pre-Vietnam 1964 value.[9] In fact, in 1973 our armed forces reached the lowest manpower level, the lowest spending in real terms, and the lowest spending as a percent of GNP since 1951.

Second, while the sharing of the burden with our NATO allies seemed very unequal in 1968, it is less unequal today. In 1973, our NATO allies in Europe spent about 3.6 percent of their GNPs on defense compared to our six percent. Moreover, our European allies

[8] GNP valued at market prices. U.S. Department of Defense, OASD (Comptroller), February 3, 1975.

[9] Edward Fried, Alice Rivlin, Charles Schultze, and Nancy Teeters, *Setting National Priorities, The 1974 Budget,* Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1973, p. 292.

[10] *The Budget of the United States Government, FY 1975,* pp. 53 and 61.

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have increased their defense expenditures in real terms by ten percent over the past three years, while we have reduced ours. And our allies on the Continent have maintained compulsory military service, which reduces the apparent financial cost in relation to real cost, while we have gone to an all-volunteer force. Finally, the United States maintains large general-purpose forces for deployment and reinforcement to other regions of the world not directly related to NATO. The Defense Department estimates the cost of these forces at about $15 billion in FY 1975, or about 17.5 percent of its budget.[11] If they were excluded, U.S. defense spending would be about 4.9 percent of GNP.

This is not to say that all the inequality of burden has been removed, or that we should not continue to press our allies to do more in their own defense. It is merely to say that we ought to recognize the substantial changes that have been made.

Third, the significance of our military balance-of-payments deficit has been exaggerated by critics of our NATO posture. In fact, in May 1974, the President was able to report to the Congress that, as a result of the latest agreement with the West Germans and military procurement by the other allies, the FY 1974 U.S. balance-of-payments expenditures in NATO Europe would be completely offset, as required under the Jackson-Nunn Amendment to the 1974 military procurement bill.[12] Even if European military purchases did not completely offset our expenditures, there is no particular reason why the balance on *military* account ought to be zero. To claim that it ought to be is to deny the principle of comparative advantage. Why shouldn't the Germans be allowed to "offset" by buying American commercial aircraft or computers? In fact, in 1974, the United States had a *surplus* of merchandise exports over imports to Western Europe of $4.9 billion. Over the five-year period 1969–1973, this annual surplus averaged $1.8 billion. Finally, in connection with the offset problem, the West German Federal Bank promised not to convert its large dollar holdings into gold. As a result, the West Germans subsidized the American international financial position by absorbing the losses as the dollar devalued. Between the end of 1969 and September 1973, their loss came to about $10 billion.[13]

[11] *Manpower Authorization Hearings,* Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, March 21–22, 1974, Washington: GPO, 1974.

[12] *A Report on Progress Made in Securing an Equitable Sharing of The Costs of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Among Its Members,* pursuant to Section 812(d) of Public Law 93-155, May 16, 1974.

[13] James Lowenstein and Richard Moose, *U.S. Security Issues in Europe: Burden Sharing and Offset, MBFR and Nuclear Weapons,* A staff report prepared for the use of the subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, September 1973, p. 6.

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The financial issues associated with our NATO forces that loomed so large five years ago do not deserve high priority today. The key issue is how to get the military effectiveness we are paying for. We should not allow it to be clouded by insistence on problems of minor importance.

IV

NATO isn't getting the military power we are paying for. As Robert Komer and others have recommended, NATO needs to restructure its posture to meet the needs of a conventional defense within available resources.[14]

The assumption that most Pact divisions are ready has led NATO to concentrate most of its combat manpower in nearly full-strength units that would be available immediately, and to neglect mobilization capability. The European NATO countries have over two million trained reservists without unit assignments. And very limited planning has been done for the reception of outside reinforcements. Pact forces are designed for a period of prewar mobilization, with many cadre units to be filled up by reservists, and for a peak of readiness 30 to 60 days after mobilization begins. NATO must have some forces to protect itself against a surprise attack by forward-deployed ready Pact forces. But an at least equally likely danger to NATO is coercion based on Soviet mobilization. The time it would take the Pact to mobilize, reinforce and ready its cadre units would let European reserve units come up to strength and let reinforcements arrive. NATO should create more cadre units and prepare for effective use of reinforcements.

While the Soviets put three-fourths of their division-force manpower in combat functions, NATO puts roughly half its men in logistic and other support.[15] U.S. and Soviet armored divisions have about the same number of tanks, but the U.S. division has twice the men (17,500 vs. 8,400) and three times the number of men per division in the theater. In part, this reflects different operating concepts. The Pact plans to commit its forces in echelons, supporting only a part of its force at a time, letting divisions be attrited in battle and then be replaced by fresh ones. NATO plans to support all its divisions and replace losses within engaged divisions. Each system has advantages. The Pact can probably put more weapons into battle for a short period and thus gain more shock power. But, with proper organization, NATO could concentrate its greater transportation assets and

[14] R. W. Komer, "Treating NATO's Self-Inflicted Wound," *Foreign Policy*, No. 13, Winter 1973–74.

[15] Lawrence and Record, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

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thus increase the firepower per unit at a key point on the front.

However, part of the difference is due to NATO's policy that logistics is a national responsibility. Nations now deploy support forces not needed in peacetime, such as transport and construction units, with equipment that could be drawn in wartime from the Continental allies' civilian sectors to equip their reserves. In the Center Region, the United States, West Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands all independently plan rear-area security forces for roughly the same geographic areas. Communications facilities and antennae from several different NATO nations are often located side by side on German hilltops. All of the NATO combat forces must depend on their allies' forces to help stop a Pact attack. So why shouldn't support of combat forces be a cooperative effort?

Richard Lawrence and Jeffrey Record recommend creation of a multinational logistics command for the Center Region to enhance "the ability of the senior field commanders in the Center Region to shift national forces and reorient lines of communication in reaction to an attack."[16] Among the many potential benefits, they estimate that the 16,000-man sustaining support increments of each of our eight NATO-oriented active army division forces (mostly reservists in peacetime) could be cut in half. And as Komer observed, "Such European assumption of certain support functions might even permit more equitable burden sharing on a basis palatable to our allies."[17] In this connection, the Nunn Amendment, passed last summer by the Congress, requiring the U.S. armed forces in Europe to reduce 18,000 support personnel with the option of converting them to combat functions, was particularly appropriate; this is now being done.

Many resources are wasted because each of our Center Region allies maintains a separate defense establishment with three services and separate national and service overheads, training establishments, supply systems, etc. What military-economic sense is there in countries with small forces maintaining some of each kind of force—for the Belgians to have a 4,200 man navy, for the Germans to buy large frigates and destroyers, or for both the Dutch and Belgians to maintain reconnaissance, ground attack, air defense, and deep interdiction capabilities in their small air forces? There has been some joint production and shared procurement, but much more is needed. General Andrew J. Goodpaster, the retiring Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), recently estimated that lack of standardization costs NATO 30 to 50 percent of its potential capability. If one con-

[16] Lawrence and Record, *op. cit.*, pp. 80–83.
[17] Komer, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

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siders the potential economies from long production runs of standard weapons and the gains in military flexibility resulting from interchangeability of spare parts and ammunition, it is not too difficult to see how this can happen.

Finally, critical vulnerabilities persist in NATO's posture. Perhaps the most glaring and inexcusable one has been the lack of aircraft shelters and rapid runway repair capabilities. The critical importance of aircraft shelters should have been obvious years earlier. But the Israelis dramatized the point for all the world to see by wiping out the Egyptian Air Force on the ground in 1967. Seven years later, there were only about 860 shelters in the NATO Center Region for the 3,800 tactical aircraft, including U.S. reinforcements, that would be in the Center Region by M + 30. About 1,070 more shelters are in the planning or construction phase. When these are completed, about half of NATO's tactical air forces will remain critically vulnerable. It makes no sense at all to spend several million dollars for a tactical fighter, not to mention all the associated costs of basing and operation, and then fail to spend the less than $500,000 required to build a shelter (including runways, camouflage, etc.) to protect it from non-nuclear attack. Moreover, for lack of basing agreements, U.S. reinforcing aircraft would be concentrated with about twice the number per base as allied aircraft, leaving them unnecessarily vulnerable. Another major vulnerability is that the war matériel reserves of some of our main allies remain inadequate even for a short war. NATO should not concede to the Warsaw Pact an easy victory gained by merely outlasting a few short weeks of NATO supply.

But these problems are not insoluble. Each of them can be solved, given the political will, which must come in part from a recognition of the necessity and value of doing so. And there has been significant progress. Aircraft shelters are being built. There has been some joint procurement; more is under consideration. Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway have formed a consortium to buy a single replacement for their aging F-104s. This could produce big savings. The German Territorial Army was formed to make better use of German reservists. The United States and its allies are negotiating to share airbases, which can both reduce the concentration of U.S. aircraft and share base overhead costs. NATO's two Center Region air force headquarters have recently been placed under one command to permit allied aircraft to be employed more flexibly across the front. Our NATO allies have been increasing and upgrading their tank forces. Nearly all the Center Region countries are upgrading their antitank forces with new highly effective guided missiles.

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V

One of the most important realignments needed in NATO's posture is in its theater nuclear forces. The present posture is dangerous and in conflict with a sensible strategy for the defense of Europe. It diverts considerable resources from our non-nuclear posture where they would contribute much more to European security. And heavy psychological reliance on the large numbers of nuclear weapons acts as a barrier to strengthening NATO's conventional force posture.

In December 1966, Secretary McNamara announced that we had 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The number has stayed about the same ever since. They are of many different types, including warheads for surface-to-surface missiles, bombs to be delivered by aircraft, artillery shells, surface-to-air missiles for air defense, and atomic demolition munitions.[18] While all of these weapons are under U.S. control, more than one-third of them would be delivered by allied forces. The yields of these weapons vary all the way from less than a kiloton (equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT) to hundreds of kilotons. Their combined lethal area is substantially more than the equivalent of 7,000 Hiroshimas. These weapons are intended for use against military targets, but many military targets are in or near heavily populated areas. The number of people killed in a nuclear war in central Europe would depend critically on how the weapons were used. For the number of civilians killed in a two-sided nuclear war using, say, half the 7,000 weapons to be less than in the tens of millions would require a degree of control, restraint and discrimination that is hard to believe possible. Moreover, the Soviet tactical nuclear posture is not designed for such discrimination.

Why do we have so many nuclear weapons in Europe? There is absolutely no logical reason. The *historical* reason is that in the 1950s, NATO doctrine was based on the concept that any war with the Warsaw Pact would be nuclear. There was no role for non-nuclear forces. So our military services raced to equip U.S. forces in Europe with nuclear weapons to make them fit approved doctrine. The United States built a large production base for fissionable materials, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff regularly projected requirements that would use them all up. This was done without any coherent plan or doctrine for the conduct of a theater nuclear war.

In the early 1960s, the Secretary of Defense tried to stop this production and deployment of nuclear weapons because it was costly and dangerous, and the total finally did level off at about 7,000 weap-

[18] For a detailed discussion of the U.S. posture in Europe, see Jeffrey Record, *U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Issues and Alternatives,* Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974.

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ons. Proposals for cutting it back were then considered, but there was intense political resistance to the idea at home and in Europe. The controversy over the role of conventional forces in NATO strategy was troubling our European allies. We did not want to add to this by raising the specter of "denuclearizing NATO."

Are there logical reasons for having a force of nuclear weapons in Europe? I think there are.

First, it has been proposed that we should have the capability for the demonstrative use of one or a few nuclear weapons as a way of showing resolve in a crisis. In eight years of studying the problem, I never saw a convincing scenario in which such use would make sense. But it is an uncertain world. This kind of limited capability does not cost much. I believe we should have it.

Second, NATO's possession of a substantial force of nuclear weapons makes a solid contribution to the deterrence of a large deliberate conventional attack by making such an attack exceedingly dangerous for the Soviets, especially if it were pressed to the point where it clearly threatened our vital interests. Moreover, in such an event, NATO's possession of nuclear weapons should act as a strong deterrent to the Soviets concentrating their land forces, lest they present attractive targets for nuclear counterattack. More generally, it imposes constraints and costs on their conventional force posture.

Third, while two-sided theater nuclear war makes no sense at all, one-sided nuclear war is even worse for the side that does not have nuclear weapons. We need a substantial nuclear posture in Europe to deter the other side from using nuclear weapons against us.

Finally, many people believe that tactical nuclear weapons act as a kind of bridge to general nuclear war. The best form of the argument has it that nuclear war is indivisible. Once it starts, there are no recognized firebreaks or stopping points. If a war breaks out in Europe, and nuclear weapons are used, then general nuclear war, including the destruction of the U.S.S.R., will ensue. This enhances the deterrent to any aggression in Europe. I have my doubts about the logic of the argument, about whether tactical nuclear war is or ought to be inevitably tied in with strategic nuclear war. But I will readily grant that the issue is sufficiently complex and uncertain that nobody can really know. Once the nuclear threshold is crossed, the danger of escalation to large-scale nuclear war is very great. And perhaps the more important fact is that the inevitability of escalation is a belief held by many people.

It is equally worth recording that there are several purposes that tactical nuclear weapons do not serve.

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First, tactical nuclear weapons cannot defend Europe; they can only destroy it. Studies and war games done in the 1960s showed repeatedly that even under the most favorable assumptions about restraint and limitations in yields and targets, between 2 and 20 million Europeans would be killed in a limited tactical nuclear war, with widespread damage to the economy of the affected area, and a high risk of 100 million deaths if the war escalated to attacks on cities. And, because of the vulnerability of key forces, the big advantages to striking first, and the location near cities of many airfields, transportation links, command posts and the like, the likelihood of such escalation would be very high.

Second, beyond the limited demonstrative use of a few weapons, there is no such thing as a two-sided tactical nuclear war in the sense of sustained purposive military operations. Studies showed that the first spasm of destruction would destroy airfields, communication and logistic centers, headquarters, and troop concentrations. General breakdown and paralysis would ensue.

Third, nobody knows how to fight a tactical nuclear war. Twenty years of effort by many military experts have failed to produce a believable doctrine for tactical nuclear warfare.

Given the purposes that can be served by tactical nuclear weapons, how many do we need? I believe that all the useful purposes can be more than adequately served by 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons. This is, admittedly, an arbitrary number, not based on a calculation of target destruction requirements. But nobody has been able to produce a calculation that makes much sense. And, compared to the area and targets involved, the destructive power of 1,000 weapons would be enormous, especially when backed up as they are by the U.S. strategic forces now armed with over 8,000 nuclear weapons.

Many parts of our tactical nuclear posture cannot stand up to scrutiny. For example, a very substantial fraction of the 7,000 weapons are bombs to be delivered by tactical aircraft, some of which are kept on what is known as "Quick Reaction Alert" or QRA in peacetime. Neither QRA nor non-alert aircraft for nuclear delivery makes sense. They became an anachronism more than ten years ago when the Soviets deployed more than enough IRBMs and MRBMs in the western U.S.S.R. to destroy each of the airfields several times over.

Theater-based aircraft, including those on QRA, are useless in a second-strike mode because they are hopelessly vulnerable. We protect our U.S.-based Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers from surprise ballistic missile attack by a set of procedures based on tactical warning (provided by early warning radars and in other ways), alert

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response, and launch subject to Positive Control. The SAC Commander has the authority to launch the alert bombers because there is still time for the President to decide afterwards whether he wants them to proceed to target or to return to base. The same procedure cannot work for the QRA aircraft in Europe. The warning times are too short. The range of aircraft and the flight times to enemy airspace make positive control procedures comparable to those of SAC impractical. And the need for consultation makes decision times too long.

The whole nuclear mission of our tactical aircraft could be done much better and more cheaply by three or four Poseidon submarines with MIRV warheads. Poseidon, with about 5,000 MIRVs, was originally bought to be sure we could overcome a projected Soviet nationwide ABM system. With the U.S.S.R. limited to ABM defense of Moscow, most of these weapons are not needed for their original purpose and should be available to replace theater-based weapons programmed for preplanned targets.

NATO tactical aircraft ought to be removed from all nuclear attack assignments and the aircraft fully committed to conventional operations. The nuclear weapons ought to be brought home and dismantled.

One argument against this is that dual capability (conventional and nuclear) is cheap: it only means adding nuclear weapons to the air forces we already have. This, however, is not true. For one thing, the nuclear weapons aren't cheap. But far more important is the fact that so-called dual capability is an illusion. The moment of conventional combat is the moment of greatest strain on our nuclear deterrent. SACEUR will not want to risk losing his nuclear attack aircraft in a conventional war. So he will be strongly tempted to hold them out of the conventional battle and make them, in effect, specialized nuclear forces. There is even a danger that he will increase the number of aircraft dedicated to nuclear missions, thus worsening the conventional balance. The result is not dual capable forces; it is extremely expensive and inferior nuclear forces.

The vulnerability of these forces is a menace. In a crisis, their vulnerability would put pressure on our decision-makers to launch them before they are wiped out. And it would put pressure on the Soviet leaders to destroy them before they are launched. Far better to leave the job to Poseidon out at sea where it can safely hold its fire until the President is ready to decide. Vulnerable forces such as nuclear-armed aircraft exacerbate and destabilize a crisis.

Moreover, the impact of NATO's European-based nuclear-armed aircraft on strategic arms negotiations (SALT) must be taken into

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account. In the Vladivostok preliminary agreement of November 1974, the Soviet Union has agreed not to include in the agreed basic ceilings (for launchers and for launchers equipped with MIRVs) any allowance for these NATO "forward-based systems." Thus it might appear that the question of reducing this element in the U.S. strategic posture has shifted wholly to the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, to which I shall refer in a moment. Yet the forward-based systems were apparently eliminated from the Vladivostok accord largely because their bearing was small *so long as* the overall ceilings were set fairly high. Thus, if—as one must hope—the completion of the Vladivostok accords is followed quite rapidly by talks aimed at reducing the overall ceilings, the forward-based systems could well come back as an obstacle. Certainly they remain a thorn in the side of Soviet military planners, apparently to a much greater extent than an objective estimate of their military value would warrant.

Other parts of our theater nuclear posture are also inappropriate to a sensible NATO strategy. Atomic Demolition Munitions, or ADMs as they are generally known, also can put our President in an intolerable position. They are supposed to give us the capability to create a sort of "instant Maginot Line." The scenario in which they are to be used goes something like this. Holes are dug for them in peacetime at key places near the border. When the invasion starts, our ADM teams set the weapons in the holes and retreat. When the weapons are detonated, big holes or earth slides are created that will slow the enemy's advance or channel his forces to make them better targets. The concept does not make political sense. Once the weapons are implanted and our forces have retreated, the President is in a position where he *has* to give the order to fire the weapons or else face their being overrun and captured by the enemy. The use of the ADMs requires an early decision to escalate to nuclear weapons before we have a chance to see whether our conventional defenses can hold. And if the President decides to initiate the use of nuclear weapons by the use of ADMs, he will have created a precedent for nuclear weapons being used on *friendly* territory, which cannot make this a very attractive prospect for our allies. I do not believe ADMs would ever be used. They too ought to be brought home and dismantled.

Another large category of theater nuclear weapons that doesn't make sense is warheads for surface-to-air missiles. The Soviets have more than enough nuclear-armed ballistic missiles to destroy Western Europe in a nuclear war. Our nuclear-armed surface-to-air missiles would contribute nothing to defense against such an attack. They would be useless in a conventional war we wanted to keep non-nu-

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clear. And firing nuclear warheads in surface-to-air missiles would be a particularly ineffective way of starting a nuclear war.

All this being said, there is of course a political factor. The purpose of our forces in Europe is to protect and reassure our allies. We cannot remove 6,000 nuclear weapons without their understanding and agreement. While the 1,000 remaining weapons (backed up by our strategic forces) would represent enormous destructive power, our allies have relied so heavily for so long on our large nuclear force that the sudden removal of large numbers of nuclear weapons would risk causing a serious loss in their confidence in their security. The removal of these weapons would need to be a part of a broad program for the substantial and visible improvement of our conventional forces. Our European allies would need to be convinced that their security was not being reduced by the change. Admittedly, it will not be easy. But the conventional power of the Pact forces and the political pressures on NATO defense budgets make it a necessity.

The manpower costs of our theater nuclear posture are hard to estimate. I can do no more than offer an educated guess: if the 6,000 nuclear weapons we do not need were removed, roughly 30,000 U.S. military personnel in Europe would be freed for non-nuclear missions. In addition, because many U.S. and allied "dual capable" units would be relieved of their nuclear training duties, their conventional proficiency could be increased significantly.

The cost of a nuclear weapon is a complex matter that depends in large part on how the fissionable material is valued. Some people have argued that we are going to produce the fissionable material anyway, and it is only being stored, not used, in the warheads. However, as long as we continue to produce fissionable materials and require them for our strategic forces, tactical nuclear weapons generate an extra requirement for fissionable materials and should be charged with the cost. By one authoritative report, the fissionable materials in our present inventory of 8-inch and 155-millimeter nuclear shells are worth about $1 billion, with an 8-inch nuclear-armed shell costing over $400,000, and a 155-millimeter shell $452,000.[19] From such sample figures it would appear that, compared with retiring the 6,000 weapons and using the materials elsewhere, it would cost roughly $2.5 to $3 billion to replace them with new ones.

An important issue was injected by the 1973 proposal of the retiring NATO Commander, General Goodpaster, to replace the 155-milli-

[19] Senator Stuart Symington, quoting expert testimony, in *Military Applications of Nuclear Technology,* Hearings before the Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Ninety-Third Congress, Part 2, June 29, 1973, Washington: GPO, p. 101.

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meter and 8-inch nuclear shells with new weapons with lower yields, or so-called mini-nukes. His argument was that "achievable new weapons of lower yields and of greater accuracy could increase military effectiveness, while reducing possible collateral damage, thereby increasing their utility as well as the acceptability in NATO planning for employment in the NATO countries. . . ." Moreover, "this kind of capability . . . can be employed against them [the Soviet forces] with a good prospect of defeating their attack, and with minimum escalatory effect. . . ."[20]

Small nuclear weapons with sub-kiloton yields have been deployed in Europe for many years. So the issue here is not one of a few weapons for demonstrative purposes. The issues are large investments and broad strategic principles.

Looking at the tactical nuclear weapons in isolation, it appears very attractive to be able to destroy military targets with less collateral damage to civilian populations, especially since, in the presumed circumstances, the weapons would be used on allied territory. However, in the context of the actual situation, the idea has several serious defects. First, given the tight budgetary situation in all NATO countries, the cost is bound to be at the expense of conventional capabilities. Second, the "firebreak" between conventional and nuclear weapons remains extremely important. Once it has been crossed, there is no recognizable stopping point. The idea that a theater nuclear war would be limited to small nuclear weapons does not make sense. It takes an expert on an instrumented test range to tell the yield of a nuclear weapon. An inexperienced observer cannot tell the yield merely by looking at the explosion, nor, certainly, by interpreting confused reports. So how would the Soviets or we know that only small yields were being used? And where is the dividing line between a small yield and a yield that is not small? Moreover, General Goodpaster himself said of the Soviet posture, "The weapons that they are assessed as having are generally considered to be of larger yield and not susceptible of the kind of employment that we would visualize in our selective use program."[21]

This is not to say that escalation to strategic nuclear war is absolutely inevitable once any nuclear weapons are used. Nobody knows. But the incentives to escalate would be very strong indeed. The danger would be extremely high. In a crisis, I doubt that a President would find the use of small nuclear weapons a very satisfactory sub-

[20] See General Goodpaster's testimony in *Military Applications of Nuclear Technology, op. cit.*, pp. 62–63, 73.
[21] *Op. cit.*, p. 73.

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stitute for the use of conventional forces.

One might say that the proposed mini-nukes combine the disadvantages of nuclear weapons with the shortcomings of conventional weapons. Their use would entail a high danger of escalation and mass destruction. Their costs are high in dollars and in operational flexibility. But, like the conventional weapons their designers seek to emulate, their destructive power is comparatively low.

Instead of spending scarce resources on mini-nukes, we ought to be concentrating on "maxi-non-nukes," that is, non-nuclear weapon systems of maximum effectiveness. In past wars, the great majority of aircraft-delivered bombs and artillery shells missed their targets, if they were aimed at targets to begin with. Typical average "miss distances" for aircraft-delivered bombs were on the order of several hundred feet. Developments of the past decade now offer dramatic improvements in target acquisition capabilities, and in the accuracy and lethality of conventional munitions. Precision-guided munitions such as Maverick have average miss distances similar to the sizes of typical targets. New technology now offers laser range-finding devices, night vision systems, television-guided homing systems, and others.

As the experience of the recent Middle East war suggests, these weapons are likely to have a revolutionary impact on conventional warfare. While "one shot one kill" may not be as close at hand as some popular commentaries would suggest, it is no longer in the realm of fantasy. If history repeats itself, there will be countermeasures and counter-countermeasures. It will be a technological race in which the United States must and can stay ahead. But to do so, we will have to concentrate our scarce defense resources there, and on other top-priority missions, and not waste them on useless refinements to capabilities for theater nuclear war. Albert Wohlstetter recently put it very well: "With the new accuracies, it becomes possible to use non-nuclear munitions in many circumstances where a desperate hope had formerly been pinned on using small nuclear weapons."[22]

In short, we ought to use the new technologies of discrimination and control, in which we have a major potential advantage, to raise, not lower, the nuclear threshold.

The improvement in NATO's conventional force posture must take place at the same time as the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions negotiations. NATO's goal in the MBFR talks should be to enhance European security by bringing about approximate equality

[22] Albert Wohlstetter, "Threats and Promises of Peace: Europe and America in the New Era," *Orbis*, Vol. XVII, Winter 1974, p. 1124.

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in conventional power and by removing those elements of the military postures on the two sides that contribute most to instability.

MBFR will not enhance European security if it locks in the Pact advantages and NATO disadvantages described earlier. Thus, NATO representatives should have no interest in an agreement to make equal (absolute or proportional) across the board cuts in combat units. By the nature of the force designs on the two sides, such a cut would favor the Pact. As Robert Komer has recommended, "MBFR or other troop cuts should be absorbed as much as possible from support and overhead structure, rather than at the expense of initial combat strength."[23] NATO representatives should also have no interest in an agreement that would freeze NATO national manpower totals in such a way that one ally could not make up for reductions by another. If the MBFR negotiations were to result in an agreement to cut to, e.g., 700,000 troops on each side in the NATO Guidelines Area (Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, West Germany, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland) and NATO were to restructure its forces, European security would be enhanced.

In reviewing our position, NATO's negotiators should be aware that we have many more tactical nuclear weapons than we need for any rational military or political purpose, and should be receptive to proposals to reduce them in exchange for Soviet reductions in their forces. For example, a significant reduction in NATO's tactical nuclear weapons could well be offered in exchange for substantial reductions in Warsaw Pact tank forces, thus moderating at one stroke the most striking asymmetries and elements of concern in present force postures.

In the long run, however, the changes I have recommended in our tactical nuclear posture are part of a more effective overall NATO defense posture. Thus, it is in our best interest to carry them out, even if to some degree unilaterally, and we should be careful not to let MBFR prevent us from doing so.

VI

If this reasoning is persuasive, how many American troops must remain in Europe? It has become popular to say, "there is nothing magic about 320,000 troops." That may be. But equal conventional military power and a substantial U.S. presence are very important. With military power equal to that of the Pact, NATO would be well placed to resist political aggression. It would be able to explore ways of developing improved relations with the U.S.S.R. on a basis of

[23] R. W. Komer, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

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equality and self-confidence, not subservience and fear. A substantial U.S. presence is needed because the United States cannot exercise effective leadership without it, and the United States remains the only generally acceptable leader of the alliance. What would "a substantial U.S. presence" amount to? It is hard to put a precise number on it. But I agree with Senator Nunn's conclusion that "a cut of 100,000 or more in U.S. troops would destabilize the overall military posture, but would have even more effect on the NATO political posture. The psychological and political impact of such a cut could lead to the 'Finlandization' of Europe and Soviet political dominance in Europe."[24]

To continue debate over lesser marginal cuts is to focus on the wrong issue. The potential financial savings would be small compared with the importance of what is at stake. Such debate weakens the confidence of our allies that we are in Europe to stay and it encourages the Soviets to believe that in time the United States will withdraw, so there is no need for them to agree to reductions in their forces. The key issue is how to get the most conventional military power out of the resources NATO is now spending on defense—including 320,000 U.S. troops. That is far more important than attempting to fine-tune the U.S. troop level.

Must our forces stay another 30 years? Perhaps. They should stay as long as Western Europe is not able to produce an integrated defense establishment with military power equal to that of the Pact, or as long as Western Europe is threatened by Soviet forces. That might be a very long time. Even so, it would be money well spent.

[24] *Policy, Troops, and the NATO Alliance,* Report of Senator Sam Nunn to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, April 2, 1974, p. 10.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA—BEFORE AND AFTER

By Robert Shaplen

THIRTY years ago, when I first traveled through Southeast Asia, there was everywhere an exhilarating atmosphere of political adventure and zeal. The conviction that justice was on the side of the rebellious and retribution the foregone fate of the outdated colonialists was infectious. Whatever the imperialist rearguard actions, however long they might last, it seemed apparent that these first-stage fights for freedom would succeed, no matter how complicated and difficult they might prove to be or how disorganized the nationalist elements were.

But with the exception of the North Vietnamese, guided by the almost metaphysical force and genius of Ho Chi Minh, the most experienced revolutionary leader in the region and at once the best-trained Communist and most ardent nationalist, the Southeast Asian revolutionary movements soon revealed an increasing ideological factionalism and a lack of cohesive leadership. There were charismatic men, such as the young Aung San in Burma, and highly educated and sophisticated Socialists such as Soetan Sjahrir in Indonesia, but they were passing figures on the historic stage. Except for Ho, there were no Titos, with whom he has often been justifiably compared, and no other Communist figures who had the qualities of leadership and organization of European leaders, even those who were Soviet puppets. The non-Communists, while often better schooled, were even less sure of themselves and of the direction they wanted the nationalist movements to take. It was thus no accident that the pattern of nationalist development was chaotic and violent at the outset, and erratic and frequently stultifying afterward, with the result that brilliant demagogues like Indonesia's Sukarno, or colorless but crafty generals like Burma's Ne Win, took over their countries and ran their own revolutions, or counterrevolutions, which were autarchic and often became despotic.

Today, after the traumatic experience of the Vietnam War—which still continues but without the shattering impact of American participation—Southeast Asia is once again in a state of transition. The trend toward authoritarianism, in varying degrees, is not only still predominant, but has become more pervasive. In every country, with the tentative exception of Thailand, that early revolutionary zeal I and others felt and vicariously shared has lost its thrust and been replaced by different forms of guided democracy that are far more

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guided and frequently misguided than democratic. Even the spirit of nationalism, though still alive in some countries and espoused sporadically by new student movements and other small opposition elements, has been sullied by time and events. As the world has become more complicated and burdened, in the last few years particularly, by mounting economic and social problems, politics as such has lost the dynamic appeal it once had; beset by personal woes and given little real opportunity to express their free opinions and take part in the political process, the racially mixed populations of most of the Southeast Asian nations are drifting in a political and social void, while economically they remain for the most part immersed in poverty. By default or otherwise, they have watched sung or unsung leaders usurp the prerogatives of power, while the revolution of rising expectations has benefited the privileged rather than the needy.

Looking back, a number of related questions may be asked that are of historical interest and also bear directly on the future. Perhaps the most important of these concern the American role in Southeast Asia since the end of the Second World War, and specifically in Vietnam, where it is often forgotten we began to play a part as long ago as 1944. At that time, on a limited but symbolically significant scale, we helped Ho and his anti-Japanese Vietminh partisans through the Office of Strategic Services. I felt then, and still do, that after Ho and his men captured Hanoi in August 1945, and again when he traveled to France in the summer of 1946, the United States would have been well advised to test his nationalism and his willingness to accept help from the West; staunch Communist that he was, he might have been "pre-Titofied" and a unified Vietnam could have become the Yugoslavia of the East. True, only the French could have made the decisions that would have permitted this result; yet the failure to adopt a firm posture of our own and to exert the strongest possible American influence to this end remains to me a disastrous mistake.

Instead we chose to support the French in their eight-year misbegotten effort to cling to Vietnam, and then fell into our own quagmire. After the Second Vietnam War had begun in 1959 or so, the United States moved in 1961 and finally in 1965 to massive involvement, with the declared aim of preventing not only the capture of South Vietnam by the North Vietnamese but also the spread of Communist insurgency, promoted chiefly by the Chinese, throughout Southeast Asia.

Now it may be asked—what was the catalytic effect of that over-involvement? Beyond the fact that our misadventure in Vietnam was a highly destructive failure, both militarily and politically, in terms of Indochina, with the likelihood of the eventual domination of all of

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that area by Hanoi today as strong or stronger than ever, did the Vietnam experience have any important political, social and economic influence on the other nations of the region, or was what has taken place in those countries more or less inevitable anyway? Did we initially misread the Chinese threat, or at best overreact to it, and confuse it with the more limited North Vietnamese expansionist intentions? And, finally, what impact did the Vietnam experience have not only on American policy in Asia but on the capacity of the Southeast Asian nations to at least comprehend the meaning of representative or responsive government, to cooperate with each other, and to make fresh adjustments of their own to the Communist powers, to Russia as well as to China, to the United States, to Japan, and, to a lesser extent, to Europe?

II

To place the issues in a larger historical context, it is important to remember that there was little or nothing in the history of these countries, or pre-nation colonies, even in their earlier episodic and often heroic struggles against the imperialist motherlands, to warrant the supposition that when they finally won their independence they would develop into Western-style democracies. Put differently, there were ample historical grounds to conclude that authoritarianism was a natural phenomenon in the area, dating back to pre-colonial times, when religious and racial movements came and went, small wars took place, dynasties rose and fell, commerce developed, but for the most part, with occasional benevolent exceptions, power was effectively held in the hands of a few and carefully dispensed among relatively small groups of wealthy retainers and controlled administrators. When the imperial powers arrived, they simply superimposed their own systems and laws on the cultures and civilizations that existed before and, for their own economic purposes, created new mechanisms of authoritarian rule.

In the Second World War, the Japanese became the new imperialists. Lacking any political comprehension of the Southeast Asian nations and forced to fight a long and bitter defensive struggle against the belatedly aroused Allies, they ruled cruelly and ineffectively. As for the Allied powers, their postwar aims and ambitions were often unclear and differed from each other. The Americans, with no colonial history on the Southeast Asian mainland, were already committed before the war to granting their island ward, the Philippines, its independence, and did so, perhaps too quickly, in 1946. The British moved swiftly to reimpose their rule, and then almost as quickly set

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Burma free, with Malaya and Singapore following more gradually. The French left no doubt during the war, as the Vichy adjunct regime in Indochina demonstrated, that they would do their utmost to return and reestablish their control. The Dutch, having helped produce the best crop of intellectual nationalists and revolutionists by giving them educational opportunities in Holland, fought a peculiar verbal running battle with themselves after the war about how far and how fast to go in granting the Indonesians their freedom, and, finally, after four years of bickering and considerable fighting, gave in and also withdrew from the scene.[1]

Rather ironically, given their lack of perception of the situation, the Japanese played an unconscious role in stimulating wartime and postwar nationalism. The sudden cruel imposition of a new imperialism, at the hands of a self-styled Asian superpower, aroused in Southeast Asian leaders an anger greater than had ever been felt by their predecessor native heroes of the sporadic rebellions harshly crushed by Western overlords. These leaders became more intensely nationalist, and more determined than ever to win their independence at once when the war was over. At the end, the Japanese sought in some cases, most notably in Indonesia, to encourage rebellion against the Western rulers in what amounted to a kind of premature vague perception of a new pan-Asianism. And just as ironically, the returning Westerners, perplexed and confounded by the sudden surge of nationalist movements when the war ended, used Japanese troops in some places, such as Indochina, to help them "maintain order" as they sought to buy time and sort out their options.

The sudden end to the war, and the state of confusion in which Southeast Asia found itself, had various different effects on the newly emerging nations. The Philippines used their overnight independence carelessly and recklessly, garishly imitating American democratic forms, and if they demonstrated some capacity for responsive self-government it was not enough to avoid the rapid growth of a new overweening Filipino oligarchy. Indonesia experimented briefly with parliamentary rule before succumbing to Sukarno's dictatorship. The shaky federation of sultanates the British left behind in Malaya went through a long revolutionary struggle against the Communists which, with the help of returning British troops, they eventually won. After that, a newly independent and invigorated Malaya joined with Sarawak and Sabah, in Borneo, and briefly with Singapore, to form Malaysia. Burma, after one of the area's more salutary periods of parlia-

[1] See Evelyn Colbert, "The Road Not Taken: Decolonization and Independence in Indonesia and Indochina," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1973.

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mentary government, was beset by tribal and Communist rebellions and fell under military dictatorship. The Indochina peninsula continued to be wracked by civil strife between the Communists and the non-Communists. In the early 1950s the French did nothing to create the conditions that could have helped the South Vietnamese survive. When they were pushed ignominiously out of the Indochina picture in 1954, the United States supported Ngo Dinh Diem as its nationalist protagonist in South Vietnam. For two years Diem loomed as a possible solution and savior of his country, but then, under the increasing mystical influence of his nefarious brothers, particularly Ngo Dinh Nhu and Nhu's wife, he too slid into dictatorship. As for Thailand, the only country in the area that never came under Western imperialism, it sporadically and unsuccessfully flirted with constitutional rule but continued for the most part to be run by a military dictatorship under a traditional and respected monarch.

III

On the basis of this spotty record during the first postwar phase in Southeast Asia—from 1945 to the early 1960s—it was easy to conclude that nationalism, by itself, had proved an ineffective and insufficient political cause or instrument. Once the early revolutionary imperative faded, it was difficult if not impossible to sustain and hold together governments that could rule on any broad popular foundations. National assemblies established on the basis of hodgepodge constitutions containing bits and snatches from various Western democracies soon disintegrated into generally useless debating forums, or simply became a convenient means for the ruling few—Sukarno, Diem, Sihanouk in Cambodia, and others—to put up false democratic fronts while they made their own decisions with the help of small inner groups of relatives and advisers. Elections held from time to time offered a pretense of public participation in government—they invariably impressed foreigners more than the natives—but they cannot be said to have inculcated any real sense of democracy among the people, and they certainly did not give a reasonable share of power to the people. There was no intention on the part of those who held the reins of power to share it in the first place, and if a popular consensus was sometimes sought it was invariably for the sake of consolidating the position of those on top and serving as a sounding board for the public expression of their views on domestic and foreign affairs. Sukarno was the supreme master of this tactic, which he developed into a fine art, and in his own unique way so was Sihanouk.

Yet to judge the inability of popular nationalist sentiment to sus-

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tain itself and to create more equitable societies as a "failure of nationalism" may be too harsh, given the lack of experience of the Southeast Asian nations and peoples. Perhaps the early postwar euphoria misled all of us, participants and observers alike, and too much may have been expected. On top of that, it was surely not easy for the disparate countries of the region—a disparity too often lost sight of—to plot their separate courses, let alone a collective one after they were each granted their independence. Nation-building in the underdeveloped world is at best a hazardous process. To make things more difficult, after 1954, when the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was peremptorily established under the dominant influence of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, a zealous crusader against communism, the Chinese-American cold war was superimposed on the region, forcing the various countries to make an additional adjustment to that power conflict. The SEATO objective of safeguarding the area from the further spread of communism by forming a rather loose alliance of Western and Asian nations, including two of the former continental imperial powers, France and Great Britain, was never, in fact, very well understood even by most of the participants, or certainly understood differently by each of them, though the pact ultimately became the oft-cited basis for American armed intervention in Vietnam.

If one considers Southeast Asia to have been passing through its first phase of transition in the years between 1945 and the early 1960s, the fairest conclusion that can be reached is that the pattern of development was natural enough, but still disappointing. Development is here used in its various meanings. Perhaps the trouble was that no one, including the still relatively few concerned Americans, had a properly conceived appreciation or comprehension of what the countries of the region needed most, which was economic and social tutelage and guidance.

Surely the path was wide open to reduce poverty and increase economic participation in a host of ways—land reform, carefully guided capital investment for the development of natural resources, the planned growth of labor-intensive industry, the creation of wider educational opportunities, and administrative and bureaucratic reforms and reorganization. Yet efforts in such directions never got started, or if they did they bogged down in the face of internal inertia and class conflicts. Even the "benevolent dictators" like Sukarno and Sihanouk, who made much of their popular appeal, operated for the most part through bread and circuses rather than through serious efforts to get at the roots of economic backwardness and meet the

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demands of their emerging and overpopulated societies.

If nationalism had been the fuel of independence, the engine it served was not ready to run on that alone, at least not for very long, and the motor soon broke down, without any mechanics available to fix it. The loss of revolutionary purpose consequently encouraged the growth of authoritarianism. What might have been more rational revolutionary goals were ignored or forgotten, or obscured in chauvinism and rhetoric.

IV

The direct American role in the Second Vietnam War, and the effect it had on the rest of Southeast Asia, should properly be divided into three periods. The first of these began in 1961, when the United States increased its economic and military assistance and rapidly built up its advisory role in support of Diem. This demonstrated that we were genuinely concerned about the spread of Communist influence not only in Vietnam and the rest of Indochina but also in Thailand and elsewhere in the region. As this aid increased, and was often misused, we showed our further concern by encouraging and then supporting the coup against Diem and Nhu in November 1963. Unfortunately, the illusion that our backing of the coup demonstrated our interest in substantial reforms in South Vietnam was quickly destroyed by our poor response to the chaos that set in afterward. We lacked not only post-coup planning but, as events unfolded, any clear understanding of the complicated politics of South Vietnam.

Granted the fact that the South Vietnamese are extraordinarily and perhaps congenitally divisive, we either should have used the leverage we had to force reforms more strongly, or, once it became obvious that the Vietnamese were incapable of putting their house in order and thus fighting a successful counterinsurgency war against the Communists, reduced our aid and certainly not become more militarily involved ourselves. And, at this point, if we had decided to regard the rest of Southeast Asia as a vital concern to the non-Communist world, we should have broadened our regional approach and policy more sophisticatedly and effectively.

Instead, having given up any real hope of internal reform through the revolving-door governments of 1963–65, we decided to fight a bigger war nonetheless. Thus a second phase began in early 1965, with the start of bombing the North and the dispatch of the first contingent of American Marines to Danang. By mid-1965, our direct participation included large-scale ground forces—in effect attempting to substitute American power for local weakness and incapacity.

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In the end, this was probably the most disastrous American decision of the century. At the time, however, it did produce a period of euphoria among non-Communists not only in Vietnam but in Southeast Asia generally. There is little doubt that in mid- and late 1965 only massive American intervention kept the Communists from cutting South Vietnam in two across the central highlands to the coast—thus confounding what must have been strong hopes in Hanoi of an early collapse of resistance by Saigon, and exerting a psychological impact throughout the area.

One of the more fascinating ramifications concerned Indonesia. The abortive Communist coup in Indonesia at the end of September 1965 was prompted by many factors, including the Indonesian Communists' belief, based on considerable evidence, that Sukarno was about to die, and their conviction, based on considerably less evidence, that the generals were about to mount a coup of their own against them. A third factor was the influence of the Chinese Communists in Peking, who by then were deeply committed to Hanoi's cause in Vietnam. According to the best evidence I was able to gather two years later, Peking did indeed play a role in inspiring Aidit and his fellow Communists in Indonesia to move swiftly and, as it proved, prematurely and disastrously—the Communist plan had originally been to work through Sukarno and to defer any outright takeover of power till perhaps 1970. With the Vietcong facing an obvious setback in Vietnam, Peking apparently felt that a Communist victory in Indonesia, containing nearly half of Southeast Asia's then quarter-billion population, was of paramount importance, and they made this point to Foreign Minister Subandrio of Indonesia and to other top-ranking Indonesian officials who visited China in the months before the coup.[2] Had the Indonesian Communists waited, they might have won out, but I doubt it. Among other things, they had grossly overrated their mass base of support, as that blunt and wily Russian, Nikita Khrushchev, had warned them during his visit there in 1960.

Between 1965 and 1968, as the Vietnam War raged violently and indecisively, the nations of Southeast Asia watched with mixed feelings. Thailand, the most immediately concerned neighbor, with which the United States had a private pact superimposed on top of the SEATO agreement, cast its lot firmly with the Americans, and pro-

[2] As to just how important Peking's influence was, we shall probably never have conclusive evidence; most of the key participants are dead and only some of the relevant documents are likely to see the light of day. My own opinion is that Peking's advice fitted with other independent assessments by the Indonesian Communist leadership; its effect was probably significant but not in itself decisive. Certainly, Aidit and his colleagues were not in the position of taking orders from Peking.

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vided air bases for our planes bombing both North and South Vietnam. Elsewhere, the bombing of North Vietnam had a certain shock effect throughout the area, dating back to our use of atomic bombs against Japan in the Pacific War. Here, once again, was a Western nation mounting a huge aerial attack against Asians that many of them doubted, justifiably or not, would ever be applied against Europeans. Nevertheless, the consensus of most Asian leaders with whom I spoke during these years, notably Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, was that our strong support of the South Vietnamese within South Vietnam was justified because the threat of Communist expansionism was real.

Lee in fact became the prime exemplar and spokesman in Southeast Asia of the "time gained" theory—that our involvement in Vietnam was giving the other nations of the region time to strengthen themselves in all ways, politically, socially and economically. (It should also be said that Singapore, particularly, benefited economically from the war, exporting steel products and other materials to Vietnam.) This theory was also set forth by a number of American officials, who hoped and came to believe that the Vietnam War would, at the very least, spur the Southeast Asian countries to stand on their own feet and to cooperate with each other, so that they would become impervious to communism. Some felt that more democratic governments would develop, but the more realistic officials, in Washington and Asia, simply thought in terms of a stronger bulwark against communism in the area.

This early period of the "time gained" theory did, in fact, have some salutary effects. In Singapore, Lee and his ex-Marxist cohorts demonstrated, somewhat to the amazement of their Malaysian neighbors, that the small island republic could survive and prosper as a unique Asian entrepôt and emporium, with ample opportunities for investment, while at the same time serving as an example of local reform, especially in housing development. Malaysia, oddly bifurcated as it was, prospered economically, and the amiable Tunku Abdul Rahman emerged as a genuine father-figure capable of holding together the tenuous racial structure of the country. In Indonesia, the initial impact of the victory of Suharto and his fellow generals over the Communists, and his subtle handling of the eclipse of the ill Sukarno, seemed a talisman of hope for economic and political recovery from the chaos of the Sukarno years. In the Philippines, the election of Ferdinand Marcos in 1965, and his early program of "rice and roads," seemed for a time like another bright new chance.

But then, in January 1968, came the Communist Tet offensive in

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Vietnam, followed by their costly May and August attacks. While they suffered a military defeat, they won a political victory which ultimately led to President Johnson's withdrawal from the American political scene and to our final realization that the Vietnam War was a mistake and that we should reduce our support. The significance of the Tet offensive was area-wide. It showed that the Americans were not invincible, that we were indeed fighting the wrong kind of war in Vietnam, that we had probably overrated the Chinese threat of a wider revolution, or that, at best, we could do little about it if the concerned nations, especially Thailand, did not rally themselves more effectively and strengthen their own counterinsurgency efforts. Moreover, the events of 1968 raised doubts in the United States about the importance of Southeast Asia in the worldwide power struggle. If the viability of the region remained one factor in the Asian equation, it no longer loomed as dominant as it had earlier. And by the same token, the likely paramountcy of North Vietnam in the Indochina area no longer was regarded as the disaster it once was.

V

The third phase in American involvement in Vietnam began in 1969 with the clear-cut decision to begin a gradual American withdrawal, albeit at a slow pace and with ill-conceived intervening decisions in Cambodia and Laos that deepened the involvement of both countries in the overall war, making it truly one for all of Indochina. And this third phase was associated with a new period of transition in Southeast Asia. As the reality and prospect of American protection receded, it was in effect a time of testing of the past—if indeed time had been gained through the American holding action in Vietnam, what had been done with that dearly purchased period of grace?

How have the nations of the area evolved over the last five years? The answer, unfortunately, is "not very well." Not only has the trend toward authoritarianism been accelerated, but the performance of Southeast Asian governments in working for their people has on the whole been ineffective.

I cannot myself separate these results from the American political performance in South Vietnam itself. In 1966 and 1967 there were at least gestures toward democracy at the national level. But from 1968 on, the United States seemed to acquiesce in, even to encourage, increasingly dictatorial and repressive government by the Thieu regime—so that by the 1971 election it was in practice hopeless to expect an opposition to contest against Thieu. Certainly the failure of the United States to bring democracy to Vietnam, or even to build a

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potentially non-Communist revolutionary base there, did not encourage the evolution of democratic rule elsewhere in the region.

This broader failure to move toward political democracy—making it progressively easier for authoritarianism to consolidate itself, by purpose or default—can be attributed to various factors. Most important, perhaps, was the lack of political education and development at the lower levels, in the rural villages, where religion and race often dominated, or where local leaders simply served as the henchmen of the pyramidal hierarchy through districts and provinces to national capitals. The older tradition of village democracy, which had been a powerful factor in several of the countries, seemed to fade away, particularly as the power of the military increased, which in most of the countries was the case. A second factor precluding political development was the lack of freedom given to such professional bodies as farmers' and workers' unions and popular organizations of any kind to emerge as nuclei for new political parties. It is significant that the Communists in the various nations of the region, particularly in Vietnam, have always placed great stress on the development of many kinds of local organizations, even religious ones, and have built up the overall strength of their movements accordingly.

In many ways, the most disappointing nation in the area has been Indonesia. Despite the economic recovery made by the Suharto regime when it consolidated itself after the failure of the 1965 Communist coup—a feat accomplished largely by a brilliant group of young economists and by the availability of sustained foreign aid eventually totaling approximately four billion dollars—Suharto, a highly cautious man, moved far too slowly to build a new political base and create a political élan in the country to replace the tired chauvinism of Sukarno. As I wrote in 1969:

> It was one thing, as Suharto said, to want to avoid a recurrence of the old political styles and formulas, but it was something else to stifle indefinitely the development of new political forms and to seek to contain political activity in the claimed paramount interest of balanced budgets and financial solvency.[3]

In particular, the Suharto regime failed to "harness or integrate the so-called Generation of 1966 [which had helped him gain power] and give its members a sense of useful participation in the new scheme of things."[4]

This neglect or subjugation of politics has continued ever since, and it was bound to engender a potential explosiveness which sooner

[3] *Time Out of Hand: Revolution and Reaction in Southeast Asia,* New York: Harper & Row, 1969, pp. 191–92.
[4] *Ibid.,* p. 191.

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or later would make itself felt. It did so in January 1974: fresh student rebellions directed on the surface against the new Japanese economic imperialism—Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka was then visiting the country—were in fact far more an expression of the smoldering discontent over the failure of development and the inability of the technocratic planners in Jakarta, and of the military-dominated regime in the field, to implement the widely proclaimed social and economic plans, particularly in the rural areas, which are as badly off as ever. Very little of the vast amount of foreign assistance—now tapering off because of foreign investment and above all the income from oil—has done anything to help the poor. With the perversion of development and the growth of new urban-rural cleavages, corruption on a massive scale has now affected the entire national fabric; petty bribery on the lowest levels is as common as large payoffs to high officials for deals involving millions of dollars. Unfortunately, foreigners in major investment enterprises have accepted this as a "necessary evil" if they want to do business in Indonesia. The new imperialism, here as elsewhere in Southeast Asia today, has thus become a joint venture between rich officials and outside entrepreneurs, and corruption has become a way of life far beyond what it was in colonial times.

Gradually, over the last five years, as the power of civilian reformers waned, the military regime has consolidated itself and at the same time developed its own factional problems. Inevitably this pattern, which has many historical precedents elsewhere, has now led to a thorough crackdown on dissent, to the jailing or silencing of reform-minded critics, including the liberal press and some of Indonesia's most prominent intellectuals. The best of the old political breed, the secular Socialists and the religious Socialists of the Masjumi party, both of which were banned by Sukarno but had hoped to resurrect themselves, were never allowed by the new regime to reemerge. Instead, once he had done away with the political structure created by Sukarno, in which three parties, the Nationalists, the conservative Muslims, and the Communists had predominated, Suharto created two new political groupings, one an amalgam of Muslim elements and the other a secular one, both of which are essentially leaderless and lack any real ideology and programs. Neither represents a threat to Golkar, the Army's own political party, a loose, predominantly Javanese coalition of so-called "functional groups," primarily professional men and soldiers, which exercises machine-type control down to the villages and seems destined to maintain its majority indefinitely, unless the new military rivalries and the rising social discontent sparked by the students create a fresh revolutionary outburst. Such

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a development, which is by no means to be ruled out, could be healthy; it could also play into the hands of the Communists, whose remnants have been fragmented and driven underground but could then revive.

In Indonesia, then, the story has been one of lost opportunities, of a regime that probably had to be military for a time after the preceding chaos, but that has become ever narrower in its political base and ever less concerned for the mass of the Indonesian people. In the Philippines, it has been a different but equally disappointing story, involving the outright rejection of democratic forms that had operated for 25 years.

There were many things wrong with Philippine democracy, including its blatant emotionalism, its political charlatanism, and the overall failure, after many years of rotating-door elections costing huge amounts of money, to bring any benefits to the people of that island archipelago. It remains highly doubtful, however, whether President Marcos' authoritarian New Society is a responsible alternative. There is, to be sure, more law and order, some signs of a beginning effort to get land reform instituted, at least for the rice lands if not for the wealthy sugar plantations, and a general improvement in bureaucratic efficiency, but these benefits scarcely compensate for the manifest lack of freedom. The fact that, after independence, Filipinos often profligately misused their liberties, and that economically the country needed a severe shaking up to reduce the endemic corruption and distribute the wealth more evenly, cannot excuse the way Marcos violated the nation's democratic tenets by establishing his virtual one-man rule.

He could have sought and probably obtained sufficient emergency powers from the old, now-disbanded legislature. Instead he chose the charade of creating "citizens assemblies" in the barrios to support a crude martial law takeover, thus destroying overnight the entire legal framework of constitutional democracy. The press, while admittedly too flagrant in its democratic heyday, has been sadly muzzled, many of Marcos' political opponents are still in jail, and no political process at all has been permitted other than that dictated by Malacanang Palace, whose tenants, Marcos and his wife Imelda, are the new rich oligarchs.

While the Philippine army and constabulary do not represent the political force the military does in Indonesia, they nevertheless have a dominant and pervasive police function, and for the past year have had their hands full dealing with two armed rebellions—the still small but resurgent Communist movement of the New People's Army in Luzon and on some of the other islands, and the separatist revolt

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of the Muslims in Mindanao and the lesser chain of southern islands. If successive governments run by Catholics had paid more attention through the years to the economic and social problems of the Muslims, the increasingly serious racial war in the south could have been avoided. Now this exploding rebellion is encouraged by Sabah and perhaps, more secretly, by extremist Muslim elements in the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur, as well as by some Arab nations, especially Libya. As this is written, efforts are under way to solicit the aid of more realistic heads in both Malaysia and Indonesia to help mediate the conflict. But in spite of this and Marcos' amnesty offers, the separatist revolt does not seem to me to be containable for long unless Manila undertakes a radical program of reform to pacify the nation's large Muslim minority, including some amelioration of the Christian land-grabbing in the Muslim areas that has been increasing for years.

There is more to it than that: in many ways the Muslims of the south look to their Muslim brethren in nearby countries rather than to Manila for spiritual and political encouragement and guidance. Ultimately, it may well prove impossible for the two racial elements in the Philippines to live together peacefully under the circumstances of the bitterness their historic struggle has provoked. This racial crisis; the still rampant corruption encouraged for so long by American postwar carpetbaggers and recently by Japanese investors; the whole unrealistic mechanism of Marcos' dictatorship and the latent violence that threatens it; the continuing urban-rural social and economic disparities that have kept the country, despite its resource advantages, from any fundamental development progress—all point to the conclusion that the Philippines has not yet had its real revolution. In a way, the nation is an example of nationalism *manqué,* and what Marcos has done is simply to provide a proscriptive hothouse imitation of what he likes to represent as peaceful, ideological revolution. At some point, despite the easy-going ways of the Filipinos, the underlying explosive social and economic discontent will burst forth. The recent outspoken criticism by prominent Catholic leaders is a sign of this discontent, but it will take time to fructify and to generate a new serious political movement capable of dealing with the multiple problems of dictatorship and the Communist and Muslim rebellions.

VI

Malaysia, which became a country in spite of itself, spanning water and blending a colorful but diffuse racial mix of slightly more Malays than Chinese, a minority of Indians, and the variegated tribal races of

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Sarawak and Sabah, is on the one hand an economic success story and on the other a Balkan-type tinderbox. After being put together like a jigsaw puzzle in the 1960s by the British, it survived the expulsion of Singapore and then, six years ago, in the spring of 1969, the bitter race riots between Malays and Chinese that came close to tearing the major part of the geographically split country apart. It remains a tribute to Tun Abdul Razak, perhaps the cleverest statesman in Southeast Asia today, and to the gentler image of his predecessor, Abdul Rahman, that the riots were subdued and that Razak was able to pursue his objective of providing greater economic and social benefits for the Malay *bumiputras* (sons of the soil) while controlling but still encouraging the successful enterprise of the Chinese and the Indians.

For the past several years Malaysia has enjoyed a boom from its wealth of riches, mostly rubber and tin and newly developed high-grade oil; its second Five Year Plan, which runs out in 1975, has been a considerable success, even though income inequalities and injustices favoring the Chinese have continued. Now, however, amid inflation, there are fresh signs of an economic slowdown as export prices, especially of rubber, have dropped. In addition to reviving racial animosities, this has spurred serious student disorders on behalf of the poor and shaken the country's still fragile stability. The latest riots, in December 1974, were put down harshly by Razak's police, but the student ferment will probably continue.

Five months earlier, in August, Razak and his nine-party National Front Coalition, which was created after the old three-party alliance of the most important Malay, Chinese and Indian parties disintegrated after the 1969 riots, won a new and overwhelming mandate in national elections. The trouble was that it was too overwhelming, and the opposition was all but obliterated; even though it won 40 percent of the vote, it only captured ten percent of the parliamentary seats, due largely to gerrymandering that preceded the vote. Moreover, the election was held under extremely tight security regulations. No "sensitive" issues, including racial ones, were allowed to be discussed.

If the coalition's victory enhanced the Malays' political majority, which has been traded off against the prevailing economic dominance of the Chinese, one has the feeling that the tenuous racial balance Razak has so far carefully manipulated could break apart under severe economic and social stress, and that the discontent of the Malays over their still far lower standards of living than the Chinese enjoy could again explode. Such an explosion, which would very

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likely be accompanied by racial disorders in Sarawak and Sabah, neither of which has ever really adjusted emotionally to belonging to Malaysia though they have obtained some economic benefits from the union, would almost surely result in an increase of authoritarian control.

Able as he is, Razak is thus still walking a tightrope, both at home and abroad. Along with the continued danger of racial violence and the student demonstrations in western Malaysia, he has had to contend with the conflict in the east over Mindanao, where the Philippine Muslim revolt has been encouraged by Tun Datu Mustapha, the extremist Muslim chief of Sabah, over whom Kuala Lumpur appears to have little control. (After the last election, Razak tried, so far unsuccessfully, to wean him away from Sabah with an offer of the national Defense Ministry.) Razak himself hosted an important world Islamic meeting in the summer of 1974, which could serve to arouse the Islamic hotheads in the country, including those who are most anti-Chinese and still want to grab off the three main southern provinces of Thailand, where there is a large Muslim population.

Last summer also, Razak took the bold initiative of traveling to Peking and making Malaysia the first Southeast Asian nation to open relations with China. Though Peking agreed to stop supporting the Communist insurgency in the northern part of the Malay Peninsula, the rebels actually stepped up their activity after the recognition. The insurgency has grown in recent years after being all but erased, and, despite suffering from recent factionalism of its own, it remains another threat to stability.

Malaysia's recognition of China, which was widely heralded for at least a year, will in all likelihood soon be followed by Manila's opening relations with Peking, and then by a similar step by Bangkok. Of the remaining two nations belonging to the seven-year-old Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia and Singapore will be the last to make such a move. How this will affect the still somewhat tenuous ASEAN alliance, as well as the relationship of the two other major powers, the United States and Russia, and of Japan, to the Southeast Asian countries is difficult to predict.

ASEAN has certainly not lived up to its promise of regional cooperation, chiefly because it has been long on talk and short on action in unraveling the complicated intra-regional economic and social problems it professes to want to concentrate on, and has most often issued vague communiqués with political overtones. Nevertheless, it has accomplished a degree of cooperation in such fields as transportation and education, and served as a useful transmission belt for ideas

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on development. Its continuing existence will probably not be affected one way or another by the diplomatic moves toward Peking of its component countries, any more than it will be by the longer-established relations the United States has had with all the nations of the area, by the growing interest the Russians have shown, particularly in trade and cultural exchanges, or by Japan's extensive economic activity. In fact, with all the powers more openly engaged in the region, the so-far sluggish ASEAN might be encouraged to take its cooperative and catalytic role more seriously than it has to date, and act as a kind of area-wide economic ombudsman.

VII

If any Southeast Asian country overreacts to a diplomatic offensive by the two major Communist powers, especially China, it will be Singapore, the small island republic with a 75 percent Chinese population. Having proved themselves resourceful in defeating the Communists in the days before Singapore became independent, Lee Kuan Yew and his ex-Marxist companions went on to establish an efficient and prosperous city-state. But since then, Singapore has proved another democratic disappointment. Increasingly, in the past several years, Lee has cracked down hard on the once active free labor unions and on the press, as well as on his remaining political opposition, which at one time was Communist-dominated, but if allowed to develop on a wider and freer basis could provide a healthy alternative to the ruling People's Action Party, which Lee has turned into his own authoritarian vehicle.

Probably the most intellectually brilliant leader in Southeast Asia today, Lee has always suffered from chronic claustrophobia—Singapore is simply too small for him. He failed on the wider Malaysian stage, chiefly because he violated his promise to stay out of Malaysian-wide politics for five years; at one time he wanted to be Secretary General of the United Nations (and might have been a good one), and he still aspires to regional leadership, but his increasingly authoritarian ways have not helped him gain the wider recognition he deserves. There is a puritanical zealotry about him which derives in part from his phobia about the Chinese Communists and the impact he fears they might have on his own Chinese population, and also from his absolute and often commendable dedication to the cause of disproving his critics and demonstrating that Singapore can be an economic showcase for the area. In accomplishing the latter objective, he is determined to brook no political interference from anyone.

Himself Chinese as well as a purist, and in many ways as complex

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a person as Nehru in trying to adjust to his Western education and his Western cultural predilections and still remain an Asian, he has unfortunately become almost a caricature of the ardent reformer, a morality-driven bull in his own small China-shop. Unfortunately, it is probably too late for him to change, and, though he is still a relatively young man, one wonders what will happen to Singapore when he and his tight group of associates are faced with the problem of handing on their government to someone else.

VIII

The student rebellion of October 1973 that overthrew the military dictatorship in Thailand marked a milestone in the development, or undevelopment, of that country. After many unsuccessful experiments in constitutional government over the past two decades, the Thais now seem to have their best opportunity to create a functioning parliamentary democracy. If they do succeed in consolidating their new revolution, it could have area-wide significance as the one hopeful example of anti-authoritarianism, and already the action of the Thai students has had some impact in reinspiring the Indonesian students and stirring up those in Malaysia and Burma.

Certainly the situation in Thailand was ripe for revolt. The repression of liberties by the dictatorial triumvirate headed by Praphas Charusathien; the rampant corruption that pervaded the military and the civil bureaucracy and reached up to the three dictators themselves; the continued neglect, despite American prodding, of the impoverished populations of the northeast and other rural areas; the failure despite, or perhaps because of, the often contentious American military presence, of the counterinsurgency program to quell the rebels in the south as well as in the north and northeast—all these were legitimate issues that finally prompted the students to mount the barricades.

Their stunning victory and the quick withdrawal from the country of the three military rulers could not have been accomplished without the open support of the liberal-minded King Bhumibol, who not only backed the students and consulted with them during the uprising but persuaded the army to keep its hands off and let the revolution run its rapid course. But the King remains a constitutional monarch, and there is no guarantee that he can hold the army in check indefinitely if the democratic process, which has moved slowly, fails to prove itself.

Today there are ominous as well as encouraging signs. The student groups have been fighting among themselves and, while taking part

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in the unfolding political procedures, including the passage of a new constitution, the formation of political parties, and the first elections since the revolution, held in January, are unclear about their long-range objectives and have lost much of their popularity. Without any firm democratic traditions and experience, parties in the past have tended to engage in endless bickering in the National Assembly, so that the army became impatient and simply moved in to take over again. The plethora of present parties—there are more than 40—have joined in several major groupings, including two predominant right- and left-wing ones; remnants of the old Democrat Party and some new army elements are among the former, while a new socialist-labor coalition has sprung up on the Left.

As of late February, it appeared that the first post-election government would be led by the Democrats, but there may be a rapid succession of experimental coalitions. Whatever its complexion, any political group holding power for any length of time will have to retain the support of the King, a majority of army leaders and the Bangkok bureaucracy. Moreover, the Chinese businessmen behind the scenes have the money and prestige to influence any regime, particularly now that trade with China has been opened up and recognition of Peking is probably not far off. In its dealings with the Thai, Peking has adopted a subtle posture of differentiating between what the Chinese government does and what the Communist Party does to encourage the Thai insurgents, who now number about seven thousand and are increasing at the rate of ten percent a year. As the American bases are reduced and our troops are gradually withdrawn, which is both inevitable and advisable, the Thai will have to prove they are capable of handling the insurgency and at the same time running an efficient democratic government.

If there is a move to the Left in the government or if the new parliament proves as chaotic and unworkable as the old ones were, the likelihood of another army takeover will increase. The chances of this happening within the next year or two seem to me about even. Some form of military-dominated guided democracy could then evolve, but with the King maintaining a lever to hold abuses in check.

In Burma, the establishment early in 1974 of "civilian rule" under a new Constitution has only changed the face of things. Despite the election of village and district councils and a National Assembly, the new Council of State with Ne Win as its President continues to run the country much as before. At best, what Burma has done is create the trappings of an East European-type dictatorship, geared to what is still vaguely called the Burmese Road to Socialism. The military

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is still everywhere predominant and the 137,000-man army continues to have its hands full dealing with tribal rebellions and chiefly with the recrudescent White Flag Communists (Burmese Communist Party), the only insurgency in the area openly supported by Peking. The Communists have doubled their strength in the past year from five to ten thousand and now constitute a serious threat, Peking's apparent aim being to counter any Soviet thrust toward the Indian Ocean (via its ties with India) and to create a friendly Burmese buffer zone.

Economically, Burma has long been dependent on foreign loans to survive. The country has a solid agricultural base, and the possibility of offshore oil discoveries, if they prove out, may bring some increase in prosperity to the 30 million people. Still highly inefficient, however, in administration, and obsolete in its infrastructure, Burma remains the victim of its past blunders, and under the continuing conditions of crisis there is no sign of an end to the harsh authoritarian rule; only the army moving against Ne Win could bring this about. However, it is interesting to note that here as elsewhere in the region student resistance has begun to be expressed, and the riots in December 1974 over the burial of U Thant in Rangoon may be a talisman of much more serious and open opposition.

IX

As this review suggests all too clearly, the "time gained" by America's massive intervention in Vietnam has not been put to good use. Even the degree of hope engendered by the Thai revolution can hardly be connected to American action—on the contrary, there are many in Thailand who feel that the revolution was in part delayed because the war was going on, because the American presence was overwhelming, and because Americans, including both President Johnson and President Nixon, seemed almost to look with special favor on the now-departed generals.

What then of the countries of Indochina itself? As their blood, in a sense, paid for the time available to others in Southeast Asia, how badly did they fare? Again the answer is not reassuring.

The new coalition in Laos, where it always seemed to me the chances for establishing peace and possibly providing a formula for Cambodia and Vietnam were best, is a noble experiment that deserves to succeed. However, the Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese mentors, already controlling three-fourths of the area, have moved quickly to demonstrate their superior political organization in the Mekong Valley region, once held exclusively by the bickering and

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now leaderless right-wing and neutralist elements. Though Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, having previously placed himself above the battle, has returned to the country after his serious illness, he no longer is the strong figure he once was, and his absence of two months dispelled the aura of his indispensability. The further erosion of non-Communist strength, especially in the corrupt south, appears unavoidable. Sooner or later, accordingly, the Pathet Lao seem destined to be the majority element, and through their hard-core leaders who are close to Hanoi, notably Kaysone Phomvihan, the North Vietnamese will be able to do pretty much as they wish—unless, as Souvanna has always hoped, a true Lao nationalism which is latent but genuine somehow surfaces.

The role of the monarchy, which both sides respect, is a salutary factor. A second factor is the presence to the north of the Chinese, who have no desire to see Laos fall completely into the North Vietnamese orbit; they are in a position to blackmail Hanoi, whose main objective remains South Vietnam and which still needs Chinese help, especially as the North's own economic problems are severe. Peking's desire to create a buffer zone in Laos, which is shared by Moscow and Washington, could perhaps create enough breathing time for Lao nationalism to consolidate, but it would still in all probability evolve into a special Lao form of national communism.

Predictions about Cambodia are difficult, given the chaotic conditions there, but one can hazard the guess that a coalition similar to that in Laos will eventually be established, and that it too will sooner or later come under Communist domination, perhaps sooner than in Laos. The chief difference between Laos and Cambodia is that the Communists in Cambodia are as divided as the elements on the government side, though this has not kept them from improving their military position. It has been apparent for some time that Sihanouk's star is fading, though he may still play a brief catalytic role at some point, and that a subtle but significant contest is going on among native Khmer Communists and those backed by Peking or Hanoi.

As in Laos, there remains a genuine Khmer nationalism—and it is represented both on the government and rebel sides. The best chance for this to express itself would be for both Sihanouk and Prime Minister Lon Nol to eliminate themselves or be eliminated, and for the chief rebel leader, Khieu Samphan (who may or may not be the original man of that name), to deal directly with some of the Phnom Penh nationalists, such as the heads of the Democratic Party and some of the anti-Sihanouk leaders of the former regime. More than the Lao, the Cambodians dislike all Vietnamese, be they Left or

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Right, and if they can somehow come together they may at least maintain a quasi-independence and preserve what is left of the once prestigious Khmer empire. But it will take a considerable amount of big-power prodding and supervision, and given the Sino-Soviet rivalry and the far from certain future of U.S. détente with both Communist powers, it seems doubtful that a tenuous coalition could sustain itself for very long.

The passage of time, and the long war, consequently have been devastating for the unfortunate Cambodians, and it seems more than likely that the country will eventually be swallowed up by Vietnam, with perhaps some of the western provinces once briefly held by the Thais and always coveted by them reverting to Thailand.

X

The Third Vietnam War that was inevitable has only brought more sorrow and tragedy to that stricken country. It was apparent from the start that the 1973 Paris agreement was solely a means for the Americans to extricate themselves and that neither of the two Vietnamese sides was then ready or willing to negotiate politically. The minimal aim of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong has been to obtain official recognition by Saigon of the legitimacy of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, and acceptance of the large but sparsely populated area it controls. There is a strong possibility that such recognition may be accorded during 1975 when and if the Paris talks resume. But even if that happens, the Communists will probably continue to fight as they talk and seek to gain control over more of the southern population than the 10 or 12 percent they now hold. The maximum aim of Hanoi remains to conquer the South completely, and there are no signs they have given up this goal.

Despite serious problems of reconstruction and morale in North Vietnam—self-criticism has never been heard in such harsh terms as in the latter part of 1974 and early 1975—fresh troop replacements have continued to be infiltrated into the South, where new roads and petroleum pipelines with way stations have been built, and the level of fighting remains high much of the time. The Communists, in fact, are close to achieving what they would have achieved in 1965 had not the Americans entered the war—the effective cutting of the country in two across the central highlands to the coast, giving them virtual control of the northern half of South Vietnam. In the entire area extending north of Saigon, they have seized all of one province and large parts of a dozen others; the government has also been hard pressed in the Delta, where the Communists now control most of the

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five southernmost provinces. At this writing, what is called a "general attack"—short of a "general offensive"—is still under way, and the government everywhere is on the defensive.

Politically, according to the testimony of their own cadres, the Communists have not made nearly as much headway as they have wished. This is due partly to the loss during the long war of most of their experienced southern political workers, whom they have been unable to replace despite recent efforts to colonize the areas they hold with members of the 1954 generation who went to the North after the end of the French Indochina War. It has also been due to the diminishing revolutionary zeal of the people in the South, who were more willing to support the Vietcong in the earlier years than they are now. But if victory looms for Hanoi, the majority of the war-weary peasants will opt forlornly and fatalistically for the Communists, and make their adjustments.

There remains one hope for the South. In recent months, for the first time since the mid-1940s, there has been a resurgence of genuine nationalist activity, and it has been generated, surprisingly enough, by liberal Catholics who have taken a strong position against the corruption and lack of liberties of the regime of President Nguyen Van Thieu, himself a Catholic. The Buddhists, badly burned politically in 1963 and again in 1966, have adopted a position of watchful waiting, although their secular leaders have been active in forming the National Reconciliation Forces which represent themselves as the neutral third force provided for in the Paris agreements. If the two main religious elements can get together, and can provide the basis for reconciliation of the minor religious sects, the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai, and the majority of bona-fide secular nationalists, there is a bare possibility that a true third force could emerge, at least holding a balance of power between the Communists and the Saigon regime.

The strength of the newly emerging nationalists, who have no weapons of their own, is hard to gauge, but they have considerable support among disillusioned government soldiers, who are increasingly making their own local accommodation with the Communists (something I predicted in the pages of this magazine in 1967).[5] Whether Thieu remains in office or someone else with third-force leanings replaces him in the presidential elections of October 1975 is an important part of the equation, as is the deteriorating economic situation in the South and the poor military morale, both of which have been accelerated by declining American aid. At the moment, of the two weary boxers in the ring of the marathon Vietnam contest,

[5] "Viet Nam: Crisis of Indecision," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1967.

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the Communists still show far greater endurance.

XI

If anything has been made clear by this rather discouraging overview of Southeast Asia, it is that American influence throughout the Vietnam War and since our withdrawal has played a far less significant part in what has taken place in the various countries of the region than American leaders once supposed, and hoped, it might. Obviously we have not succeeded in drawing the line we had tried to draw in Vietnam. But even if the American action in Vietnam is judged as a holding operation for the sake of the rest of Southeast Asia, it has been largely a failure. We have neither succeeded in encouraging the building of democracy and governments responsive to the people nor persuaded the other countries to create among themselves a cohesive entity that would serve as a deterrent force against possible outside aggression. From the military standpoint, SEATO is a hollow shell, and talk of nonaggression pacts among the various nations, and of some new sort of collective defense systems, has not led to any important results. While, to be sure, there is no immediate threat from the big powers in the area, one cannot say that, taken as a whole or regarded nation by nation as targets of subversion, the Southeast Asian countries are much better off than they were eight or ten years ago. The threat of subversion is still a serious one, and the general lack of political stability constitutes a danger factor.

One must, therefore, conclude, to return to the questions posed earlier, that our over-involvement in Vietnam served no useful catalytic purpose. The "time gained" has at best created a certain sense of self-dependence in most of the countries, and a feeling that each, in its own way, must define its own identity as part of Asia. Whether ASEAN, in due time, can promote a larger regional identity remains to be seen, but the outlook at the moment is not especially encouraging. There are too many rivalries, commercial, political and racial, to warrant much optimism, though it is possible, as for example in the case of the Muslim disturbances in the Philippines, that sooner or later a formula for mediation may be found within the region itself.

If our intervention in Vietnam served, at best, to delay a Communist takeover, or certainly a more rapid broadening of Communist influence throughout the Indochina area, it seems to me impossible to say that our dismal experience there has affected events elsewhere in Southeast Asia very much one way or another. It may be postulated that, if Indochina had been overrun sooner, the impact of such an earlier Communist expansion would have altered events elsewhere,

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but this remains a very "iffy" proposition. The one possibly positive exception, which I have referred to earlier, is Indonesia, where the initiation of the over-hasty 1965 coup can perhaps be attributed partially to the Communist setbacks in South Vietnam. If Peking did help spur that failed coup, it may be that this also was a contributing factor, but only one, to the Chinese adopting a more cautious line in encouraging insurgencies in other Southeast Asian nations. Those insurgencies remain alive today, but it must also be said that American policy-makers probably misread or exaggerated the Chinese threat, at least in the alarmist terms in which it was seen in 1965.

If the costly experience of Vietnam has taught us anything, it is that the nations of the area are best left alone to work out their own political solutions. The United States can do its best to moderate and diminish great-power rivalries, and in any event to encourage the neutrality of the countries of Southeast Asia, and of the region as a whole, toward such rivalries. Obviously the American rapprochement with China has already made a critical difference. This was scarcely predictable as the cards lay in 1961 or 1965, but one can properly ask—might it have come about even earlier if we had learned more about Asian communism through a successful gamble with Ho Chi Minh in the 1940s? A deepening of the present state of détente with both Moscow and Peking could help immensely to assure the neutrality of Southeast Asia. At the moment, there are no signs of aggressive intent by any of the big powers; the acute Sino-Soviet hostility is reflected elsewhere, and in the past year there have been many indications that the Japanese have absorbed the lessons of the Tanaka trip and are acting to meet the dangers of their overzealous economic imperialism.

So the most we should do is maintain our interest in Southeast Asia, but at a low profile, and as best we can, given the social and economic imperatives that we face domestically in the United States, encourage more rational development in the different countries of the region while, when the occasion demands it, expressing our continuing concern with democratic reforms. It would be a pity if our disillusion over Vietnam, and our turning inward, provoke anything less than that.

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REPORT FROM ANGOLA

By Kenneth L. Adelman

THE first European power to arrive in black Africa is now the last to depart. The April 1974 coup in Lisbon, one of those rare instances in history when a change in government reverses a vital national policy, has led to the end of centuries of Portuguese colonization. Such a rapid shift in policy, resulting in the promise of independence for Mozambique on June 25 and Angola on November 11 of this year, was bound to fundamentally change the character of African politics. This decolonization in the south, together with the Ethiopian revolution, the new power of the oil-producing states, and the tragedy of the Sahel drought in the north, have made 1974–75 a historic time for Africa.

Angola is the last and certainly the most difficult territory for Portugal to leave. Since 1483, when Diogo Cao first came to the mouth of the gigantic river he called "Zaïre," Portugal has prided itself on maintaining this valuable territory, 14 times the size of the metropole itself and nearly twice as large as Texas. Besides these strong historical ties to Portugal, there are several factors which make Angola's transition to independence important, difficult, and as we shall see, potentially explosive.

II

Angola is a rich and relatively unexploited country. Indeed few territories have become independent with such wealth in mineral resources and such promise of a booming economy. Oil, diamonds, and iron ore have been found in abundance and no one can say what else exists in the land that has been minimally prospected. Because of its mineral wealth, Angola may well become one of the richest countries in Africa. Unprocessed primary products account for 80 percent of total exports, including a substantial agricultural output (raw cotton, fish meal, bananas, and wood are exported and Angola is the world's fourth-largest coffee producer).

With such natural resources, it is not surprising that the economy is booming. Since 1966, Angola's real growth rate has been over six percent and its total exports grew 37 percent during 1973, resulting in an increase in the balance of trade of an astounding 83 percent. Statistics for 1974 will be even brighter, as the surplus in the balance of trade for the first quarter of 1974 almost equaled that of the entire previous year, with exports shooting up 184 percent over the first quarter of 1973. While the economy has slowed down somewhat since last summer as a result of the political uncertainty, it should pick up when a stable government becomes established. With a GNP of $1.5 billion in 1973, Angola appears to be in a period of sustained economic growth over the long run.

Angola is unique among former African colonies in the relatively large size of its white population and the lack of training of its black population. Of the 6.2 million Angolans, approximately 350,000 are white, making it the largest white population in sub-Saharan Africa besides South Africa.

Partly because of Portuguese government incentives, many new settlers have come to the area since the early sixties. Between 1960 and 1967, Angola's expatriate population increased at four times the rate of the population as a whole. Most of these immigrants were peasants, unskilled and semi-skilled workers, and Portuguese soldiers urged to remain after their tour of duty. Thus Angola is unique

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not only in its large numbers of whites, but also in that over half of them are in the lower economic strata. It is only in Angola that one sees white and black farmers working adjoining plots of land and only in Luanda, unique among African capitals, that one sees predominantly white domestics, construction workers, and manual laborers. Members of this white working class generally consider themselves Angolan rather than Portuguese and hope to remain after independence. They have established themselves and are earning an adequate living, perhaps slightly better than their brothers in Portugal. Besides, they have nowhere else to go, since the



dire economic situation in Portugal does not invite them back and a lack of capital prevents their migrating to South Africa or other African countries to establish some type of business.

A minority of Angolan whites are the more classic colonial settlers—businessmen, plantation owners or managers, and administrators. This group actually controls the Angolan economy and most of the local administration, although some blacks do have high jobs in the civil service, the traditional ladder for black advancement.

This small black representation in the Angolan modern sector reflects Portugal's long neglect of educational and social services in its colonies. Angola's literacy rate is a pitiful ten to 15 percent; among blacks it is below ten percent and among

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whites only slightly lower than Portugal's itself, or 60 percent. As dismal as they are, these statistics are brighter than those of 14 years ago. At that time, Portugal began a major educational push which came as a result of the 1961 revolt in the north, which indicated that more was needed to pacify the population, and of the failure of the *assimilado* policy, which by that time had deemed only one percent of the black population sufficiently educated and "civilized" to qualify for Portuguese citizenship.

At present, primary school education is supposedly compulsory, although only a percentage of black children attend school. Less than 15 percent of primary school children continue on to secondary school, and the University of Angola serves middle- and upper-class Portuguese almost exclusively—less than ten percent of the 1,500 students are either black or mulatto. In addition, few Angolan blacks have had the opportunity to study abroad.

The disparity between white and black economic and educational levels is bound to create problems for independent, black-run Angola. The new political leaders will want to open up economic opportunities to the 90 percent of the black population still engaged in subsistence farming, and the obvious channel will be through the unskilled and semi-skilled jobs now held by whites. This situation differs from that in Mozambique and most other former African colonies, where foreigners performed mainly professional and highly skilled jobs out of the reach of most blacks at the time of independence.

III

Angola presents innumerable problems for the Portuguese and great uncertainty for the future because of its competing liberation groups. Unlike the situation in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, the Portuguese cannot simply turn over Angola to any one group. At the time of the April coup, there were three Angolan liberation movements and one of these, the MPLA, had been split into three factions.

The Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) was founded in 1956, partly by members of the Angolan and Portuguese Communist Party. It was able to attract a small following, mostly among urban intellectuals, until expelled from Luanda in March 1959. The movement went to Conakry, then to Kinshasa, and finally settled in Brazzaville, where it has remained ever since.

In 1962, the MPLA selected a new president, Dr. Antonio Agostinho Neto, revolutionary poet, medical doctor, and outspoken radical arrested several times by the Portuguese. He soon traveled to the United States to seek support, but because of his Communist background, was unsuccessful. Through the years, he has relied almost entirely upon Russian assistance, supplemented by a little money from Algeria.

Dr. Neto is the most leftist of the liberation leaders, favoring state control over the means of production and close ties with the Soviet Union. Being a doctor and an intellectual, Neto has been able to attract many educated blacks, white leftists, and mulattoes. Although his following includes city-dwellers of Luanda, Lobito, and Nova Lisboa, the majority of his support rests on ethnic identity, as is true of all three liberation movements. Neto is an Mbundu, a group which constitutes slightly over one-fourth of the black population and occupies the center of Angola inland from Luanda.

The MPLA has suffered from incessant internal conflicts throughout its history. After the April coup, which made the chance of governing an independent Angola

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a real possibility rather than a far-fetched dream, the movement split into three. Led by Joacquim Pinto de Andrade, a group of 70 intellectuals and high MPLA officials publicly accused Neto of "presidentialism" and dictatorial rule before withdrawing their support. More serious was the rebellion of Daniel Julio Chipenda, Neto's military commander in Zambia and eastern Angola. During the most recent MPLA conference in Lusaka in August 1974, Chipenda and Andrade accused Neto of ignoring his troops in the field while traveling luxuriously around the world. When they demanded a complete accounting of MPLA finances, Neto walked out and took his loyal delegates with him, leaving the others free to elect Chipenda as the new MPLA president.

This split, coming when Portugal was prepared for independence talks, greatly upset a group of African presidents. Meeting in Brazzaville one month later, the presidents of Zambia, Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), Zaïre, and Tanzania forced the three factions back together, at least on paper. Neto, Chipenda, and Andrade had tried to reconcile their differences earlier, but failed. Neto was once again leaving town when the African presidents ordered him to return from the airport and negotiate. An elaborate document was then prepared, naming Neto president and the other two vice presidents, and creating two councils with a complex voting procedure to determine major policies. Like all forced agreements, however, this elaborate plan was soon ignored, and Neto and Chipenda, both claiming to be MPLA president, subsequently expelled each other from the movement.

These divisions eventually proved irreconcilable, with Chipenda publicly accusing Neto, whom he calls a "pathological case," of using Nazi tactics, killing his top commanders, and being a valet of the Soviet Union. Neto was able to keep the upper hand, however, due in part to help from the Portuguese. When his position plummeted because of internal divisions, the Portuguese continued to keep him afloat. They refused to recognize other factions and always considered Neto the MPLA president and sole spokesman. While officially claiming to be neutral, the Portuguese used the government-controlled radio in Angola to favor Neto and his extreme leftist ideological statements. This favoritism stems from the fact that the Portuguese have long considered Neto the most powerful and intelligent liberation leader, from the similarity of their own leftist ideology and that of Neto, and from close personal ties, particularly between Neto and his former classmate Mario Soares, Socialist leader and present Portuguese Foreign Minister. In any case, Neto is now firmly in control of the main MPLA organization, having represented the group at the Mombasa preparatory talks with the other two major liberation groups and the Alvor summit talks with the Portuguese. Given these circumstances, it was hardly surprising that in mid-February Chipenda cast his lot with the second major liberation group, the Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA).

The oldest of the three movements and the most active militarily, the FNLA fortunately is less complicated than the MPLA, as it has always been led by Holden Alvaro Roberto. The movement has its roots in tribal organizations advocating the revival of the Kongo Kingdom. Roberto, himself a Bakongo, has lived his life in Kinshasa, Zaïre, spending only the first two years in Angola proper. Roberto's group began the war of liberation with the March 1961 revolt that eventually left 400 Portuguese and as many as 40,000 Africans dead. In March 1962, Roberto named members of other tribes, including an Ovimbundu, Jonas Savimbi, to lead-

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ership positions in his government-in-exile. This attempt to enlarge his ethnic base failed, however, and present FNLA support rests almost entirely on the Bakongo tribe, now estimated at about 20 percent of the black Angolan population, including from 750,000 to one million Angolan Bakongos now living in Zaïre. The FNLA controls northern Angola by popular support and sheer military power since it has the strongest army of the liberation movements.

Being more pragmatic than ideological, Roberto has scraped together support from every conceivable source—political backing and financial help from the United States in the early sixties, medical supplies from the World Council of Churches and WHO in the early seventies, and finally arms from Rumania and advisers and equipment from China in 1974. Throughout the years, however, most of the outside aid has come from Zaïre, in terms of money, military camps, advisers, arms, and complete political backing. Even with his recent alliance with Rumania and China, Roberto is still considered the most Western-oriented of the three liberation leaders.

The third group, Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), began as an offshoot of FNLA. In 1964 Jonas Savimbi quit his post as Foreign Minister in the government-in-exile and accused Roberto of "flagrant tribalism" and of getting support from "American imperialists." It seems that Savimbi then tried to join MPLA but was refused membership. In any case, he set out on his own and in 1966 founded UNITA, only to be expelled from his base in Lusaka the following year for damaging the Benguela Railroad, Zambia's link to the west coast. Savimbi then lived in Cairo until mid-1968 when his group reentered eastern Angola, becoming the first liberation movement to operate entirely from within the country. The Portuguese permitted them to do so because they considered UNITA preferable to the other two movements then fighting in the area, and because they constituted no military threat themselves since they had few troops.

Since 1968, Savimbi, who holds a political science degree from the University of Lausanne, has ardently practiced the Maoist tactic of launching a revolution in the rural areas by raising political consciousness among the peasants. He has consolidated his support among the Ovimbundu, the largest linguistic-ethnic group in Angola (with about 33 percent of the black population and most of those living in the south). While able to get some equipment from China in the early years, Savimbi has existed with little outside support and proudly claims that 80 percent of his arms are stolen or captured.

UNITA has grown dramatically from "12 people with knives" in 1966 and 1968, to a small group in the wilderness one year ago, to a full-fledged popular movement today. Some of this success is due to Savimbi's political acumen in creating a centrist, moderate movement between the Marxist MPLA and the conservative FNLA. While professing socialism and protection of peasants from bourgeois exploitation, Savimbi is not an ideologue and is thus more politically flexible than Neto. Unlike Roberto, he relies on virtually no outside assistance, which enables him to maneuver with few restrictions. Finally, Savimbi has won the respect and confidence of African leaders and journalists more easily than either Roberto, considered by many to be of average caliber, or Neto, considered very bright but ruthless and obstinate. Savimbi is gaining in popularity and would certainly receive the most votes in any free election today, primarily because he has the largest ethnic base of support. UNITA is beginning to be freed from its past financial woes by con-

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tributions from white Angolan businessmen, especially in the south.

A transition to independence is difficult enough where the liberation forces are divided into three groups; its prospects become downright foreboding in light of the particularly virulent hostility and conflict among all three groups in recent years. Each of the liberation movements had its own problems fighting the Portuguese, and they also spent much of their time fighting each other. After the 1961 revolt, which largely depopulated northern Angola, the FNLA could no longer conduct an effective guerrilla war, which depends on local popular support and protection for success. The MPLA, with its headquarters in Brazzaville, had problems getting into battle, primarily since Zaïre forbade MPLA troops from crossing its territory to fight in northern Angola. Neighboring Cabinda, the MPLA's major battleground, had its own liberation movement which actively opposed the MPLA, and eastern Angola, the only other place to fight, was far away and barren of trees, villagers, and Portuguese soldiers. UNITA lacked arms, money, and trained fighters; moreover, if too diligent in making war, it could always be expelled by the Portuguese and left homeless since the group was already barred from Lusaka, Brazzaville, and Kinshasa.

Because of these difficulties, the war against Portugal sputtered on through the years with little real activity. In all of 1973, for example, the Portuguese lost only 81 soldiers, of whom not more than 15 were actually shot in combat, the rest falling victim to ground mines. Nevertheless, while losing the occasional skirmishes, the liberation armies did contribute decisively to winning the war. By forcing Portugal to maintain a 50 to 60-thousand-man army for 14 years in Angola alone, they helped create enough resentment to bring on the coup.

Even though only occasionally encountering Portuguese, the liberation movements did, however, actively confront each other, both militarily and politically. Fighting took place in northern Angola from 1962 to 1966, when the MPLA prevented the FNLA from extending control into the Mbundu area close to Luanda, and continued on some scale until the coup. Battles again developed between the two groups in the east from 1966 to early 1974 when the FNLA and MPLA effectively dissipated each others' forces. UNITA was engaged in this conflict as well, fighting both the FNLA to its north, and MPLA to its south.

Despite their common goal of removing Portugal from Angola, the groups never managed to cooperate politically. In October 1961, the two liberation groups then in existence, both with headquarters in Kinshasa, discussed consolidation until Roberto balked, saying that there was too great a Communist influence in the MPLA. In August 1962, Neto and Roberto again discussed merging but these talks ended within two days. The first of their many cooperation agreements was signed in October 1966 and then quickly ignored. In December 1973, President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre attempted a diplomatic coup by uniting the groups, but this soon was nullified since Neto trusted neither Roberto nor Mobutu and dared not move into Kinshasa as the agreement specified. In July 1974, the groups again signed an agreement in Bukavu, Zaïre, stating that they would cooperate fully and present a united front to the Portuguese. Yet within a few weeks the accord was ignored by all parties. Its chief architect, President Mobutu, then openly violated it by escorting an FNLA official to a secret meeting with General Spinola to unilaterally present the FNLA position.

Growing international pressure and Portuguese impatience to establish a transitional government led to the recent cooperation agreements. Savimbi paved the

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way in late 1974 by agreeing separately with FNLA and MPLA to "put an end to all hostilities and propaganda" and present a united front in negotiations with Portugal. Finally the MPLA and FNLA signed the most recent of their bilateral accords during the preparatory talks in Mombasa, Kenya, in January 1975. How long such cooperation agreements stay in effect of course remains to be seen.

Initially outside these three movements was Angola's fourth-largest ethnic group, the white settlers. The Portuguese have refused to recognize any white movement since the April coup, stating that the three existing liberation groups must represent all Angolans. This policy brought initial resentment from whites, many of whom had actively opposed the liberation movements, and for a time there was fear of a white revolt, perhaps a Rhodesian-type UDI. In the spring and summer of 1974, conditions were ripe for such a revolt: whites feared either a radical future government or civil war; the Portuguese Army could not be counted upon to oppose white settlers, which it had refused to do in Mozambique months earlier; and there were no liberation armies in the country which could resist a revolt. Despite the fear, no revolt materialized and aside from minor incidents in Luanda in September and October, the white settlers have remained unexpectedly passive.

Several factors help explain their political restraint. Immediately after the coup, many whites were relieved that the old dictatorship was gone but may not have realized the changes that would result. More importantly, they were totally unorganized and politically inexperienced. The white population—ranging from top business executives and administrators to common laborers and illiterate peasants—was simply too socially and economically stratified to form a single interest group. Besides, even if the desire was there, they had little knowledge of how to organize themselves effectively. Angola was always controlled from Lisbon and there were no opportunities for local political involvement or experience. In short, when the whites had a chance to take power, there was no organization or leadership to spearhead the movement. The two white groups which have arisen since then, the so-called Christian Democrats and Frente de Unidade Angolana (FUA), have little following and are either dispersed or politically inconsequential. (This lack of political experience contrasts sharply with the situation in Rhodesia where the whites were highly organized and actually running their own affairs for 32 years before UDI in 1965.) Since the majority of Angolan whites are of the working class, perhaps they feel less immediately threatened by independence; having no investments, they may think they have little to lose from a change in government at least until the time when their jobs may be in jeopardy. Finally, it is also contended that the tolerant Portuguese racial attitudes throughout the centuries may have removed some of the emotional fright of whites living under black leadership, so prevalent in other African colonial situations.

Rather than actively rebelling, many whites have left Angola, though the exodus is nowhere near as great as that from Mozambique. Portuguese authorities estimate that some 40,000 whites left in 1974. However, the majority of these represent the temporary departures of dependents, with the breadwinner commonly sending his family to Portugal until a new government is well established.

The whites remaining are mostly waiting and hoping that the transition to independence is rapid and peaceful. Some are joining the liberation movements, in much the same pattern as blacks. Thus white agricultural workers in the south are aligned with UNITA, big mineral and coffee producers in the north with FNLA, and urban proletarians, professionals, and intellectuals with MPLA. The Portu-

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guese policy of limiting whites to political participation in one of the three groups will probably be beneficial in the long run. It encourages them to join a group which has a real opportunity of governing the country, prohibits them from forming a separate, racial organization, and acts as a moderating influence within the movements themselves as it encourages these to appeal to white supporters.

IV

The last factor complicating Angola's transition to independence is the secessionist movement of Cabinda, the small enclave now part of Angola though geographically separated from it. The Cabindan issue is important in itself, due to the vast oil reserves of the area, and its disposition is symbolic in terms of the territorial integrity of Angola proper.

With a population of under 80,000, Cabinda is a tiny area of only 7,000 square kilometers (or slightly larger than Delaware), lodged between the Congo and Zaïre. Portugal was originally interested in the hardwood forests and drew up the 1885 Treaty of Simulambuco, which stipulated that the enclave came under Portuguese protection and that any change in its status would have to be made with the consultation of the Cabindan people. In the 1950s Salazar violated this provision by integrating Cabinda into Angola for administrative purposes and declaring the territories together an integral part of Portugal.

The issue was relatively unimportant until oil was discovered offshore from Cabinda in 1966. The reserves found were quite large, and the future looks brighter still as the drilling increases yearly. During 1974, Cabinda produced a daily average of 150,000 barrels of oil; on an annual basis at 1974 oil prices, this would be worth about $430 million to a local government. This makes the small area quite valuable for an independent Angola, the Cabindans themselves (who could receive over $5,000 per capita annually from oil proceeds alone) or the neighboring states of the Congo or Zaïre.

Cabindan leaders consider themselves ethnically and culturally distinct from Angolans, with whom they have been administratively associated less than 20 years. Consequently they formed their own liberation movement, Front pour la Libération de l'Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC), to advocate separation from Angola and their own independence. FLEC has petitioned for an OAU or U.N.-run referendum to decide the issue. Meanwhile, of course, it has raised its own army of a thousand soldiers, over half of whom served in the Portuguese Army and thus are fairly well trained. This FLEC army, supported largely by President Mobutu and often stationed in Zaïre, has been sporadically fighting MPLA troops in Cabinda for years, with the most recent incidents occurring last November.

Portuguese authorities were quite open to FLEC's position until recently, and the Congo and Zaïre have tacitly supported the movement, each by allowing a faction of FLEC to operate in its capital with financial backing. This has been done in spite of "total support" for their respective allied liberation movements, MPLA and FNLA, which vigorously oppose Cabindan independence. In the Mombasa agreement, the first and practically only principle agreed on by all three liberation leaders was to "safeguard the territorial integrity of Angola" by retaining Cabinda as "an integral and inalienable part of Angolan territory," language that was reiterated with Portuguese concurrence in the summit accords of January 15, 1975.

As with every element in the Angolan puzzle, the Cabinda piece is complex, since

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the small enclave could hardly remain totally independent for long. If it were not firmly part of an independent Angola, the temptation of the half-billion-dollar piece of real estate would eventually prove too great for Zaïre or the Congo.

Besides being economically important in itself, Cabinda is considered by the liberation leaders as a symbol of Angolan unity. Secessionist movements can never be ruled out in black Africa, where ethnic attachments are still quite strong. The situation is particularly serious in Angola, which has three major ethnic groups occupying different areas of the country, each now politically represented by a liberation movement. Rather than three national liberation movements, Angola actually has three regional and basically ethnic movements hoping to take over the entire nation. Should any one movement not succeed, it could well attempt to take its part of the country and secede. The transportation system of Angola proves most conducive since road and rail lines run almost exclusively east-west, *from inland to the sea, typical of colonial transportation systems in Africa.* There is only one main road and no railway going north-south across the Cuanza River, which divides the Angolan population. UNITA could conceivably separate the south from the north simply by destroying the main bridge across the river and blocking the airports and coastal ports, thereby creating a defensively secure and economically viable area with considerable agricultural and mineral resources. A movement such as FNLA could separate the north from the south, especially with Mobutu's military backing, and could survive well on receipts from diamonds, coffee, and mineral resources. Accordingly, there is real danger, publicly expressed by Savimbi, that if Cabinda goes, it "would spark separatist movements elsewhere in Angola."

v

As a result of these four factors—Angola's mineral wealth and booming economic prospects, a large but unorganized white population, deep conflicts within and among the three liberation movements, and the possibility of Cabindan separation and other secessionist movements—Angola at this point is an open and inviting area for outside influences. Neighboring African states are particularly interested in developments there, which are bound to affect their futures. While Angola is economically independent, having both valuable exports and the means of transporting them, the same cannot be said of its neighbors, Zaïre and Zambia, which depend on Angola's transportation network. Cabinda's neighboring states, Zaïre and the Congo, obviously have a very keen interest in the future of that precious territory. Various world powers have been involved in the Angolan situation as well.

Recently MPLA president Neto said, "After we are freed from Portuguese colonialism, we must be liberated from that of our neighbors and brothers." He was referring primarily to President Mobutu, who is the most heavily involved and strongest outside influence on Angola today. This is only natural since Zaïre has a large stake in Angolan affairs. Their 1,500-mile common border divides various important tribal groups, most notably the Bakongo. Because of past conflicts in the area, there are refugees on both sides, as many as one million Angolans now in Zaïre and four thousand rebel Katanga troops in Angola. The Benguela Railroad in Angola serves as a vital outlet for copper, Zaïre's main export, which accounts for three-fourths of that nation's foreign exchange earnings. Even under Portuguese rule when Mobutu was fully supporting the liberation movements, he

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continued to send almost 40 percent of the copper through Angola, a figure which would certainly increase if political conditions were favorable. A friendly Angola could supply much-needed foodstuffs to Zaïre and, on the other hand, an independent Cabinda somehow associated with Zaïre would be most welcome, as indicated by Mobutu's large participation in the training and equipping of the FLEC army. Finally, Mobutu has invested a great deal in Holden Roberto over the last nine years, an investment he would not like to see wasted.

Politically, Mobutu needs a peaceful Angolan border to give him time to mold a new Zaïrian political system based on glorification of the leader (immodestly called Mobutism). Border conflicts could disrupt this grand scheme, his top domestic priority. Internationally, Angola presents Mobutu with his first genuine opportunity for diplomatic grandeur, something he has sought in vain during extensive past travels. Longing to create an image as leader of the continent, Mobutu has played a highly visible role in the Angolan situation, engineering several aborted agreements such as the 1973 unification of MPLA and FNLA, and the Bukavu and Brazzaville agreements.

Leaving the role of peacemaker for that of advocate, Mobutu has championed Roberto on every possible occasion. Ignoring his own Bukavu agreement, he met with General Spinola and an FNLA representative in September. To weaken Neto, Roberto's chief opponent, Mobutu encouraged the Chipenda revolt (some say with great financial incentives) and he continues to refer to Chipenda as "MPLA President elected at the Lusaka Conference." Mobutu tried unsuccessfully to convince Foreign Minister Soares, during the latter's various trips to Kinshasa, to deal with Chipenda and not with Neto. In short, Zaïre's stakes are high in the Angolan transition, and Mobutu will do everything possible to assure that it ends in Roberto's success.

Zambia's participation has been more even-handed than Zaïre's, but its interests in the area are no less great. Zambia's 600-mile border with Angola is not too important since the area is practically barren of people and known resources. Far more crucial is Angola's transportation network, a lifeline to the sea for Zambia. Since the closing of the Rhodesian border two years ago and the recent problems of Tanzanian restrictions on the use of its roads, Zambia must now rely on the Benguela Railroad to transport well over half its copper, Zambia's only important export. So vital is this link that President Kaunda had to expel Savimbi for endangering Zambia's use of the railroad in 1967. As a result of the impending Portuguese departure and the Tanzanian restrictions, Zambia has already petitioned Angola to transport over two-thirds of its copper, which would make it almost totally economically dependent upon Angola in the future.

Politically, Zambia has been neutral, supporting all the liberation movements and at various times allowing MPLA/Neto, MPLA/Chipenda, and UNITA troops to operate from its borders. Throughout the war and especially since the coup, Kaunda has stressed peace and unity, which is in keeping with his philosophy of African Humanism and his desire for leadership among the new African states. Above all, Kaunda would like a peaceful transition to Angolan independence which would minimize delays on the railroad and eliminate present labor problems in the Lobito harbor resulting from political uncertainty and unrest.

Congo (Brazzaville) has long been involved with the liberation movements out of both ideological and economic considerations. It would welcome a Soviet Marxist ally such as Neto in the area and is certainly eager to get its hands on Cabinda,

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which would mean far more to the economically poor Congo than to the minerally wealthy Zaïre.

Finally, South Africa has a stake in Angola because of the Angolan-Namibian (Southwest African) border and economic investments. A hostile government in Luanda would certainly increase the guerrilla activity in Namibia. South Africa has investments in Angola, including the large Cunene hydroelectric scheme on the Angolan-Namibian border and private interests in Angolan diamonds, minerals, and the Benguela Railroad.

As vitally interested in Angolan affairs as they are, these African states will continue to use political influence to guide future events. The Congo and Zaïre will push for the MPLA and FNLA, respectively, in Angola and for their own FLEC factions in the case of Cabindan independence. Zambia, on the other hand, wants any political ambiguity resolved quickly and peacefully, not really caring who wins just as long as the railroad runs on time. In addition to its political influence, Zaïre and Zaïre alone of these countries has the option of military intervention, should it feel the need.

More indirect but still important in Angolan affairs is the influence of the United States, China, and Russia. In December, Chipenda said he expected the great powers to influence the outcome in Angola. Apparently Mobutu shares this view since he planned a December trip to Moscow to discourage further Russian assistance to Neto.

The United States first became involved in the liberation movement in the early sixties by supporting Holden Roberto on a covert basis. Since the Kennedy Administration, however, the United States has been publicly neutral toward all liberation movements, and American officials deny rumors, now very prevalent in Luanda, of heavy continuing CIA support for the FNLA. The main U.S. interests in Angola are political—to encourage a friendly government in a large and potentially powerful African country—and economic—to preserve American business interests. Particularly important are the interests of Gulf Oil, the fourth-largest oil company in the United States, which has exclusive rights over Cabindan oil. In terms of trade, the United States is the principal importer of Angolan goods, even ahead of Portugal, and the third-largest exporter to Angola. Congress has recently indicated positive U.S. interest by voting foreign aid for both Portugal and its former territories in Africa.

The Chinese, having no economic interests in Angola, seem motivated by ideological and political concerns. They were obviously attracted to the Angolan war of liberation, truly a textbook case of small, black guerrilla units fighting a colonial and imperialistic white power, and until recently seem to have been more taken by the idea than by any one leader or movement. In 1968, they welcomed Savimbi to Peking and subsequently gave him some small support. Just last year, according to Savimbi, the Chinese implied that they could give him additional help, but he apparently refused the offer. In 1971 Chinese leaders welcomed Neto who, because of his reliance on Soviet backing and ideology, went away empty-handed. Then in December 1973, they greeted Roberto, who had received minor Chinese assistance ten years earlier. The Chinese finally decided to back one of the movements seriously and promised the FNLA over a hundred guerrilla warfare specialists and a reported 450 tons of military equipment, both to enter Kinshasa beginning last June.

It seems that by backing Roberto, the most Western-leaning of the leaders, the

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Chinese decided to sacrifice some ideological purity for political payoffs, or perhaps they merely wanted to oppose the Russians' protegé and simply chose the strongest alternative, even though it meant aligning with the U.S. favorite. In any case, the Chinese stand to gain politically by expanding their influence in Africa, to which they give over half their foreign assistance. In particular, they seek greater support in West Africa at present, after years of assistance to the Asia-facing east coast. Two years ago they planted a firm foothold in the area by greatly impressing Mobutu on his first trip to China and subsequently sending him over a hundred agricultural advisers and teams of doctors, providing a reported $100-million interest-free loan, and even promising to build in Kinshasa an exact replica of Peking's Cultural Palace.

The Russians, as always, are a bit more direct and obvious in their policy than the Chinese. The Soviet Union has backed the MPLA and Neto from the beginning in order to win another ideological and political ally in the area, hopefully one a bit stronger than Congo (Brazzaville). The Russians, however, seem less interested in the Angolan intrigues than the Chinese. In 1971 and 1972, they seemed to decrease their support for the MPLA, apparently thinking that the movement was internally divided, militarily feeble, and unable ever to dislodge the Portuguese from Angola.

Despite great-power interest and historical involvement in Angola, the present situation is unlikely to bring about a confrontation. Times have changed since the showdown days of the Congo crisis and no sufficient military, political, or economic incentive exists to warrant large-scale intervention. Only the Chinese have military advisers in the area, and they are extremely unlikely to become involved in any fighting. The Angolan situation could present great-power difficulties only if either China or Russia massively steps up assistance to its ally and the other then reacts. While the situation would become tense, the liberation forces, rather than the great powers themselves, would remain the chief actors.

VI

In a situation as complex as that of present-day Angola, it might seem foolhardy to predict any future course of events. One year ago, no one could have imagined Portugal voluntarily leaving Angola at any time within the century, and six months ago few considered Savimbi an important leader. Nevertheless, the historical facts along with the general flow of recent events do point to certain apparent and some less obvious conclusions.

First and perhaps most apparent, the transitional government, which will rule Angola until November 11 of this year, will be more occupied with internal conflicts than with effective administration. The Alvor accords signed by the three liberation leaders and Portuguese officials on January 15 provide for each of the four parties to run aspects of the government and enable each to keep a check on the others. The plan calls for the Portuguese High Commissioner to guarantee observance of the accords, help direct foreign policy, and participate in promulgating laws. There is a three-man Presidential Collegium, with one representative from each liberation movement, which provides a rather unique rotating presidency and votes by two-thirds majority rule on major issues involving the ministries and the promulgation of laws. Control of the 12 ministries is evenly divided among the four parties—Portugal and the three groups.

While the new governmental structure seems overly complicated, it does force

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two of the three liberation leaders to agree before any major action is taken[1] and gives Portuguese authorities important powers as well. The weakest point in the scheme is the division of the ministries, which will create innumerable conflicts. The MPLA seems to have received the choicest picks with the Ministries of Information, Planning and Finance, and Justice, hence controlling the radio stations, finances, and court system. FNLA did not do so well, receiving only one important ministry, Interior, which includes some enforcement officials and local authorities in the interior. UNITA received only one major ministry as well, that of Labor and Social Security, which deals with workers throughout the country. Conflicts are likely to arise over the use of these positions to further the individual liberation movements, and accusations will undoubtedly be made that the radio is biased toward MPLA, enforcement officials are furthering FNLA interests, and labor officials are more interested in political support for UNITA than just wage settlements.

The main task of the transitional government, besides running the administration for ten months, is to assure elections for a constituent assembly. These elections will be held before October 31 and candidates can only be nominated by the three liberation groups. While they are specific on these points, the public accords neglect to mention what the constituent assembly actually does after being elected, particularly what its relationship is to the choosing of a head of state. It may be that the assembly will write the new constitution which includes a procedure for electing a president, or more probably it will select the president directly. The accords are seriously deficient in not making this clear since one of the most vital elements in any governmental structure is the procedure for choosing its leaders.

It now seems that this matter will be decided and the leadership crisis resolved, directly or indirectly, by internal military power. Neither MPLA nor FNLA will lose the struggle for leadership in Angola graciously and both cannot win. The only possible resolution now appears to be military victory by one or the other, either alone or aligned with UNITA. Hence Angola seems to be heading for a difficult period of large-scale fighting and civil war.

At present the military situation is indeed tense, with five separate armies operating within Angola, each with its own arms, troops, commanders, and goals. According to Portuguese authorities (who provided all the following statistics, valid for January 1, 1975), the FNLA (before Chipenda's move to join them) had a total of 21,000 troops, 9,000 inside Angola, including about 500 in Luanda, and 12,000 undergoing training in Zaïre. While the caliber of these troops and their equipment has improved somewhat with recent Rumanian and Chinese aid, it is still rather low. The disposition of Chipenda's 2,000 troops in eastern Angola and Zambia, which were reportedly of low morale and thinking of deserting to Neto before their leader moved to join Roberto, is somewhat uncertain, although they are now at least nominally under the umbrella of the FNLA. MPLA has a total of about 10,000 troops, 1,500 in Cabinda, 2,500 in eastern Angola, 300 around Luanda, and some 5,700 undergoing training in the Congo, Zambia, and Angola. Man for man, the MPLA soldier is the best trained, equipped and led, as many have come directly from the Portuguese Army. The MPLA may increase its pres-

[1] For some reason, the three liberation leaders decided in Alvor that none of them would officially participate in the transitional government. Thus while still presidents of their respective liberation movements—still very much in existence as separate groups—Neto, Roberto, and Savimbi have no official positions in Angola.

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ent strength by recruiting the well-trained 4,000 Katanga ex-gendarmes now living in Angola, as reports indicate is being discussed. UNITA has 8,000 troops, up considerably from its seven to eight hundred in April but still not a powerful force, especially since over half are undergoing training now and their equipment is old. The FNLA is therefore the strongest militarily and best located strategically, being directly north of Luanda. Yet with its large number of new recruits and generally lower caliber soldier, FNLA may not be predominant, at least at this point. Finally, the Portuguese Army has 30,000 troops, only half its April strength due to demobilization of its black and white Angolan soldiers.

In addition to existing troop strength, the liberation movements are presently besieged with new recruits throughout the country, young men not wanting to miss any future action, and they are frantically training and arming these additional troops.

The negotiators at Alvor tried to defuse this tense situation by consolidating the separate liberation armies. The parties had serious difficulties agreeing and the meeting almost broke up over the issue. However, it was finally decided that by September each liberation group would supply 8,000 troops and Portugal 24,000 troops to a new Angolan army of 48,000 total strength. Military affairs and the police would be directed jointly by the Portuguese High Commissioner, three liberation representatives, and six military commanders. Liberation troops not in the new army are specifically allowed to remain in place, which in effect allows them to retain control over their areas.

How well these plans actually work depends upon the cooperation and trust among liberation groups and the moderating influence of the Portuguese Army. Neither element particularly inspires confidence or is likely to prove sufficient to prevent conflicts from arising. Given the years of active fighting among the three movements, it seems most dubious that such hostility will suddenly disappear overnight, especially since the outcome now determines the leadership of Angola whereas before it meant relatively little. Even if the three groups do consolidate their armies as prescribed, it remains to be seen whether they will surrender troop control to the unified command or retain it within their own command, and what they will actually do with their additional troops, those not to be included in the new army.

The Portuguese Army is unlikely to save the situation either, as its soldiers seem unwilling to fight. During the disturbances in the black neighborhoods of Luanda last summer, when over 100 persons were killed, Portuguese soldiers generally resisted getting involved. Soon after Portugal signed ceasefire agreements with UNITA in June and FNLA and MPLA in October, the liberation armies entered Angola and began to patrol the black areas of the major cities. By the year's end, the Portuguese Army had completely surrendered control of these areas to the three other armies, apparently following the wishes of its soldiers and fearing cries of colonialism and repression should they be forced to take action. The Portuguese soldiers would certainly be more reluctant to risk their lives trying to moderate fighting between liberation armies than to reestablish order in the black sections of Luanda. As mentioned previously, the army may prove equally undependable in actions against white settlers. Besides, precisely at the most crucial time, one month before independence as the new leadership is being chosen, Portugal is to begin withdrawing its troops from Angola. The Alvor accords provide for Portuguese troop withdrawals to begin in October 1975 and end in February 1976.

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Not to be totally pessimistic, the leadership crisis may be resolved with little actual fighting. Instead the victory may be won by military threats and a predominance of force by any one group or alignment of two groups. This is fairly unlikely, however, since neither FNLA nor MPLA would appear to be so accommodating.

Outside powers are likely to continue or even increase their support, but are unlikely to intervene militarily. As stated, the great powers have no compelling reason to become deeply involved and the African nations, except Zaïre, have no real capacity for doing so. Even Mobutu would not risk OAU and general African opposition in an overt move, which in any case would bolster Roberto's enemies, determined to chase out the new colonialists. At the extreme, he could only intervene covertly by enlisting Zaïrian Bakongo troops into the FNLA, but even this is improbable unless the battle is raging with the unfriendly Neto on the verge of total victory. In any case, Mobutu would probably deny such intervention and an outsider would find it almost impossible to disprove him.

While the whites are unlikely to take unilateral action, they certainly could be expected to react violently in case of military or political attack. Their chance for a separate armed rebellion has passed, and their fate is now tied to that of the liberation movements. Should there be real civil war, threatening their lives and property, the already well-armed white community would respond by fighting and leaving in haste. Those staying would ask for Portuguese military support, which would pose innumerable problems for the Lisbon government. Even though it would feel morally bound to protect its former citizens and extensive Portuguese business interests in Angola, the government would have both logistical problems recruiting enough soldiers who would actually fight and a real political crisis since the Armed Forces Movement, which controls the army and government, is very determined to stop foreign conflicts and leave Angola quickly.

The whites may also react to political threats of expulsion. At this point, many feel caught between the Portuguese government, which would like them to stay in Angola in order to avoid the political and economic adjustments a mass repatriation would cause, and some of the liberation groups (particularly the FNLA), which would like those of the working class to leave for good, thereby releasing their jobs to blacks. Apparently the status of white settlers was a difficult issue at Alvor, where a compromise was reached providing that the citizenship of Portuguese domiciled but not born in Angola would be specially studied. Such study could well conclude that this large group, mostly manual laborers and farmers coming since the 1960s, does not qualify for Angolan citizenship, causing the settlers to react, many by fighting.

Cabinda's fate depends on what happens in Angola proper—the more the fighting there, the greater its chance of independence. In a relatively peaceful transition, the new government with its consolidated army will have the military force and certainly the determination to retain Cabinda. This is especially true since the summit accords commit Portugal and the High Commissioner in Luanda to preserving Cabinda as an integral part of Angola. If large-scale fighting breaks out in Angola, however, the MPLA would have to withdraw its troops from Cabinda to go for the larger prize in Luanda, and the Portuguese might do likewise to minimize the conflict in the main territory. Although Cabinda might then become independent, it would not be aligned with the Congo. President Mobutu would never allow the valuable territory on his border to markedly strengthen

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his one-time foe across the river, and he has a great deal to say in the matter as the FLEC army's biggest contributor. More probable is an independent Cabinda initially coming under Zaïrian protection, as it was under Portuguese protection for centuries, with closer ties and perhaps even integration coming later.

To postulate the last and most tentative prediction, it seems likely that Roberto and Savimbi together will initially take power, with one of the two victorious in the long run. While the MPLA currently has the most trained professionals to actually run the new government, its leadership under Neto has faltered. Neto has not been able to control his own internal conflicts, in part because he is a hard-line Marxist who insists upon ideological purity in the movement. In this period of Angola's development, a less rigid leader who knows and appreciates the art of reconciliation and compromise would be more successful. In the long run as well, Angola needs someone to weld the various tribal, economic, and racial interests of the huge and diverse country in an imaginative rather than doctrinaire way. In addition, the rise of Neto would create serious political problems with neighboring Zaïre, which neither country could well afford at this point.

It is inconceivable that Neto and Roberto could work together for long. One must give way to the other, as cooperation between them appears impossible on personal, ethnic, political, and ideological grounds. The two leaders have been involved in too many personal and military battles, and each one's ethnic base is sufficiently narrow, particularly Roberto's, to arouse deep distrust. Their political support, both in Africa and from the great powers, pulls them apart, Neto with Russia and Congo (Brazzaville) and Roberto with their rivals, China and Zaïre. Savimbi and Neto would have an easier time cooperating but again the ideological differences remain, as seen in Neto's refusal to accept Savimbi in the MPLA years ago.

The Roberto-Savimbi alliance would be an obvious one. The two worked together for years, Savimbi as Roberto's Foreign Minister in the government-in-exile, indicating no serious ideological differences. Recently Savimbi has hinted at such an accord, publicly saying that Roberto now appreciates Angola's needs and if he had been as open-minded years ago, Savimbi would never have left him. The alliance would combine the strongest military power, FNLA, with the strongest popular movement, UNITA, as well as the Bakongo north and Ovimbundu south. (Chipenda, incidentally, is on friendly terms with Savimbi as well as Roberto.) Problems with this might arise over the control of Luanda, in the heart of MPLA territory. One possible solution would be to move the capital, at least temporarily, to Nova Lisboa, more centrally located in the country and long thought to be the future capital, as the name indicates.

African alliances, such as that predicted for Roberto and Savimbi, have a tendency of lasting just so long. Eventually one or the other must take total control but this may be some time off, thus fortunately not calling for a prediction at this point. It should be mentioned, however, that if Roberto eventually wins, he could prove more independent than many people now expect. Although certainly indebted to Mobutu, his success has been more the result of long Zaïrian support than of any new and special relationship with Mobutu. Historically it has always been in Zaïrian interests to fully support Roberto, as did Lumumba, Kasavubu and Adoula before 1965. Roberto would certainly be friendly to Zaïre but might not be under Mobutu's firm control.

There is always the possibility that the future Angolan leader will be none of

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the present contenders. The situation here may replicate that of 1952 Egypt or Algeria at independence in 1962; in each case, military or political unknowns rose to the top within two to three years. In the short run such a switch seems unlikely unless there is total chaos in the country for an extended period of time. Still the three leaders have not yet been tested in terms of effective political leadership on a large scale. No one is sure if they can make the transition from guerrilla fighters —mainly involved with condemning colonialism and imperialism, raising foreign support, and directing troops in small guerrilla operations—to truly national leaders—contending with powerful ethnic groups in other regions of the country, white businessmen, manual laborers, foreign investors and economically reliant neighboring states. The new Angolan leadership must also be able to rapidly develop the long-neglected black rural population, over 90 percent illiterate, and improve the social and health facilities of the country.

Whatever the outcome in Angola, it will certainly be unique because the various elements of the situation are themselves unique. In a way, it is unfortunate that, after centuries of delay, decolonization in such a complex setting had to be so rapid, taking place in less than 19 months from the coup to total independence. If only Portugal had sensed and followed the flow of history in the fifties and sixties, there would have been every possibility of an easy transition to a multiracial and well-developed independent Angola. However, this was not to be and the Portuguese must now hastily depart with all too little preparation and all too great a danger of serious conflict and civil war.

VII

The story of Angolan independence has just begun, but the story of Portuguese decolonization is nearly over, bringing in its wake drastic changes in southern Africa and vibrations throughout the continent. With the decolonization of Angola on the west coast and particularly of Mozambique on the east, the white-ruled states have lost their border guards and been jolted into a realization that major adjustments are now needed. Rhodesia has already released black nationalist leaders in return for a ceasefire on its borders and has agreed to consultations on eventual black majority rule. South Africa is curtailing its police support to Rhodesia and is actively considering eventual independence for Namibia and easing its domestic apartheid policy in return for a ceasefire on its borders and establishment of normal diplomatic relations with black African states. It may take years to implement these steps and the specific proposals may change drastically, but at least the points are being actively discussed and even negotiated now, something totally inconceivable just one year ago.

The winds of change have indeed swept through southern Africa. If Angola can make the transition to independence without devastating civil war and total chaos, its economically strong and truly multiracial society could well lead the harmonious development of a one-time racially ugly and troubled area of the world.

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CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor:

Your two articles in January dealing with international economic aspects of the oil pricing and capital recycling problems are an important contribution to the indispensable debate on these issues. They are a salutary antidote to the hysteria in some circles, recently taking the form of armchair strategies for military intervention in the Persian Gulf. Their demonstration that the financial problems are not "unmanageable," however, may encourage the opposite tendency of undue complacency and a consequent de facto energy policy of doing nothing. Both articles play down the issue of oil prices, and both relegate the development of alternative energy sources to a back burner, with little urgency to its solution. I believe these to be serious errors.

The five-author article (Farmanfarmaian et al.) presents a compelling case for new multilateral petrodollar recycling funds, dealing respectively in government obligations and diversified private investments. Like other proposals which involve OPEC country participation, the first of these is superior to the Kissinger-Simon proposals of late November. The second, in the form of a multinational investment trust, is an innovation of great potential merit.

On the other hand, while the authors may be correct in doubting the prospects for early reductions in oil prices, they seriously understate the extent to which price reductions would reduce the international economic problem to more manageable limits. This is because of their emphasis on the level of gross payments for oil instead of the OPEC payment surpluses on current account. It is those net surpluses that constitute the critical problem—the huge excess of OPEC earnings beyond what the oil-exporting countries can spend on current imports for consumption, domestic investment, and armaments. If those earnings could be matched by current imports, there would be a large transfer of income from consuming to producing countries, but not what we now face—an unprecedented kind of economic adjustment calling for new institutions and new forms of international collaboration. As the Chenery article rightly states (page 246), the income transfer would be little more than two percent of the GNP of the importing countries, or about one half-year's normal growth. The diversion of resources to additional exports would be comparable to a sudden increase of two percentage points in the proportion of defense expenditures to GNP, with the higher level then sustained. In the United States, defense expenditures increased between 1950 and 1952 by over eight percentage points and between 1965 and 1967 by almost two full points.

The amount of OPEC financial surpluses will depend on the volume and price of their oil exports, their capacity to import goods and services, and the earnings on their cumulative surpluses invested abroad. Many projections have been made since the current "crisis" erupted; some recent estimates place the likely peak accumulation at $200 to $325 billion (in 1974 value dollars) or only half the levels widely discussed last summer. In the analyses emphasizing "market forces," different price assumptions do not greatly affect the amount of accumulations because lower prices are offset by a larger volume of OPEC oil exports. In the real world, however, both conservation and alternative supply development may be governed more by deliberate policies than by market forces. In that event, the range of prices discussed in the five-author article (from present levels to a level of $6 per barrel) could lead to vast differences in the financial surplus accumula-

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tions. My own calculations suggest that at the $6 price (adjusted for inflation) the peak accumulation would be as low as $130 billion compared with my own estimate of $400 billion or more if present prices continue (likewise adjusted for inflation). Both may be "manageable," but the reduction is greatly to be preferred.

The five-author article, moreover, errs (page 203) in assuming that increased exports to OPEC would have to be "diverted" from the stream of presently traded goods. Such additional exports would in fact be diverted mainly from the much larger volume of domestic production. Currently in industrialized countries, they would not have to be diverted from anything; they would be produced by labor and capital now going unused or underused due to the worldwide recession.

The article likewise overstresses the capital shortage in the importing countries and the need for new investments to generate the resources for ultimate repayment. That is a correct description for the poor developing countries, but not the critical issue for the industrialized countries. The OECD group could make good use of additional capital, but it is certainly able to generate the resources to pay for oil; the bottleneck lies in the OPEC group's inability to absorb those resources.

Notwithstanding these defects of analysis, the proposals in the five-author article go a long way toward a viable plan for handling the inescapable medium-term capital recycling problem. It would be improved by adding a complementary concept: triangular recycling of a portion of the OPEC surpluses through developing countries, over and above what such countries need merely to pay their oil bills. That plan would go much further than the ideas sketched on pages 214–15; it would provide OPEC financing for development projects (such as the expansion of food production) which in turn require goods and services from the OECD group. Such triangulation would permit the OECD countries to pay *currently* (although indirectly) for a larger fraction of their oil imports by means of additional exports to the poor LDCs, thus reducing the need for OPEC investments in the OECD countries. (Recently reported French export drives to Egypt are an example.) That objective is so desirable from the OECD viewpoint that its governments should consider sharing in interest subsidies and ultimate repayment guarantees to make triangular recycling attractive to all concerned.[1]

The Chenery article reflects a more sophisticated analysis of alternative scenarios and gives some badly needed quantitative perspective to the debate in place of the all-too-common hand-wringing and panic-mongering. It errs in the opposite direction from the first article, however, in understating the difficulties of absorbing large-scale OPEC investments in the OECD countries. It also presents a highly implausible projection that a $2 or $3 drop from present prices would expand the OPEC market by 9 million barrels a day in 1980, 13 million in 1985, and 29 in 1990 (the *difference* in 1990 being as large as the *total* sales in 1974). In effect, Chenery simply disregards the political element of concern over dependence on supplies from a cartel which has shown a capacity to alter prices without notice and whose Arab component, comprising over half of present OPEC output and a larger fraction in the future, has shown a willingness to impose politically motivated embargoes. With prices at $7 to $8 per barrel, and "with some assurance that supplies would be forthcoming at this level," the OECD countries are expected to forego higher-cost alternatives. It is not made clear how the "assurance" of continuing supplies at a given price would be secured or guaranteed.

[1] A triangular recycling plan is set forth in some detail in an article by Arnold H. Packer, "Living with Oil at Ten Dollars per Barrel," *Challenge*, January–February 1975, pp. 17–25.

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Chenery's implicit strategy for the OECD countries, apart from his wise advice to avoid unnecessary curtailment of economic growth, comes down to deferring or abandoning action to develop alternative energy sources while hoping that OPEC calculations of self-interest—based on the feared ultimate loss of markets to such sources—will bring prices down. The five-author article likewise passes over the question of alternative sources by referring to long lead times and environmental constraints which will prevent major replacement of OPEC oil until the 1980s.

But genuine forward movement on alternative sources is the most powerful lever available to the OECD countries to influence the price of oil. While substantial new supplies cannot be forthcoming until well into the 1980s, action now could affect the price in the 1970s. Apart from price, the political (and contingent economic) advantages of reduced dependence on OPEC supplies are surely worth a margin of $2 or $3 per barrel (five to seven cents per gallon of product).

Energy conservation will also help to depress prices, but it is not a substitute for the development of alternative energy sources. Conservation by itself might simply invite further price increases, leaving the surplus revenue and capital recycling problems unchanged, while the importing economies, having squeezed out wasteful uses, would be even more vulnerable to interruptions in supply.

The development of alternatives to low-cost oil is not an easy enterprise. It will require very large capital investments and the resolution of difficult environmental issues—not the abandonment of environmental goals, but the recognition that any set of energy supply solutions will involve some environmental protection costs and some degree of environmental impairment. The world will have to face these problems in any case during the next 25 to 50 years. Even the most optimistic appraisals of oil and gas resources anticipate declining physical availability soon after the year 2000 if not before. OPEC price-raising in effect is forcing a 25-year acceleration of a transition that would have been required in any event.

An adequate response cannot focus solely on any single aspect of the problem. It must incorporate simultaneously downward pressure on prices, management of capital recycling, conservation, and development of alternative supplies. And it must hold steady on course, not veering with every weekly or quarterly shift in the weathervane.

LINCOLN GORDON
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Washington, D.C.

To the Editor:

In an area as volatile as the Middle East, it is extremely precarious to make predictions without regard to history. Unfortunately, Richard Ullman, in his January *Foreign Affairs* article on the U.S. role in the Middle East, charges in without regard to his own credibility. He believes that a new and this time "catastrophic round" of hostilities between Israel and the Arab states is imminent unless Israel meets three basic conditions. These are: (1) recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the establishment of a Palestinian state; (2) withdrawal from all the territories occupied in 1967, including part of Jerusalem; and (3) acceptance of an "absolutely unambiguous American commitment" to guarantee Israel's existence, "including even the stationing of U.S. military contingents in Israel."

Let me say right off that in this prescription for an end to Middle East hostilities, Mr. Ullman never once suggests that the Arab states be required to sign a

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peace treaty with Israel—or even to negotiate directly for one! Nor does he explain how one could achieve peace without negotiations. Indeed, he fails even to mention the word "peace" in that context anywhere in the paper, thus permitting the assumption that the objective of his proposal is limited only to an "end to hostilities" and to the prevention of an "Israeli defeat"—not to peace itself.

It is also curious to note Mr. Ullman's almost complete omission of the role the Soviet Union has played and is continuing to play in the rearming of Syria, Iraq and Egypt, and as a declared partisan of their cause. He ignores the impact of the Soviet Union's competition with the United States for control of the Middle East and the routes to India, a struggle which some observers feel makes peace between Israel and Egypt almost impossible without Soviet consent and cooperation. Mr. Ullman does suggest that U.S. "collaboration" with the Soviet Union would be "most desirable" in preventing a new war, but then promptly dismisses it as not "essential." He apparently does not regard U.S.-U.S.S.R. collaboration, including joint forces, tantamount to placing the fox in charge of the chicken house—he actually believes that with Soviet troops stationed in demilitarized zones, "the Israelis would feel sufficiently reassured to withdraw from occupied territories"! Such collaboration is more likely to increase than to reduce the risk of confrontation.

Given the Soviet Union's policy of open hostility toward Israel, it is difficult to take this suggestion seriously. Equally unrealistic is his assumption that Israel's withdrawal from occupied territory is "vitally" necessary for an end to hostilities. He never really tells us why. He completely ignores Israel's historic rights regarding this territory. Does he actually believe that the Arabs would be any more satisfied to stop at the pre-1967 borders when in fact they have never accepted the existence of the state of Israel no matter what its borders?

A review of Egypt's unsuccessful efforts over 25 years to destroy Israel should easily identify Egypt—not the Palestinians—as the primary foe of Israel and the one which will have to come to terms if hostilities are to end. History also offers ample reason to question the totally unsupported claim that the Palestinians are a "highly nationalistic people." Mr. Ullman makes no distinction between the inhabitants of the refugee camps and the Palestinians of the West Bank. The latter, it should be noted, never left the homes and villages they were born in. If they ever felt a high degree of "nationalism" in the 25 years since Jordan seized their territory and blocked the establishment of an Arab state created by the U.N. partition resolution, it never surfaced.

Hostilities in the Middle East stem primarily from Egypt's refusal to accept the partition resolution and the establishment of the state of Israel, not from any dispute over boundaries or a belated recognition of alleged Palestinian "nationalism." An "unambiguous" American guarantee, such as Mr. Ullman proposes, cannot change this hard fact. Indeed, after American experiences with Korea and Vietnam, it is hardly likely that Congress would agree to such a commitment.

There have been several efforts to stabilize the Middle East through guarantees of one kind or another, all of them failures. The Constantinople Convention of 1888 guaranteed that the Suez Canal "shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or war, without distinction of flags. . . . The Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockage." That solemn pledge was reaffirmed by the Eisenhower "guarantee" of free passage for ships of commerce through international waterways, including the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran. And then there was the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 in

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which Britain, France and the United States pledged to "guarantee" existing boundaries in the Middle East. Not to be forgotten also is the U.N. peacekeeping force in the Sinai, which was supposed to prevent hostilities between Egypt and Israel, and which melted away at Nasser's command. None of these guarantees was worth the paper it was written on in the face of altered circumstances and national self-interest. There is no reason to believe that an "unambiguous" guarantee would be any more sacred.

Far from guaranteeing peace, a U.S. commitment backed by troops would give the Arabs every reason to reinforce their present propaganda war with the kind of guerrilla warfare instituted by President Nasser all over again. Since the Arabs would not have to yield anything to Israel in the event of a U.S. guarantee, they would most likely resist vigorously any effort to bring them to the peace table with Israel. Why should they go if the United States is willing to pull their chestnuts out of the fire and compel Israel to return to them the land they lost in a war they started? Eventually, under such an arrangement, Israel would be left waving a meaningless guarantee in the face of hostile Arab armies massed along its narrowly restricted borders. In short, such guarantee proposals as Mr. Ullman's only serve to make the Arabs more recalcitrant by keeping alive their hopes to destroy Israel.

At present, Israel is very satisfied with the supply of American arms and barring the direct intervention of the Soviet Union feels itself strong enough to cope with any Arab state or combination of states. Israel's leaders have repeatedly stated that they neither want nor require U.S. armed forces to be stationed on their territory, and they also believe that Secretary of State Kissinger's focus on Egypt as the pivotal figure in any move toward peace is correct, at least in the initial phases of negotiations following the Yom Kippur War. In my view, therefore, Mr. Ullman would do well to recognize that continued negotiations and a balance of armed strength between Israel and the Arab states are the surest guarantees for an end to hostilities in the Middle East.

ALLEN LESSER
Director, Washington, D.C. Office
Public Affairs Committee, Zionist Organization of America

Mr. Ullman replies:

Mr. Lesser complains that I do not "explain how one could achieve peace without negotiations." His phrase reveals our differences. My proposal for an explicit U.S. commitment to Israel is aimed not at achieving "peace" in the sense of formal recognition and treaties—at least in the short run. It is aimed at creating a foundation of security upon which, eventually, formal peace might be built. It is aimed at taking the possibility of Israel's destruction out of the day-to-day politics of the Arab states, so that Arab leaders who want to coexist with Israel will not always feel forced to escalate their anti-Israeli rhetoric to combat that of rival politicians.

Mr. Lesser's letter is a classic example of the best being the enemy of the good. Like him, I too would prefer a negotiated peace. Like him, I also would prefer that this should happen without the deeper involvement of outside powers. But unlike him, I regard the dynamics of politics on both sides as making such an outcome very nearly impossible in present circumstances. Therefore I would now settle for predictable security, and not "peace." I put forward my proposal for an American guarantee of Israel's security not because I regard such an arrangement

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as intrinsically desirable, but because I think it the least undesirable—not only for Israel, but also for the United States—of a number of undesirable alternatives.

Mr. Lesser correctly infers that our differences stem from a different weighing of "history." Unlike him, I do not believe that in the present circumstances in the Middle East the past is a reliable guide to the future. Israel's past military successes will be much more difficult to repeat now that Arab oil revenues make available unlimited amounts of the most advanced weapons; combined with the immense disproportion of populations, they vastly lengthen the odds against Israel. Similarly, Mr. Lesser asserts that I ignore Israel's "historic *rights*" [my italics] to the territory occupied in 1967. I am mindful, instead, of Israel's *claims*, based upon history, but I am mindful, also, that Israel's enemies have claims which they, too, base upon history, and I know of no way of adjudicating between these competing claims. Mr. Lesser wonders why I suppose that Israel's enemies would be "satisfied to stop at the pre-1967 borders." Indeed, I do not suppose that all of them would be. That is why I regard a structure of deterrence built upon an explicit American guarantee as more desirable for the maintenance of Israel's security than continued retention of occupied territory. Egypt, which Mr. Lesser identifies as Israel's "primary foe," seems today to be (aside from Jordan) the state most ready to come to terms with Israel, if only President Sadat can be sure that the Palestinians cannot either radicalize his politics or those of the states, like Saudi Arabia, upon whose financial support Egypt has come increasingly to depend. That is why I continue to believe that the best way out of the current Middle Eastern dilemma—in which each side finds it politically impossible to do what is required to make a settlement politically possible for the other—is for outside powers to act so as to change the grounds upon which the debate takes place.

My proposal is for a guarantee by the United States—acting with others if possible but alone if necessary—of Israel's security roughly within the 1967 borders. It does not, as Mr. Lesser alleges, *require* Israeli recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization or the creation of a Palestinian state; whether or not such a state were established would not be a matter for Israeli decision. Clearly there could not be simply a return to the conditions of 1967; the division of Jerusalem, to take only one instance, could not be allowed to recur. I am mindful of the poor record of past "guarantees" in the area, but those I propose are so different from the past as scarcely to be comparable. The appropriate analogs are not those Mr. Lesser cites, but the U.S. guarantees, made visible by the presence of U.S. forces, of the security of West Germany or South Korea. In those cases, what was guaranteed was not "peace" but security; stability has been assured at no cost in lives while, gradually, regional tensions have relaxed. In this respect, Soviet participation would be highly desirable. The presence of U.S. forces would assure the Israelis that they would not be left to face the Soviets alone, while the presence of Soviet forces would enable Arab politicians to assure their own populations—who, it must be remembered, have been educated to quite a different view of Israeli intentions than that of Mr. Lesser (or, for that matter, myself)—that their security also would be safeguarded. Once the security of the area is seen to be assured, then, gradually, peace might have a chance.

Richard H. Ullman
Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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MACROPOLITICS: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN A GLOBAL SOCIETY. By Richard W. Sterling. New York: Knopf, 1974, 648 pp. $13.95.

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT. By Michael Haas. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974, 681 pp. $10.95 (Paper).

These two contrasting volumes challenge the conventional literature of international relations. Confronting the doctrine of political realism, Professor Sterling argues persuasively that new global forces (compression of time and space, the universal quest for development and justice, and the emergence of transnational actors) have transformed international society and necessitate the macro-perspective he supplies. Professor Haas gives us an impressive and exhaustive treatment of the causes of war from the perspective of a behavioral scientist.

A THEORY OF CONFLICT. By Brian Crozier. New York: Scribners, 1975, 245 pp. $12.50.

With less theory than polemic, Crozier attacks modern revolutionary movements as leading to totalitarianism and suggests ways to nip revolution in the bud.

THE QUESTION OF GOVERNMENT: AN INQUIRY INTO THE BREAKDOWN OF MODERN POLITICAL SYSTEMS. By David Fromkin. New York: Scribners, 1975, 228 pp. $8.95.

Present-day "inflation, crime, and rampant disorder" suggest to the author a resemblance to Rome in her final days. A reflective diagnosis and set of remedies.

ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA. By Robert Nozick. New York: Basic Books, 1974, 367 pp. $12.95.

A significant restatement of the natural rights-libertarian defense of the "minimal" state.

BECOMING MODERN: INDIVIDUAL CHANGE IN SIX DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974, 437 pp. $15.00.

Based on extensive field research in South Asia, Nigeria, Latin America, and Israel, this book analyzes the emergence of "the syndrome of the modern man": efficiency, openness, and public concern.

THE SEA CHANGE: THE MIGRATION OF SOCIAL THOUGHT, 1930–1965. By H. Stuart Hughes. New York: Harper and Row, 1975, 283 pp. $10.00.

A valuable examination of the impact on American social thought of the European refugees fleeing fascism and, reciprocally, the influence of the American experience on thinkers such as Hannah Arendt, Erik Erikson, and Paul Tillich.

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THE THIN BLUE LINE: INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND ITS FUTURE. By Indar Jit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle and Bjørn Egge. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974, 353 pp. $12.50.

An impressive example of international cooperation in itself, this is a timely "how to do it" volume co-authored by three experienced officers—an Indian, a Briton, and a Norwegian.

THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. By G. I. Tunkin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974, 497 pp. $20.00.

This work by a noted Soviet scholar brings the Soviet theory of international law into the service of peaceful coexistence, thus revising the formerly authoritative writings of Vishinsky.

SUEZ 1956: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW. By Robert R. Bowie. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, 148 pp. $7.50 (Paper, $2.50, 1974).

Bowie's fine case study provides scant comfort to those who foresee the transformation of international law from an instrument of state policy to a restraint on state behavior.

FISHERIES CONFLICTS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC: PROBLEMS OF MANAGEMENT AND JURISDICTION. Edited by Giulio Pontecorvo. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1974, 203 pp. $12.50.

A competent and thorough examination of an important issue in the international management of world resources.

General: Military, Technological and Scientific

Andrew J. Pierre

THE ULTRA SECRET. By F. W. Winterbotham. New York: Harper and Row, 1974, 199 pp. $8.95.

The fascinating story, at last revealed, of how the British broke the German code and read Hitler's messages to his generals, sometimes prior to their reception in the field. Some changes in assessments of Allied leaders during World War II will now be required, since we now know that they had quite extensive knowledge of Germany's dispositions and operational plans before and during battles. But historical revisions should await a more complete account than that provided here, solely on the basis of the author's recollections and without benefit of the official documents.

NATIONAL POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY: NUCLEAR REACTOR DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE. By Henry R. Nau. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, 287 pp. $12.50.

An impressive, but more, an important study. Through a careful analysis of the political dimensions of nuclear technology in Western Europe, Nau challenges present conventional wisdom: "National politics, far from becoming an increasingly inappropriate perspective for studying technological relations among modernized societies, may be a more relevant focus than integration or interdependence."

ADVICE AND DISSENT: SCIENTISTS IN THE POLITICAL ARENA. By Joel Primack and Frank von Hippel. New York: Basic Books, 1974, 299 pp. $12.95.

Citing the supersonic transport, the ABM, pesticides, and other examples, two scientists argue that "concerned citizens" should be skeptical of government use of scientific advice unless the data are made available for independent verification; "concerned scientists" should not rest with writing advisory reports for Washington but should carry their message to the public.

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THE VOYAGES OF APOLLO: THE EXPLORATION OF THE MOON. By Richard S. Lewis. New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Company, 1974, 308 pp. $12.50.

Science fiction, were it not true. A lofty account of the six landings on the moon by a veteran science reporter.

FROM KNOW-HOW TO NOWHERE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY. By Elting E. Morison. New York: Basic Books, 1974, 199 pp. $10.00.

Morison writes with wit and wisdom in this short but sweeping history of American technological development. Well-suited for the Bicentennial.

U.S. TACTICAL AIR POWER: MISSIONS, FORCES, AND COSTS. By William D. White. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974, 121 pp. $2.50 (Paper).

U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES. By Jeffrey Record, with the assistance of Thomas I. Anderson. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974, 70 pp. $2.50 (Paper).

Two additions to the Brookings defense policy series which, by delineating the alternatives, can increase the chance for making intelligent choices. White's volume examines costs and missions and should be a valuable contribution to the decisions ahead on the acquisition of U.S. tactical warplanes for the 1980s. The Record work, in questioning the size and mode of the present development of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, fits neatly into the growing debate on this subject, with its potential for European-American discord.

TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974, 148 pp. $8.95.

As land-based missiles become more vulnerable, submarine-launched missiles may hold the key to stable deterrence. Therein lies the importance of this brief and relatively technical report on the state of the development of antisubmarine capabilities.

PROTEST AND THE URBAN GUERRILLA. By Richard Clutterbuck. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1974, 309 pp. $10.00.

The author, a retired British Major General who had practical experience in dealing with terrorism in Malaya, Palestine and elsewhere, considers this form of violence to be on the upswing. Many interesting examples are drawn from the IRA.

THE POLITICAL USES OF SEA POWER. By Edward N. Luttwak. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, 79 pp. $6.50 (Paper, $2.25).

Briefly, but with originality, the author elaborates a theory of "suasion" for the peacetime use of naval forces as instruments of policy.

CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL. Edited by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1974, 350 pp. $20.00.

Sixteen authors touch on almost all the relevant issues in this symposium. A useful volume, although the "contrast" is more in the diversity of subjects than in the points of view.

POLITICAL-MILITARY SYSTEMS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES. Edited by Catherine McArdle Kelleher. Beverly Hills (Calif.): Sage Publications, 1974, 299 pp. $12.50 (Paper, $7.50).

Country-by-country rather than truly comparative, this collection on the role of the armed forces in the societies of selected developing countries and socialist states is notable for the inclusion of a number of newer scholars incisively digging their teeth into intellectual terrain first charted a decade ago.

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SMALL POWERS IN ALIGNMENT. By Omer De Raeymaeker and others. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1974, 424 pp. Belg. Fr. 620.

A useful addition to the limited literature on small-power behavior. Analyzes the differing motives which led the smaller West European powers to join NATO and some to later consider leaving the alliance. Particularly apt for today's difficulties is the case of Portugal, the "unhappy ally."

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

EURO-DOLLARS: THE MONEY-MARKET GYPSIES. By Jane Sneddon Little. New York: Harper and Row, 1975, 301 pp. $12.50.

A book that calls the Euro-dollar market glamorous, licentious and, in some respects, like the pushmi-pullyu must have a contribution to make. This one provides an excellent explanation of the mysteries for the uninitiated, lots of facts for the partially informed, and clear-cut analysis and arguments about the controversial issues for the cognoscenti. There is a little too much detail in spots, but that the best book on such a subject should also be amusing is an uncovenanted bonus. The author is an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.

BY BREAD ALONE. By Lester R. Brown, with Erik P. Eckholm. New York: Praeger (for the Overseas Development Council), 1974, 272 pp. $8.95.

IN THE HUMAN INTEREST: A STRATEGY TO STABILIZE WORLD POPULATION. By Lester R. Brown. New York: Norton, 1974, 190 pp. $6.95 (Paper).

The larger volume is a timely, comprehensive, and very interesting discussion of the causes and dangers of the interrelated food, population, and energy problems of the world. Worried, but with many prescriptions for how things might be put right, the authors see the need for multiple approaches, but stress the central importance of increased food production in the developing countries. The smaller work expands a strategy for population control.

POPULATION DYNAMICS AND INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE: PROPOSITIONS, INSIGHTS, AND EVIDENCE. By Nazli Choucri. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1974, 281 pp. $18.00.

A neglected side of the population problem and its political dynamism is here examined rigorously and comprehensively. Interesting, suggestive, but inevitably not altogether conclusive.

A TIME TO CHOOSE: AMERICA'S ENERGY FUTURE. Final Report by the Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1974, 511 pp. $10.95 (Paper, $3.95).

The Ford Foundation report traces a series of scenarios and concludes that the United States can conserve energy and continue economic growth. It recommends a wide range of actions, but members of an advisory board register many dissents.

MANKIND AT THE TURNING POINT: THE SECOND REPORT TO THE CLUB OF ROME. By Mihajlo Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel. New York: Dutton/Reader's Digest Press, 1974, 210 pp. $12.95.

The quest for an alternative to the deadly endings traced in *Limits to Growth* has produced a more sophisticated computer model. While stressing global interdependence, this one deals separately with regions and permits the testing of a variety of assumptions. The results reported here still point to danger, but make a case for "differentiated growth," international cooperation, and coordinated action across a wide front.

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MEMBERSHIP AND NONMEMBERSHIP IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. By Joseph Gold. Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1974, 683 pp. $10.00.

Not only the definitive work on law and practice, but an interesting commentary that throws light on "what really happened." The author has been with the Fund since 1946 and is now its General Counsel.

INDUSTRIELLE OST-WEST-KOOPERATION: PROBLEME UND PERSPEKTIVEN. By Matthias Schmitt. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1974, 204 pp. DM. 22.

A German businessman with much experience of industrial cooperation with the Communist countries gives an interesting analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, and problems of this spreading practice.

DEVELOPMENT IN RICH AND POOR COUNTRIES: A GENERAL THEORY WITH STATISTICAL ANALYSES. By Thorkil Kristensen. New York: Praeger, 1974, 164 pp. $15.00.

The Danish economist and politician, who formerly headed the OECD, here takes the first step in constructing a general theory of development, good for all sorts of countries. He counts on others to add to this interesting start, which stresses the importance of knowledge, and thus, because its dissemination is now more rapid, is optimistic.

BARGAINING WITHOUT BOUNDARIES: THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND INTERNATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS. Edited by Robert J. Flanagan and Arnold R. Weber. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974, 258 pp. $14.50.

These conference papers and the discussion of them make a good contribution to the slim literature of an exceptionally interesting subject.

ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THE WAY FORWARD. By Sir Alec Cairncross and others. New York: Holmes & Meier (for the Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel), 1975, 245 pp. $25.00.

Five good economists from as many countries—Sir Alec is joined by Herbert Giersch, Alexandre Lamfalussy, Giuseppe Petrilli, and Pierre Uri—have cut through a good deal of stereotyped thinking to find a way of advancing integration by dealing with Europe's economic problems. Their recommendations are numerous, detailed, and reasonable.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN MIXED ECONOMIES. Edited by Wolfgang Friedmann. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974, 410 pp. $17.50.

The study of public corporations grows, though perhaps not as rapidly as their importance. This last book edited by Wolfgang Friedmann—with a major essay by him—interestingly compares the relations of public and private companies in France, Italy, Nigeria, Turkey, Britain, and the United States.

THE PERMANENT WAR ECONOMY: AMERICAN CAPITALISM IN DECLINE. By Seymour Melman. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974, 384 pp. $9.95.

Waste and inefficiency, not stimulus and technological spillover, are the consequences for the American economy of what the engineer-author once called *Pentagon Capitalism.*

THE MULTINATIONAL COMPANY IN EUROPE: SOME KEY PROBLEMS. Edited by Michael Z. Brooke and H. Lee Remmers. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974, 194 pp. $10.00.

European experts concentrate on the European experience and give some comparisons with the more familiar American practices.

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STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRIALISATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By György Cukor. New York: St. Martin, 1974, 265 pp. $16.95.

A pragmatic Hungarian economist with a lively mind writes on all the key issues, and, as a bonus, adds a commentary on industrialization in Eastern Europe.

DAS BANKWESEN IM GRÖSSEREN EUROPA. By Rudolf Regul and Herbert Wolf. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1974, 636 pp. DM. 148.00.

Authoritative pieces on the banking systems and practices of 13 European countries, plus such subjects as Euro-dollars, the European Community's banking dimensions, and the process of bank cooperation.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAN TINBERGEN. Edited by Willy Sellekaerts. White Plains (N.Y.): International Arts and Sciences Press, 1974, 266 pp. $20.00.

A second volume of essays honoring the Dutch Nobel Prize winner in another of his favorite fields. (The first was noted in January 1975.)

The United States

Gaddis Smith

THE COLD WAR BEGINS: SOVIET-AMERICAN CONFLICT OVER EASTERN EUROPE. By Lynn Etheridge Davis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, 427 pp. $15.00.

A sensible description of the conflict between ritualistic American adherence to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and Soviet behavior. The author demonstrates conclusively that the United States was not motivated by dreams of economic control and never contemplated military threats against the Soviet Union because of Eastern Europe.

THE UNITED STATES AND WEST GERMANY, 1945–1973: A STUDY IN ALLIANCE POLITICS. By Roger Morgan. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Harvard Center for International Affairs), 1974, 282 pp. $22.50.

A concise, much-needed survey of a crucial quarter-century in German-American relations, presented as a contribution to a general theory of alliances.

EAST ASIA AND U.S. SECURITY. By Ralph N. Clough. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1975, 248 pp. $8.95 (Paper, $3.50).

The overriding theme of this lucid and constructively critical discussion of recent events is that "the United States has intrinsic interests of the highest order in only one East Asian country: Japan."

S. SH. A.: NAUCHNO-TEKHNICHESKAIA REVOLIUTSIIA I TENDENTSII VNESHNEI POLITIKI. Edited by A. A. Gromyko and V. V. Zhurkin. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1974, 254 pp. Rubles 1.09.

Experts of the Soviet Academy's Institute of the U.S.A. examine the role of scientific-technological factors in U.S. foreign and military policy. This study marks a big step forward in Soviet scholarship on contemporary America.

THE CROUCHING FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY—A FORECAST. By Roger Hilsman. Garden City: Doubleday, 1975, 666 pp. $12.50.

An ambitious, diffuse effort to predict the shape of the world and its implications for American foreign policy. Only the future will reveal whether the effort is successful, although in 1975 some readers will not accept the argument that a principal characteristic of the future will be ever-increasing abundance.

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DETERRENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE. By Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974, 666 pp. $17.50 (Paper, $6.95).

An outstanding set of 11 case studies, ranging chronologically from the Berlin blockade of 1948 to the Cuban missile crisis, set in a comprehensible, non-mathematical framework of theory.

THE WITNESS AND I. By O. Edmund Clubb. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974, 314 pp. $9.95.

Engrossing history and autobiography. The author was a leading member of the group of talented and experienced Foreign Service officers who were driven from government service by the misguided "loyalty" reviews of the early 1950s.

THE PAPERS OF GENERAL LUCIUS D. CLAY: GERMANY 1945–1949. Edited by Jean Edward Smith. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974, 2 v. $35.00.

Seven hundred letters and cables written by General Clay, the military governor of the U.S. zone of occupation in Germany. A very important source for the history of American relations with Germany and the Soviet Union at the onset of the cold war, well-edited by the author of a forthcoming biography of General Clay.

THE JOHN DOE ASSOCIATES: BACKDOOR DIPLOMACY FOR PEACE, 1941. By R. J. C. Butow. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974, 480 pp. $16.95.

A fascinatingly detailed account by a talented historian of the secret efforts of Maryknoll Father James M. Drought and his Japanese contacts to prevent war between the United States and Japan. Based on American and Japanese sources.

TOO PROUD TO FIGHT: WOODROW WILSON'S NEUTRALITY. By Patrick Devlin. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, 731 pp. $19.50.

A subtle inquiry by a distinguished British jurist into President Wilson's personality and the idealistic motives which compelled him to lead the United States into war with Germany in 1917. No new sources, but an imaginative use of what has long been known.

GERALD FORD AND THE FUTURE OF THE PRESIDENCY. By Jerald F. terHorst. New York: Third Press, 1974, 245 pp. $9.95.

A friendly but not adulatory biography by a journalist closely associated with his subject since 1948. One-third of the book deals with events since October 1973, and the author's resignation as the President's press secretary because of the Nixon pardon is described in an epilogue.

THE PALACE GUARD. By Dan Rather and Gary Paul Gates. New York: Harper and Row, 1974, 326 pp. $8.95.

The strength of this book, co-authored by a noted White House television correspondent, is that it does not concentrate on Watergate but instead analyzes the backgrounds, personalities, and policies of the men—especially Messrs. Haldeman and Ehrlichman—who served President Nixon.

UNDERCOVER: MEMOIRS OF AN AMERICAN SECRET AGENT. By E. Howard Hunt. New York: Berkley, 1974, 338 pp. (New York: Putnam, distributor, $8.95).

Lively, self-serving memoirs by the former CIA agent, White House "plumber" and Watergate operative. Hunt is bitterly critical of John Dean, John Mitchell and Richard Nixon.

STATE OF THE NATION 1974. By William Watts and Lloyd A. Free. Washington: Potomac Associates, 1974, 354 pp. (New York: Basic Books, distributor, $10.00; Paper, $4.50).

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The second in a biennial series giving the results of a sophisticated poll of the attitudes of the American people on a wide range of issues relating to the present and future "State of the Nation." The 1974 poll reveals that people are very pessimistic about the nation's future, although generally satisfied with their present personal condition.

THE SEGMENTED SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MEANING OF AMERICA. By Robert H. Wiebe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, 209 pp. $7.95.

For centuries thinkers have advanced all-encompassing explanations of American behavior—God's hand, the frontier, affluence, race. Professor Wiebe offers compartmentalization, characterized by bargaining at home and a dehumanized application of brute power abroad.

AMERICA AFTER NIXON: THE AGE OF THE MULTINATIONALS. By Robert Scheer. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974, 326 pp. $7.95.

A lively, vigorous, but sometimes careless and over-simplified elaboration of the theme that "corporations and their top government allies are at the center of what ails the society."

The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

CONTINENTAL COMMUNITY? INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRATION IN NORTH AMERICA. Edited by W. Andrew Axline and Others. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974, 302 pp. $4.95 (Paper).

Twelve political scientists and economists present their ideas—some vague and opaque, others specific—on Canada's relations with the United States.

THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS. By Gordon Connell-Smith. New York: Halsted Press, 1974, 302 pp. $16.75.

The well-known author of this valuable study of hemispheric interaction concludes that for the United States Latin America is both a special sphere of influence and a low-priority area in foreign policy, whereas the true U.S. interest would be better served by the opposite—less significance for Latin America in theory and more importance in practice.

THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: ESSAYS BY FRANK TANNENBAUM. Edited by Joseph Maier and Richard W. Weatherhead. New York: Knopf, 1974, 246 pp. $10.00.

The editors have brought together 13 published and unpublished essays by one of the most memorable of U.S. Latin Americanists, and have contributed a biographical introduction. Most of the subject matter is political, but economics, race, and topics from the social sciences are also included.

LATIN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE WITH DEPENDENCY AND BEYOND. Edited by Ronald H. Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein. Cambridge: Schenkman, 1974, 781 pp. (New York: Halsted Press, distributor, $24.75; Paper, $9.50).

Lengthy studies of the historical sources and current characteristics of dependency and underdevelopment in Guatemala, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba, with a left-leaning perspective.

FROM CORTÉS TO CASTRO. By Simon Collier. New York: Macmillan, 1974, 429 pp. $12.95.

Breadth of scope is the dominant characteristic of this very competent treatment

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of Cuba, which encompasses geography, history, race, economic and social development, and political themes, culminating in "Latin America, the West, and the World."

DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP IN VENEZUELA, 1945–1958. By GLEN L. KOLB. Hamden (Conn.): Archon Books (in association with Connecticut College), 1974, 228 pp. $10.00.

Acción Democrática and the era of Pérez Jiménez are examined as the background of a prognosis of Venezuela's political future that appears to blend equal measures of pessimism and optimism.

ARGENTINA AND THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY: CONFLICT AMONG POLITICAL ELITES, 1904–1955. By PETER H. SMITH. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974, 215 pp. $12.50.

The riddle of Argentina is approached through a novel quantitative methodology applied to voting records in the Chamber of Deputies, in an effort to probe the political transformations of this century. The statistical treatment will appeal to specialists.

FOUNDATIONS OF BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH. By DONALD E. SYVRUD. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press/Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1974, 295 pp. $12.00. (Paper, $4.95).

Readers with a more than casual interest in economics will find much detailed material here, including data concerning indexing. The author, a former U.S. Treasury representative, takes a favorable view of Brazil's recent economic policies.

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION IN CHILE. By PETER S. CLEAVES. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, 352 pp. $16.75.

Specialists in organizational theory as applied to governmental operations in third-world nations will do well to consult this examination of economic planning and administration, housing, budgeting, agriculture, and related fields, under Frei and Allende.

STRUGGLE IN THE ANDES: PEASANT POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN PERU. By HOWARD HANDELMAN. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975, 303 pp. $10.00.

A thorough analysis of rural unrest, peasant land movements, and community political activity, with interesting references to regional differences created by variations in the extent of social and economic modernization. There is extensive statistical material and a copious bibliography.

EXPROPRIATION POLITICS. By JESSICA PERNITZ EINHORN. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1974, 148 pp. $13.50.

A well-researched analysis of the IPC case in Peru and President Nixon's January 1972 policy statement on expropriation without compensation, in terms of the bureaucratic political factors that were involved.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

DEUTSCHLAND UND DER KALTE KRIEG. By ERNST NOLTE. Munich: Piper, 1974, 755 pp. DM. 64.

The author of an acclaimed and original work on European fascism has written a history of the cold war; its broad transatlantic focus, its philosophical-intellectual penetration, and its mastery of the literature make this a major work that future writers on this controversial subject will have to reckon with.

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ÜBER DEN TAG HINAUS—EINE ZWISCHENBILANZ. By Willy Brandt. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1974, 552 pp. DM. 34.

A book of general reflections, interspersed with notes taken during his chancellorship, which illustrates Brandt's moral and humane outlook on politics; at the center is his vision of the good society rather than an account of his actual leadership. An unusual record of an unusual politician.

WILLY BRANDT: PORTRAIT OF A STATESMAN. By Terence Prittie. New York: Schocken Books, 1974, 356 pp. $10.50.

A conventional summary, by a well-known British journalist.

THE HUNDRED DAYS TO HITLER. By Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel. New York: St. Martin, 1974, 245 pp. $8.95.

A seasoned team of writers on Nazism presents a brief account, based on well-known sources.

LE IIIe REICH ET LA RÉORGANISATION ÉCONOMIQUE DE L'EUROPE, 1940–1942: ORIGINES ET PROJETS. By Jean Freymond. Leiden: Sijthoff (for the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, Geneva), 1974, 302 pp. Gldrs. 59.00.

A scholarly survey of Germany's effort to establish a new economic order in Europe, seen against the background of earlier German plans for a European bloc under its auspices.

I GIVE YOU MY WORD. By Françoise Giroud. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974, 275 pp. $8.95.

Autobiographical reflections by the Secretary of State for the Condition of Women in Giscard's cabinet. A welter of opinions and impressions on a variety of subjects—from eroticism to life in New York to Erich von Stroheim and, above all, French politics—by a woman of several careers and obvious energy. Good reading.

THE FRENCH AGAINST THE FRENCH: COLLABORATION AND RESISTANCE. By Milton Dank. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1974, 365 pp. $12.50.

A journalistic account, narrowly researched, of an endlessly fascinating and grim story.

THE POLITICS OF TORCH: THE ALLIED LANDINGS AND THE ALGIERS *PUTSCH*, 1942. By Arthur Layton Funk. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1974, 322 pp. $11.00.

A study of the political negotiations that accompanied the Allied landing in North Africa, with the controversial deal with Darlan fully examined.

RAPALLO: NAISSANCE D'UN MYTHE. LA POLITIQUE DE LA PEUR DANS LA FRANCE DU BLOC NATIONAL. By Renata Bournazel. Paris: Colin/Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1974, 258 pp. Fr. 84.

A broadly gauged study, based on archival work in France, Germany, and Britain, of all the ramifications of the famous German-Soviet agreement of 1922, with particular attention to the discrepancy between actual events and how they were perceived within the framework of national politics.

WINSTON CHURCHILL. By Henry Pelling. New York: Dutton, 1974, 724 pp. $12.95.

The best one-volume biography to date, by an English historian who combines thorough knowledge of man, period, and sources with intelligence, forthrightness, and a lucid, unassuming style. A pleasure to read and ponder.

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WHO KILLED THE BRITISH EMPIRE? AN INQUEST. By George Woodcock. New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Company, 1974, 356 pp. $10.00.

A Canadian writer tries to explain the end of Britain's "patrician autocracy." A useful and suggestive survey.

THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY. By Roy E. Jones. New York: Longman, 1974, 191 pp. $10.50.

An attempt to analyze the changing context of British foreign policy: intelligent, suggestive, if a bit ponderous.

TRADITIONALISM, CONSERVATISM AND BRITISH POLITICAL CULTURE. By Bob Jessop. London: Allen & Unwin, 1974, 287 pp. £4.65.

A British sociologist criticizes the hitherto adduced reasons for political stability and working-class conservatism in Britain—such as civility and deference—and suggests different explanations for political behavior, which are related to class and social experience. For a slim volume on a lively subject, it is rather full of models and abstruse concepts.

THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT IN SPAIN, 1914–1923. By Gerald H. Meaker. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974, 562 pp. $18.95.

The Spanish working classes were passionate enthusiasts of the Bolshevik Revolution, but the Spanish Communist Party of the early 1920s was a striking failure. This excellent study, by an American historian, tries to explain the paradox by setting it in the context of prewar divisions between anarchism and Marxism. A major and literate work.

THE "RED YEARS": EUROPEAN SOCIALISM VERSUS BOLSHEVISM, 1919–1921. By Albert S. Lindemann. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, 349 pp. $15.75.

A remarkably dispassionate, yet fascinating, study of the postwar years when Bolshevism and Socialism vied with each other for control of the masses—assumed to be revolutionary in character. The book studies the interplay of German, French, and Italian socialists with Russian Bolsheviks and focuses in particular on the Second Congress of the Comintern. An absorbing account of an important moment in European history.

AUSLÄNDERBESCHÄFTIGUNG UND INTERNATIONALE POLITIK: ZUR ANALYSE TRANSNATIONALER SOZIALPROZESSE. Edited by Reinhard Lohrmann and Klaus Manfrass. Munich: Oldenbourg (for the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik), 1974, 395 pp. DM. 55.

A comprehensive survey, by several hands, of all aspects of the use of foreign labor in Europe, particularly in Germany where in 1972 two and a half million foreigners had found jobs. By discussing the effects of foreign labor on the countries of origin as well as on the host nations, and on the role of international bodies, the book will be useful even at a time of decreasing use of foreign labor.

THE BITTER YEARS: THE INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF DENMARK AND NORWAY, APRIL 1940–MAY 1945. By Richard Petrow. New York: Morrow, 1974, 403 pp. $10.95.

A good journalistic account of some aspects of the Scandinavian experience. The author has supplemented printed sources with interviews, and corrects earlier impressions. The absence of footnotes is a serious drawback.

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The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

THE SEALED TRAIN. By Michael Pearson. New York: Putnam, 1975, 320 pp. $8.95.

A reexamination of Lenin's complicity with the Germans in returning to Russia in 1917 and of the events leading up to the October Revolution. It reads like fiction, and some of it may be, but the author has consulted leading authorities, conducted research on his own, and unearthed new evidence.

POLITICAL UNDERCURRENTS IN SOVIET ECONOMIC DEBATE: FROM BUKHARIN TO THE MODERN REFORMERS. By Moshe Lewin. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, 373 pp. $16.50.

This is Kremlinology at a high level, an attempt to relate current economic thought and debate in the U.S.S.R. to the views and controversies of the earlier periods of NEP, Stalinist command economy and Bukharinist heresy, and post-Stalin experimentation. The author then tackles, cautiously, the whole question of party, state, and economy, and the possibility of some new coalition of political forces.

STALIN UND HITLER: DIE SOWJETRUSSISCHE AUSSENPOLITIK, 1930–1941. By Sven Allard. Berne: Francke, 1974, 314 pp. Swiss Fr. 54.

This study by a distinguished diplomat and historian (an enlarged edition of the Swedish original published in 1970) is arresting both for its main argument that Stalin consistently sought an understanding with Hitler from 1933 onward and for the many facts and interpretations drawn from recently available documents and from the author's own rich experience.

THE LAST SECRET: THE DELIVERY TO STALIN OF OVER TWO MILLION RUSSIANS BY BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES. By Nicholas Bethell. New York: Basic Books, 1974, 224 pp. $8.95.

For the first time, the full horror story of the forcible repatriation of Soviet nationals by the Western Allies after World War II is truthfully and dramatically told. Lord Bethell's well-researched book and Hugh Trevor-Roper's thoughtful introduction both point up the political and moral dilemmas facing the political leaders who made the fateful decisions and the military men who had to carry them out.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD INDIA: IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY. By Robert H. Donaldson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974, 338 pp. $15.00.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH. By J. P. Jain. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1974, 258 pp. Rs. 50.00.

These two monographs, by an American and an Indian scholar respectively, are both overlapping and complementary. The first is more meticulous, the second more discursive, and both find Soviet policy in South Asia to be based more on global and regional great-power interests than on any plan or prospect for Communist rule. It also comes through clearly how far concern with China, rather than America, underlies both Soviet and Indian policy.

RUSSIA AND BLACK AFRICA BEFORE WORLD WAR II. By Edward Thomas Wilson. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1974, 397 pp. $26.00.

A thorough job of research brings to life a little-known side of Russian and Soviet foreign policy, from nineteenth-century imperial ventures in the Red Sea area to the interplay of Comintern tactics and African radicalism in the 1930s.

TO DEFEND THESE RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOVIET UNION. By Valery Chalidze. New York: Random House, 1974, 340 pp. $10.00.

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The power of this work comes from its documented description of the struggle for human rights in which the author himself was active, supplementing his discussion of the legal system, censorship, and denial of civil and minority rights. Far more than another "I chose freedom" book.

HOW COMMUNIST STATES CHANGE THEIR RULERS. By Myron Rush. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974, 346 pp. $15.00.

A comparative study exemplary in the boldness of its approach and in the cautious realism of the "findings and reflections." In the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe the established positions of the Party apparatus and of its senior secretary have created something like an institutional pattern which conditions, if it does not determine, the outcome of succession crises, while in the states where the founder-hero is still in charge (e.g., China and Yugoslavia) the succession cannot be arranged in advance and great uncertainties lie ahead.

MEMOIRS. By József Cardinal Mindszenty. New York: Macmillan, 1974, 341 pp. $10.00.

A significant historical document, testimony to a life out of tune with the times but stubbornly faithful to God's law and Hungary's rights as the Cardinal himself saw them. The book gives details on hitherto imperfectly known episodes, including his torture before trial in 1949 and his departure from Hungary under the combined pressure of the Communist regime in Budapest, the Vatican, and the United States, in 1971.

EAST CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS. By Joseph Rothschild. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974, 420 pp. $14.95 (Paper, $7.95).

With the benefit of a low-key approach, and the results of recent research by many scholars inside and outside the region, this history does a creditable job of selecting, organizing, and interpreting the tangled affairs of a dozen countries. As a reliable guide, it supersedes in most respects the earlier surveys of Hugh Seton-Watson and of Macartney and Palmer.

NONALIGNMENT AND SOCIALISM: YUGOSLAV FOREIGN POLICY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE. By Lars Nord. Uppsala: Political Science Association, 1974, 306 pp. (Stockholm: Rabén and Sjögren, distributors).

A well-reasoned study—of a kind Yugoslav scholars have not done—showing how in concrete cases the pursuit of Yugoslav security interests and socialist goals does or does not fit in with the principle of nonalignment.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND STRATIFICATION IN EASTERN EUROPE. By Alexander Matejko. New York: Praeger, 1974, 272 pp. $18.50.

Basically this book is about Polish society, with passing reference to other East European countries and to the common pattern of Soviet-style communism. The author is one of the talented sociologists who left Poland in 1968.

RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING IN EASTERN EUROPE. By Burton Paulu. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974, 592 pp. $22.95.

A ponderous but most informative background book covering policy and practice in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia.

The Middle East and North Africa

John C. Campbell

THE CANAL WAR: FOUR-POWER CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Lawrence L. Whetten. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974, 520 pp. $17.50.

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An intensive investigation of the military, political, and diplomatic interaction of the United States, the Soviet Union, Egypt, and Israel from the 1967 war to the aftermath of the war of 1973. No one can write the full story at this stage, but Whetten has cast a wide net and used all the available published material. An expert on military strategy and hardware, he gives us an extra dividend in the form of an essay on naval parity in the Mediterranean.

THE ELECTRONIC WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1968–70. By Edgar O'Ballance. Hamden (Conn.): Archon Books, 1974, 148 pp. $8.00.

The author pictures this first electronic conflict in history as a proxy war, in which the superpowers were battle-testing their weapons, and offers a lively and technically detailed account of the phase of Israeli-Egyptian fighting dominated by advanced aircraft and missiles which ended with the ceasefire of August 1970.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE PALESTINIAN-ARAB NATIONAL MOVEMENT, 1918–1929. By Y. Porath. London: Frank Cass, 1974, 406 pp. (Portland, Ore.: International Scholarly Book Services, distributor, $18.00).

An Israeli scholar's monograph on the beginnings of Arab-Palestinian nationalism, describing in detail its leaders, ideology, factions, activities, relations with the British —and its failures. Good treatment of the Palestinians' changing relations with the Syrians and differing attitudes on Zionism and the Jewish presence.

ARAB STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE. By Malumud Ata Alla. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974, 271 pp. (Chicago: Imported Publications, distributor).

A Marxist interpretation of recent political and economic developments across the Arab world, with special emphasis on the aid given the "progressive countries" of the area by the Soviet Union. Originally published in Russian.

THE MIDDLE EAST IN TRANSITION: A STUDY OF JORDAN'S FOREIGN POLICY. By Mohammad Ibrahim Faddah. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1974, 339 pp. $13.95.

A broad, reasonably objective, but poorly edited survey of Jordan's involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as its relations with its Arab neighbors and the Western powers. Essentially a work of compilation and rearrangement of published material, its wide use of Arab sources adds some items and interpretations of particular interest.

CRISIS DECISION-MAKING: ISRAEL'S EXPERIENCE IN 1967 AND 1973. By Abraham R. Wagner. New York: Praeger, 1974, 186 pp. $15.00.

Analysis, complete with tables and equations, of the factors—psychology, environment, personalities, events, perceptions, alternatives—that entered into the decision-making process related to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, with a brief final chapter on the parallel process in 1973. In the end, it comes down to "rational choice."

MODERN TURKEY. By Geoffrey Lewis. New York: Praeger, 1974, 255 pp. $11.50.

A minor classic (in its fourth edition) which gives a brief but authoritative roundup of Turkish history and politics and carries the story through 1973.

EXPORTING WORKERS: THE TURKISH CASE. By Suzanne Paine. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974, 227 pp. $13.95 (Paper, $6.95).

An in-depth study of the Turkish experience in exporting labor to Western Europe, mainly the effects on the Turkish economy. The author concludes that its results have not all been as favorable as have commonly been presented.

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South and Southeast Asia

Lewis C. Austin

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF BANGLADESH WITHIN A SOCIALIST FRAMEWORK. Edited by E. A. G. Robinson and Keith Griffin. New York: Halsted Press (for the International Economic Association), 1974, 330 pp. $29.75.

Bangladesh, as the editors point out, comes nearer to one's nightmares of Malthusia than almost any other country in the world. These papers, from a star-studded international group of economists convened to do some emergency thinking on a situation of endemic crisis, are stimulating and saddening: this science struggles not to be dismal, but it is an uphill battle.

SOUTH-EAST ASIA FROM COLONIALISM TO INDEPENDENCE. By Jan Pluvier. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974, 571 pp. $31.50.

SOUTHEAST ASIA: A POLITICAL INTRODUCTION. By Richard Butwell. New York: Praeger, 1975, 242 pp. $10.00 (Paper, $4.95).

Two books that offer an overview of Southeast Asian political history since 1940. Historian Pluvier's big book treats the period before the attainment of independence with a careful and detailed concern for a multiplicity of facts; political scientist Butwell's little one covers the post-independence period with less detail and more value-judgment. Each is good of its kind; the colonial fact is the central theme of both.

SOUTHEAST ASIA UNDER THE NEW BALANCE OF POWER. Edited by Sudershan Chawla, Melvin Gurtov and Alain-Gerard Marsot. New York: Praeger, 1974, 196 pp. $15.00 (Paper, $4.95).

This penetrating symposium on prospects for Indochinese survival in the brave new world of multipolar balancing concludes, *inter alia,* that although the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are presently dominant, Chinese prospects for hegemony are better in the long run; that Japan's future in the area lies in economic rather than political predominance, possible in the framework of a Sino-Japanese détente; that Southeast Asia can avoid being a battleground only to the degree that it attains unification, the prospects for which are unpromising.

POLITICS AND POWER IN CAMBODIA: THE SIHANOUK YEARS. By Milton Osborne. New York: Longman, 1974, 120 pp. $6.50 (Paper, $3.50).

A keen-eyed and fair-minded view of Sihanouk—a man whose energy and ability were unfortunately not matched by the vision to find a way of institutionalizing a workable politics for his nation. Osborne suggests that the question of CIA involvement in the coup that overthrew Sihanouk is secondary. Deep-rooted internal weaknesses and failures made an end to his increasingly inadequate rule inevitable.

TRIAL IN THAILAND. By George K. Tanham. New York: Crane, Russak, 1974, 175 pp. $10.50.

The author was Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency in the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, 1968–70. His instructive memoir points to some serious problems in the repression of revolution: e.g., economic "development" can increase discontent; arming the populace can give them weapons against you; the popular view of the insurgents tends to be different from the government view; and local rulers do not relish oversolicitous foreign direction.

THE MYSTICAL WORLD OF INDONESIA: CULTURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CONFLICT. By Allen M. Sievers. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, 425 pp. $14.00.

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In this panorama of Indonesian society, an economist who doesn't mind using non-quantifiable variables argues that only fundamental changes in the traditional value system can make possible either political democracy or economic welfare in the abysmally impoverished peasant villages. The unorthodox thesis is presented subtly and readably.

THE RISING MOON: POLITICAL CHANGE IN SARAWAK. By Michael B. Leigh. Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1974, 232 pp. (Portland, Ore.: International Scholarly Book Services, distributor, $14.00; paper, $12.25).

A data-packed piece of research, whose tables, footnotes, and appendices add up to a disturbing prognosis and indictment of Malaysian policy. To wit, in a multiracial society (45 percent Dayak natives, 30 percent Chinese, 25 percent Malay/Muslim) avoidance of bitter ethnic strife depends on the formation of parties with a Sarawak identity. But such parties threaten the central government, and thus central control is extended, tragically, only at the cost of communal rivalry.

U NU: SATURDAY'S SON. By U Nu. Edited by U Kyaw Win. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975, 358 pp. $15.00.

Nationalist leader, political exile, erstwhile sensualist and Buddhist mystic, the former Prime Minister of Burma is not a typical politician. His autobiography, equally atypical, is frank and moving.

East Asia and the Pacific

Lewis C. Austin

THE WORLD AND CHINA, 1922–1972. By John Gittings. New York: Harper and Row, 1974, 303 pp. $11.00.

Gittings, China correspondent of the Manchester *Guardian*, has written an intensely lucid analysis of the long-term continuities in Chinese foreign policy. His principal theses: when nationalism and socialism conflict, national goals win out; when domestic and foreign constraints conflict, foreign predominate; when Mao and other leaders debate, Mao is victorious.

POSTSCRIPT WITH A CHINESE ACCENT: MEMOIRS AND DIARIES, 1972–1973. By C. L. Sulzberger. New York: Macmillan, 1974, 401 pp. $10.00.

Like its predecessors, this book is a record of conversations with the great and observations of the humble: the minutiae, from fascinating to platitudinous, of a dedicated note-taker. While the author's visit to China in late 1973 provides a highlight and some continuity, the coverage is worldwide.

MAOISM IN ACTION: THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. By C. L. Chiou. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press/New York: Crane, Russak, 1974, 176 pp. $10.50.

A clear and concise outline-history detailing the events of the last decade in China. It contains contrasting theories of their interpretation and the ideologies that inspire the theories, and offers a view of events that sees Mao as neither inspired ideological hero nor power-hungry politician, but something in between.

LAND REFORM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA: A STUDY OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCE. By Victor D. Lippit. White Plains (N.Y.): International Arts and Sciences Press, 1974, 183 pp. $15.00.

Economic development always depends on diverting funds from consumption to investment. This understated but important work argues that land reform as practiced in China in the early 1950s offered a useful tool to accomplish such a saving, by shifting

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the agricultural surplus away from rent payments to landlords who consumed and into tax payments to a state which invested. The statistical data are carefully selected and the mathematics is ingenious.

CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: PEKING'S RELATIONS WITH REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS. By Jay Taylor. New York: Praeger, 1974, 384 pp. $22.50.

A careful recapitulation of published data on Chinese policy in Southeast Asia in the 1960s, which is relatively long on facts and short on analysis. From the Deputy Chief of the Political Section in the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong.

THE CHINESE RED ARMY: CAMPAIGNS AND POLITICS SINCE 1949. By Gerard H. Corr. New York: Schocken Books, 1974, 175 pp. $8.95.

This veteran journalist's book, a popular account based on non-Chinese sources, is highly readable and its conclusions persuasively presented.

UNITED STATES-JAPANESE RELATIONS: THE 1970's. Edited by Priscilla Clapp and Morton H. Halperin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974, 234 pp. $7.95.

A notably competent clutch of scholars and administrators of both nations have produced a set of papers on a complex and changing relationship which deserves, for the most part, to be read with care by those concerned.

PALACE AND POLITICS IN PREWAR JAPAN. By David Anson Titus. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974, 360 pp. $20.00.

This case study in the political style of "privatized" decision-making is a superlative analysis of the role of the Imperial Household in the labyrinthine Japanese politics of the 1930s, and provides vivid insights into a pattern of government which worked by cabal, clique, and personal contact.

ASSIGNMENT: TOKYO. AN AMBASSADOR'S JOURNAL. By Armin H. Meyer. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974, 396 pp. $10.95.

The years 1969–72 were turbulent and consequential for Japanese-American relations, and the American Embassy in Tokyo was a hot seat for career diplomat Meyer. His accomplishments and disappointments are recorded with a diplomatic tact which occasionally (and unfortunately) blunts or obscures the force of his comments.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

NEO-COLONIALISM IN WEST AFRICA. By Samir Amin. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975, 298 pp. $11.95.

UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN KENYA. By Colin Leys. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, 284 pp. $10.50.

Both studies present convincing evidence to support the theory that dependence of poor, raw-materials exporting countries on capitalist markets and investment will ultimately distort their economic development. Amin surveys the economies of eight West African states, whose development, he says, has virtually halted, because of the area's colonial fragmentation. In an intensive exposition on Kenya, Leys demonstrates the links between foreign investment and the consolidation of an indigenous nonproductive and government-protected bourgeoisie. In his view, the growing inequities and severe restrictions on popular participation should result in serious upheavals in "stable Kenya" after Kenyatta's passing.

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URBANIZATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS: AN ESSAY ON MOVEMENT AND CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA. By Kenneth Little. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974, 153 pp. $10.00.
POWER AND INDEPENDENCE: URBAN AFRICANS' PERCEPTION OF SOCIAL INEQUALITY. By P. C. Lloyd. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974, 248 pp. $18.75.

Each of these works is interesting as much for what it reveals about the intersection of African and Western culture as for its data on urban Africa. Little's fluent essay provides an overview of African adaptations to capitalism and urban life, while Lloyd presents the results of an intensive investigation of how Nigerian Yorubas view opportunities for economic achievement—their relatively benign reaction toward growing economic stratification is, he feels, showing signs of erosion.

URBAN POLITICS IN NIGERIA: A STUDY OF PORT HARCOURT. By Howard Wolpe. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, 314 pp. $16.75.
URBANIZATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE: THE POLITICS OF LAGOS, 1917–1967. By Pauline H. Baker. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, 384 pp. $18.50.

Wolpe's detailed analysis of the political organization of Port Harcourt often but not always illuminates his thesis—that communal conflicts will continue to be an important channel for the economic competition concomitant upon "modernization." Baker's intelligent and readable account of the evolution of Nigeria's capital also bears out this idea about communalism.

PLAN IMPLEMENTATION IN NIGERIA: 1962–1966. By Edwin Dean. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974, 294 pp. $13.25.

Admirably eschewing professional jargon, this useful book explains the shortfalls in the implementation of the Nigerian National Development Plan, particularly in terms of a failure to proportion the plan to the strengths and weaknesses of executive capability in various areas. The author notes, however, that many of the plan's general economic goals were achieved as a result of the performance of the private sector.

THE LURE OF AFRICA: AMERICAN INTERESTS IN TROPICAL AFRICA, 1919–1939. By Edward H. McKinley. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974, 293 pp. $12.95.

This entertainingly written account of American involvement in Africa at the height of the colonial period documents the enormity of our ignorance as well as the paucity of our economic interest in that continent.

ZAMBIA: SECURITY AND CONFLICT. By Jan Pettman. New York: St. Martin, 1974, 284 pp. $15.95.

An intelligent and comprehensive survey of Zambia's political and economic development since independence, somewhat marred by what hindsight reveals to be an exaggerated view of the external—southern African—threats to the nation's security.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND RHODESIA: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Ralph Zacklin. New York: Praeger, 1974, 188 pp. $17.50.

Overtaken to some degree by recent events in Rhodesia, this study still offers a succinct summary description of the workings of U.N. sanctions machinery in the case.

AFRIKANER POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1934–1948. By Newell M. Stultz. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, 200 pp. $8.00.

An analysis of the failure of the policy of "conciliation" between English and Afrikaners and the consolidation of power by the Nationalists after their unwilling participation in World War II.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

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Errata: January 1975 issue of *Foreign Affairs,* p. 319, fn. 3, for "1967" read "1976"; p. 331, l. 33, "All this means . . . ," should follow quoted material.

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